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This thesis explores the corporate governance model in state-held listed companies 
in China. The following research questions are addressed: (1) What is the current 
corporate governance model of state-held listed companies in China? (2) Are state-held 
listed companies well governed under the current corporate governance model? (3) If the 
answer to the second research question is negative, then is there any other model under 
which state-held listed companies may be well governed?  
The “state-controlled” model that directs the corporate governance of state-held 
listed companies in China has common elements with the bank-based model, under 
which banks play a predominant role in corporate financing in a weak securities market. 
It also contains the employee participation element of the stakeholder model, but the 
trade unions in China are still strictly controlled by the government. The state-controlled 
model relates to the issue of how the state assets of China were and are managed, which 
is at the very “intersection” of political control and economic reform. It is the state-
controlled model that has led to China’s unique earmarks of two-tier share market and 
two-tier board structure. 
This thesis argues that state-held listed companies in China are not well-governed 
under the state-controlled model, because it fails to protect minority shareholders and the 
two-tier board structure does not perform efficiently due to poor law enforcement arising 
from corruption in China. The state-controlled listed companies would be better governed 
under a “law-controlled model” rather than a “state-controlled model.” This new model 
would improve the corporate governance of state-held listed companies by virtue of 
implementing the rule of law in China (or at least the “thin” rule of law in transition from 
“rule by law”). Failing that, the practical issues arising from “state-controlled model” 
could be addressed by (i) reforming the laws; and (ii) enforcing the laws (including 
improving the anti-corruption supervisory regime and effecting judicial independence).  
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Summary of Amendments 
 
To be tasked with “major amendment” is a humbling experience. Approved by 
Faculty of Law, I have read through the feedback from the three examiners and have 
found their comments to be quite insightful in guiding the re-organization of my thesis 
and in making the necessary amendments. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to 
the examiners for the effort they gave put into my review, and I hope my amended thesis 
will match their expectations.  
Corporate governance is a highly topical issue these days. The thesis has been re-
drafted following extensive consultation with government officials, senior executives of 
state-owned enterprises and law practitioners in China.  On the one hand, I intended to 
provide a series of thoughtful observations based on a broad range of literature; on the 
other hand, because of the enormity of the subjects involved, it is unrealistic to attempt 
significantly more than a thesis-length treatment systematically and vigorously exploring 
the practice of state-held listed companies from the perspective of corporate governance.  
This revised thesis has undergone some major changes. The research topic has been 
explicitly identified to be the state-held listed companies, the organization of the thesis 
has been adjusted and made more coherent and the arguments have been clearly tied-in 
with each other between chapters. Furthermore, an increasing number of statutes and 
regulations are supplemented in the amendments, which are set out at the Appendix 
hereto this summary.  
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Making these amendments is, admittedly, an uphill task, one which has taken up 
quite a bit of my time this past year. I was fortunate to have the guidance of my 
supervisor for this time. Currently, I lead the legal team of a global oil and gas company, 
one which is a state-held listed company headquartered in Beijing. I have tried my best to 
contribute my experience and knowledge in managing the enormous and varied workload 
of a regional legal role to this research in my own way. 
I will summarize the amendments chapter-by-chapter, in comparison with the 
previously-submitted first edition (referred to as “first version”): 
 
“Corporate Governance Model of State-Held Listed Companies in China” 
 
The title of the revised edition specifies the issue of corporate governance of state-held 
listed companies in the context of China, on which the research questions and arguments 
of this thesis are based. The key words are “corporate governance model”, “state-held 
listed companies” and “China”. 
 
 




1. The legal framework (section 1.1.2/A) is re-drafted based on Chapter III of the 
first version; 
 
2. Two main types of public listed companies in China (section 1.1.2/B) are re-
drafted based on Chapter II of the first version; 
 
3. Research perspective is identified in section 1.2 comprising: 1.2.1 research 
questions and arguments and 1.2.2 research scope. Three research questions are 
addressed: (1) What is the current corporate governance model of state-held listed 
companies in China (discussed in Chapters II, III, IV and V)?; (2) Are state-held listed 
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companies well governed under the current corporate governance model (elaborated in 
Chapters IV, V and VI)?; (3) If the answer to the second research question is negative, 
then is there any other model under which state-held listed companies may be well 




1. Research methodology (section 1.3.2), feasible recommendations (section 1.3.3), 
and organization and framework of thesis (section 1.4) are revised accordingly; 
 
2. The terminology of “public listed company”, “state-held listed company”, “non-
tradable shares” and “controlling shareholder” are re-defined in order to fix the problem 
of the language being too “loose”; 
  
3. The figures in Table 1.4 “Overview of the Public Listed Companies in China” 




1. The section of literature review, most of which has been redistributed to other relevant 
sections of the amended thesis; 
 
2. The survey results on East Asian Corporations by Claressens, Djankov & Lang have 
been removed from Table 1.3 as it appeared in Table 2.4 of Chapter II in the first version. 
 
 




1. This Chapter is re-drafted and developed from Chapter V of the first version. It 
sets the scene by sketching the state-controlled model into its elements reflected in the 
bank-based model and stakeholder model respectively; 
 
2. The stakeholder model is re-drafted based on the section of stakeholder in Chapter 
IV of the first edition. 
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This is a brand-new chapter, which is re-drafted and developed from chapters III and V of 
the first version. It gives an overview of how the state-controlled model of state-held 
companies in China is underpinned by both political control and SOE’s reform. In 








1. Two types of ownership structures (section 4.1.1) are re-drafted based on Chapter 
II of the first version; 
 
2. Two-tier shareholding structure (section 4.1.2) is re-drafted based on Chapter II of 
the first version; 
 
3. The Reform of Sales of Non-Tradable Shares of Public Listed Companies (section 
4.2) is re-drafted based on Chapter II of the first version;  
 
4. Meanwhile, the statistics of post-reform (section 4.2.3) have been updated; 
 
5. The final section of practical issues arising out of the state-controlled ownership 
under the two-tier shareholding structure (section 4.4) is a brand-new section, in which 
the cumulative voting system has been analyzed in detail (section 4.4.3); 
 
6. This Chapter also offers insights as to the derivative actions by exploring both 
legislation and judicial application (section 4.4.4). In particular, it analyzes how the 
derivative actions come to be accepted by all the people’s courts in China; 
 
7. The statistics from the Chinese law database of “LawinfoChina” 
<http://www.lawinfochina.com> are used to explain the limited number of derivative 
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The empirical study (section 4.4.1) and controlling shareholders’ tunneling behaviors 
(section 4.4.2) are re-drafted. 
 
 




This Chapter is re-drafted and developed from the section of “board of directors” in 




1. The internal control (section 5.1.2) is discussed in far greater detail; 
 
2. The director’s duties in the context of China are analyzed by exploring both 
legislation and judicial application in section 5.1.3/B(C);  
 
3. The statistics from the Chinese law database of “LawinfoChina” are used to 
explain the loyalty duty and duty of diligence; 
 
4. The independent director (section 5.2.1) and supervisory board (section 5.2.2) are 
re-organized to be contrasted with the United States and Germany in historical 
development respectively; 
 
5. The similarities and differences of supervisors, supervisory boards and 
codetermination in Germany and China are re-organized and highlighted in the section 
5.2.2; 
 
6. The final section of practical issues arising out of the state-controlled ownership 
under the two-tier boards (section 5.3) is a brand-new section. The author tries to argue 
that the state-held listed companies in China are not well governed under the two-tier 
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shareholding structure where the state is the controlling shareholder because of the 
following two issues: 1. The supervisory board is not needed with the presence of 
independent directors; 2. The independent directors could not perform their third role in 
China – protecting minorities. 
 
 




This Chapter is a brand-new chapter, and is re-drafted and developed from chapters III, V 
and VI of the first version. 
 
This chapter is organized and structured by exploring the following issues based on the 
research of Chapters IV and V: 6.1 Are state-held listed companies in China well 
governed under the state-controlled model? 6.2 If not, why the corporate governance of 
state-held listed companies in China fails to work effectively under the state-controlled 
model? 6.3 State-held listed companies could be well governed in other jurisdictions? 6.4 
How corporate governance in state-held listed companies might work? I draw 
conclusions to these issues at the end of the chapter. 
 
In this Chapter, the author also examines the challenges in relation to non-enforcement, 
corruption, political control and judicial non-independence. 
 
 




1. The positive roles that Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) play in the corporate governance of China are moved from Chapter VI 




1. The title of this Chapter has been amended to “Final reflections” where it was 
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
―Corporate governance is a permanent topic in the capital market and is a 
long-term task of the China‘s capital market.‖  
 
Mr. Shang Fulin, Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission 
 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 World-wide overview 
Corporate governance now plays an increasingly important role in explaining 
economic behavior and performance, reflecting developments in international 
investment, national trade and corporate operations.
1
 Becht et al. (2002) identify six 
reasons why corporate governance has become a prominent topic in the past few 
decades: ―(i) world-wide wave of privatization; (ii) pension fund reform and the 
growth of private economic savings; (iii) takeover wave; (iv) deregulation and 
integration of capital markets; (v) the late 1990s Asian financial crisis; (vi) a series of 
corporate scandals in the USA, Europe, and Asia.‖2  
In recent decades, numerous academic scholars, domestic corporate governance 
codes, and international organizations have given their own interpretations of 
corporate governance, and extensive research on corporate governance has been 
                                                        
1 
The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) report ―Saints and Sinners – Who‘s 
Got Religion?‖ (2001) finds that there is a close relationship between corporate 
governance and financial ratios (in terms of the share price performance of large 
stocks). Available at: www.webb-site.com/articles/Saints&Sinners.pdf. 
2
 Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, ―Corporate Governance and Control‖ 
(October 2002) ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, at 10. 
2 
 





A. Legal framework 
In China, there are two main types of corporate law: statutes and regulations. A 
series of statutes (or several sections of the statutes) coupled with regulations 
constitute the complete legal framework. Statutes are promulgated by the legislatures, 
which include the National People‘s Congress and local People‘s congresses. 
Regulations are issued by the Central Government, the State Council, or its Ministries 
(such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission or the Ministry of Commerce), 
                                                        
3 
UK Cadbury Report (1992) states that: ―Corporate governance is the system or 
process by which companies are directed and controlled.‖ See Cadbury, A. Report of 
the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London, 1992). 
Shleifer & Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as ―an institutional 
arrangement‖ for value maximization by which ―suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a proper return on their investment‖. See Shleifer, Andrei 
& Vishny, Rober, ―A Survey of Corporate Governance‖ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 
737. The Basel Committee Report on Corporate Governance (1999) suggests a 
multi-actor approach, through which ―boards of directors and senior management‖ as 
the main responsibility for corporate governance and promote it ―for governments 
through laws and regulations, for securities regulators and stock exchanges through 
disclosure and listing requirements, and for accounting professionals through audit 
standards on communications to boards of director and senior management and 
through publication of sound practices‖. See Kern Alexander, Rahul Dhumale & John 
Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: the International Regulation of 
Systematic Risk (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 241. For China‘s contemporary 
academia, some noted economists have identified corporate governance in their 
writings. Wu Jinglian (1994) asserts that corporate governance is an ―organizational 
structure‖, consisting of the owner, board of directors and senior managers. ―A check 
and balance relationship is formed within that structure, in which the owner entrusts 
his capital to the board. The board is the highest level of decision-making of the 
company‖. See Wu, Jinglian, Xiandai Gongsi Yu Quye Gaige (Modern Company and 
Enterprise Reform) (Tianjin People Press, 1994) (in Chinese). Lin Yifu et al. (1997) 
refer to corporate governance as a series of institutional arrangement for owners of the 
company to monitor and control the management and performance. See Lin Yifu et al., 
Information Sufficiency and SOE Reform (Shanghai People Press, 1997) (in Chinese). 
3 
 
and by the local governments under authorization by law. 
    The Company Law (Revised 2006)
4
 and Securities Law (Revised 2006)
5
 are the 
primary statutes related to corporate governance. Other statutes may apply to 
industry-relevant companies, including the Commercial Bank Law (2003)
6
 and the 
Insurance Law (2002)
7
, and to specific events, such as asset security (Property Law 
(2007)
8
) or liquidation (Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (2006)
9
). 
    The regulations set out rules for various corporate operations, which are mostly 
applied to public listed companies, including corporate governance in the Code of 
Corporate Governance of Public Listed Company (―CG Code‖) (2002)10; independent 
directorship in the Guideline for the Establishment of Independent Director System in 
Public listed Companies (2001) (―ID Guideline‖)11; incorporation in the Regulation 
                                                        
4
 It is adopted at the Fifth Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People‘s Congress on December 29, 1993. It was revised for the first time on 
December 25, 1999, revised for the second time on August 28, 2004, and revised for 
the third time at the 18th Session of the 10th National People‘s Congress of the 
People‘s Republic of China on October 27, 2005. The revised Company Law comes 
into force on January 1, 2006. 
5
 It is adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9th National 
People‘s Congress on December 29, 1998, and is revised at the 18th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People‘s Congress of the People‘s 
Republic of China on October 27, 2005. The revised Securities Law comes into force 
on January 1, 2006. 
6
 It is adopted at the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People‘s Congress on May 10, 1995, and is revised by the Sixth Session of the 
Standing Committee of the Tenth National People‘s Congress on December 27, 2003. 
It comes into force on July 1, 1995.  
7
 It is adopted at the 14th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National 
People‘s Congress on June 30, 1995, and is revised by the 30th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Ninth People‘s Congress. It comes into force on October1, 
1995. 
8
 It is adopted at the 5
th
 Session of the 10
th
 National People‘s Congress on March 16, 
2007. It comes into force on October 1, 2007.  
9
 It is adopted at the 23rd meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National 
People‘s Congress on August 27, 2006. It comes into force on June 1, 2007. 
10
 It is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and State Economic 
and Trade Commission (in 2003 it was changed to the Ministry of Commerce) of the 
State Council on January 7, 2002. 
11
 It is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on August 16, 2001. 
4 
 
on Administration of Company Registration (Revised 2005)
12
; disclosure in the 
Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Public listed companies 
(2007)
13
; and corporate constitutions in the Guidelines for the Articles of Association 
of Public listed Companies (Revised 2006) (―Articles Guidelines‖)14.  
    The PRC Company Law
15
 categorizes two types of company: limited liability 
companies and joint stock limited companies. In the case of limited liability 
companies, a shareholder is liable to the company to the extent of the amount of the 
shareholder‘s capital contribution. In the case of joint stock limited companies, the 
total share capital is divided into shares of equal value, and shareholders are liable to 
the company to the extent of the shares that they hold. Being a joint stock company is 




                                                        
12
 It is issued by the State Council on December 18, 2005 
13
 It is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on January 30, 2007. 
14
 It is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on March 16, 2006. 
The governance practices shall keep the balance between enabling instruments by 
company itself and mandatory legal provisions. For examples, the ―Articles 
Guidelines‖ provides the sample of articles of association for all public listed 
companies in China, but it could be supplemented and modified by the companies 
themselves. The enabling parts in the Articles Guidelines concerning corporate 
governance provide the circumstances in which the company‘s guarantees should be 
approved by the Shareholder‘s general meeting (Article 41), and provide the legal 
liability of controlling shareholders (Article 39), etc.  
15
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 3. 
16
 Supra Note 5, Sec.48 and 50. A joint stock limited company applying for the listing 
on the stock exchange shall meet the following requirements 1. The stocks shall have 
been publicly issued upon the approval of the securities regulatory authorities; 2. The 
total amount of capital stock of the company shall be no less than RMB 30 million; 3. 
The shares as publicly issued shall reach more than 25% of the total amount of 
corporate shares; except that the total amount of capital stock of a company exceeds 
RMB 0.4 billion, the shares as publicly issued shall be no less than 10%; and 4. The 
company shall not have committed any offence over the latest three years and there is 
no false record in its financial statements. Where the stock exchange may prescribe 
higher requirements for listing, they shall be reported to the securities regulatory 
authorities for approval. The stock exchanges have the authority to examine and 
approve the application for the listing of any securities. 
5 
 
B. Two main types of public listed companies in China 
A ―public listed company‖ is a joint stock limited company that has A and/or B 
shares listed on either of the two stock exchanges in mainland China － Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange
17
 － excluding those listed in Hong 
Kong. In China, public listed companies can be categorized into according to the type 




The controlling shareholder of state-held listed company is the solely 
state-funded companies or SASAC (or its local branches) on behalf of the state 
(which holds the ―state share‖) or the state-owned enterprises (exclusive of solely 
state-funded companies) (which holds the ―state-owned legal person share‖). The 
―state share‖ and ―state-owned legal person share‖ are collectively known as 
―state-owned shares.‖ The controlling shareholder of the private listed companies is 
an ordinary person or a non state-owned enterprise.
19
  
                                                        
17
 Ibid. Sec.121. 
18
 Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report 2006: The 
Corporate Governance of State Holding Listed Companies (Fu Dan University Press, 
2006) (in Chinese), at 2. 
19
 The ―solely state-funded company‖ is defined in the overview of SOEs in Chapter 
III. In this thesis, ―enterprise‖ has a wider meaning than company. An enterprise may 
refer to a legal entity, incorporated under the Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (―IEOWP Law‖, which is not 
regulated the PRC Company Law. An enterprise could also be a non-legal entity, such 
as partnership, sole proprietorship (i.e. it cannot sue or be sued in its own name and it 
cannot own or hold any property). The IEOWP Law is adopted at the First Session of 
the Seventh National People‘s Congress and promulgated by Order No. 3 of the 
President of the People‘s Republic of China on April 13, 1988, and effective as of 
August 1, 1988. The IEOWP Law promulgated under the then plan-economy system. 
The management of an ―enterprise owned by the whole people (―Quanmin Suoyouzhi 
Qiye‖) was appointed and all the major transactions and decisions were to be 
approved by the government departments who are administrating. Since 2006, the 
SASAC has directly held shares in state-held listed companies, rather than being an 
investor in the non-listed holding companies. See infra Note 258. 
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In empirical studies of economics, the controlling shareholder has been defined 
by La Porta et al.
20
 and later by Stijn Claessens et al.
21
 and Faccio and Lang.
22
 To 
measure control, La Porta et al. ―combine a shareholder‘s direct (i.e., through shares 
registered in her name) and indirect (i.e., through shares held by entities that, in turn, 
she controls) voting rights in the firm . . . [A] firm has a controlling shareholder if the 
sum of a shareholder‘s direct and indirect voting rights exceeds an arbitrary cutoff 
value, which, alternatively, is 20 percent or 10 percent.‖23 
The PRC Company Law defines the ―controlling shareholder‖ as: (i) a 
shareholder whose stocks comprise more than 50% of the total equity stocks of a joint 
stock limited company; or (ii) a shareholder whose shareholding is less than 50% but 
still larger than that of any other shareholder, so that the largest shareholder is still 
able to have a predominant influence over corporate matters.
24
 That is to say, the 
                                                        
20
 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, ―Corporate Ownership 
around the World‖, (1999) 54 J. Fin. 471. 
21
 The investigation of ultimate control patterns in 2980 publicly traded companies in 
nine East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), it is concluded that there is large 
family control in more than half of East Asian corporations, and significant 
cross-country differences do exist. See Stijn Claessens et al., ―Who Controls East 
Asian Corporations?‖, Working Paper, 1999. 
22
 Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, ―The Separation of Ownership and Control: An 
Analysis ultimate ownership in Western European Corporations‖, Working Paper, 
2000. 
23
 Supra Note 20, at 478. 
24
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 217(2). This definition is similar to the stipulation of the 
American Law Institute: ―(a) A ‗controlling shareholder‘ means a person who either 
alone or pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with one or more other persons: 
(1)Owns and has the power to vote more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting 
equity securities of a corporation; or (2)Otherwise exercises a controlling influence 
over the management or polices of the corporation or the transaction or conduct in 
question by virtue of the person‘s position as a shareholder‖. See American Law 
Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (St. 
Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1994), §1.10; ―Controlling 
shareholder‖ is defined by the SGX Listing Manual as ―a person who: (a) holds 
directly or indirectly 15% or more of the nominal amount of all voting shares in the 
company. The Exchange may determine that a person who satisfies this paragraph is 
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controlling shareholder is restricted by law to being the largest shareholder in the 
company. 
Table 1.1 Classification of Controlling Shareholders 





 Holders of State-owned Shares 
































                                                                                                                                                              
not a controlling shareholder; or (b) in fact exercises control over a company‖. The 
minimum percentage of shareholding for controlling shareholders defined in the 
Listing Manual by Singapore Stock Exchange is 15%, which falls into the empirical 
range by the economists, that is, ―the sum of a shareholder‘s direct and indirect voting 
rights exceeds an arbitrary cutoff value, which, alternatively, is 20 percent or 10 
percent‖. The Section 54(3) of the Competition Act of Singapore (Cap.50B) provides 
that ―control shall be regarded as existing if, by reason of securities, contracts or any 
other means, or any combination of securities, contracts or other means, decisive 
influence is capable of being exercised with regard to the activities of the undertaking 
and, in particular, by (a) ownership of, or the right to use all or part of, the assets of an 
undertaking; or (b) rights or contracts which enable decisive influence to be exercised 
with regard to the composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking‖. 
25
 Supra Note 18, Table 3.4. 
26
 The ―SASAC‖ stands for the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. The SASAC is responsible for managing the state assets of China and is 
a special working commission under the State Council. The central SOEs are typically 
large-size entities that have bearings on the national economic lifeline, national 
security, major infrastructure and essential natural resources), accounting for about 
40% and 42.6% of assets and profits of all SOEs. The figures are from the Research 
Bureau of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
PRC, Reports on the Supervision of State-owned Assets and the Reformation of 
State-owned Enterprises (2008) (China Economic Publishing House, 2009) (in 
Chinese), at 25. China had 159 ―Central SOEs‖, whose total assets exceed RMB 12 
trillion by 2006.  As at the end of 2008, the number of Central SOEs has been 
deceased to around 140 by means of restructure or privatization. The target of Chinese 
government is to have around 80-100 Central SOEs by 2010. See Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report 2009: Market for Corporate Control 













18.29 15.52 4.57 32.25 26.59 2.77 
 
(A) State ownership distribution in public listed companies 
    According to the China Corporate Governance Report 2006, of the 835 public 
listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 662 have state-owned shares, 
which together account for 50.8% of all of the listed shares on the Exchange. In 370 
companies (44.31% of all public listed companies), the amount of state-owned shares 
exceeds 50% of the total shares of those companies.
27
 In other words, nearly half of 
all public listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are controlled by the 
state. 
 
(B) Ownership of the controlling shareholder 
The comparative statistics in Table 1.2 show that the average shareholding of the 
largest controlling shareholder in state-held listed companies is 45.13%, which is 
higher than that in private companies. More remarkable is the ratio of shareholding of 
the largest to second largest shareholder of 37.48, which is much higher than the 
13.42 in private companies. The shareholder of state-owned shares is thus the largest 
                                                        
27
 Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report 2009: Market for 
Corporate Control and Corporate Governance (Fu Dan University Press, 2009) (in 
Chinese), at 28. 
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shareholder in the state-held listed company.  
 
Table 1.2 Comparison of the Average Shareholdings of Controlling Shareholders 





 State-held Listed Company Private Listed Company 
Shareholding of largest 
controlling shareholder  
45.13% 32.64% 
Ratio of shareholding of 




(C) Ownership and control 
In a survey of East Asian corporations conducted by Claessens, Djankov and 
Lang, ownership and control are respectively measured by cash flow rights and voting 
rights. The ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights is measured by the degree of 
separation, where the smaller the ratio, the greater the separation.
29
 Based on this 
method, a survey of public listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 









Private Listed Company 
(Shanghai) 
Ownership (average 
cash flow rights) 
42.84 22.42 
Control (average 45.99 34.32 
                                                        
28
 Ibid. Table 3.2. 
29
 See Claessens, Stijn, Djankov, Simeon & Lang H.P., ―The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in East Asian Corporations‖ (2000) 58 Journal of Financial Economics 
81. 
30




Average ratio of cash 




    According to Table 1.3, the average ratio of cash flow rights to controlling rights 
in state-held listed companies is 0.92. This is higher than that in private listed 
companies, indicating less separation of ownership from control. 
 
1.2 Research perspective of this thesis 
1.2.1 Research questions and arguments 
In the last few years, much academic research and empirical studies have 
examined the topic of corporate governance in Chinese corporations.
31
 This thesis 
                                                        
31
 Tam (2002) explores the ethic issues emerging in the context of China‘s economic 
and corporate governance development. These issues include: corruption, stock 
manipulation, fraudulent dealing, plundering of state assets, etc. See generally On Kit 
Tam, ―Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China‖ (2002) 37 
Journal of Business Ethics 303. Wei (2005) explains the two main functions of 
Chinese securities market: corporate finance and external mechanism of corporate 
governance. It is further suggested to design a securities regime, combining the 
strengths of market-based and bank-based approach. See generally Wei Yuwa, ―The 
Development of the Securities Market and Regulation in China‖ (2005) 27 Loyola 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 479. Wei (2006) analyzes 
the interaction between corporate governance and market volatility. It assesses the 
impact of corporate governance on the volatility of China‘s securities market, and 
concludes that developing securities market in China has helped encourage and 
promote sound corporate governance practices, although the monitoring functions are 
still weak. See further Wei Yuwa, ―Volatility of China‘s Securities Markets and 
Corporate Governance‖ (2006) 29 Suffolk Transitional Law Review 207. Chang 
(2005) examines the evolving foreign participation in China‘s securities market, 
which was once forbidden but is now desired. It discusses the legal risks of investing 
in China, bringing up issues of weaknesses in corporate governance, private securities 
regulation, and judicial enforcement. See generally Chang, Terry E., ―The Gold Rush 
in the East: Recent Developments in Foreign Participation within China‘s Securities 
Markets as Compared to the Taiwanese Model‖ (2005) 44 Columbia Journal of 
Transitional Law 279.  
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explores the corporate governance model in state-held listed companies in China. The 
following research questions are addressed:  
(1) What is the current corporate governance model of state-held listed 
companies in China (discussed in Chapters II, III, IV and V)?  
(2) Are state-held listed companies well governed under the current corporate 
governance model (elaborated in Chapters IV, V and VI)?  
(3) If the answer to the second research question is negative, then is there any 
other model under which state-held listed companies may be well governed (to be 
proposed in Chapter VI)?  
The ―state-controlled‖ model that directs the corporate governance of state-held 
listed companies in China has common elements with the bank-based model, under 
which banks play a predominant role in corporate financing in a weak securities 
market. It also contains the employee participation element of the stakeholder model, 
but the trade unions in China are still strictly controlled by the government (see 
Chapter II).  
The state-controlled model relates to the issue of how the state assets of China 
were and are managed, which is at the very ―intersection‖ of political control and 
economic reform (Chapter III). It is the state-controlled model that has led to China‘s 
unique earmarks of two-tier share market and two-tier board structure, which will be 
discussed in Chapters IV and V, respectively. 
    This thesis argues that state-held listed companies in China are not 
well-governed under the state-controlled model, because it fails to protect minority 
shareholders and the two-tier board structure does not perform efficiently (Chapter IV 
and V) due to poor law enforcement arising from corruption in China. This thesis does 
not aim to make the case for a wholesale change of legal regime to establish a brand 
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new corporate governance system. Instead, it explores effective refinements that could 
improve corporate governance in Chinese listed companies through a law-controlled 
model and the implementation of the rule of law in China. It also addresses how, in 
the event that such refinements cannot be made, the practical problems arising from 
the ―state-controlled model‖ can be overcome by virtue of (i) reforming the laws; and 
(ii) enforcing the laws. To smoothly drive the governance of state-held listed 
companies, a ―law-controlled‖ model, that aims to advance the rule of law (or at least 
a ―thin‖ rule of law developed from ―rule by law‖), enforces good corporate 
governance, and reduces governmental bureaucracy and political forces in business 
activities associated with corruption (Chapter VI).  
 
1.2.2 Research scope 
A. Public listed companies and state-held listed companies 
Public listed companies are recognized by the Chinese central government as 
significant sources of investment in the capital market.
32
 It is thus a crucial task in the 
reformation of the capital market to enhance the quality of public listed companies, 
which should focus on maximizing the benefits of shareholders as a whole.
33
 
This thesis focuses on ―state-held listed companies‖ rather than all public listed 
companies in China. Private listed companies are not the subject of the corporate 
governance model discussed here. However, private listed companies are inevitably 
involved in China‘s SOEs reform and privatization.  
                                                        
32
 The Growth Enterprise Board is to be launched under the regulation of Provisional 
Measures of Publicly Issuing New Shares for the First Time and Listing on the Growth 
Enterprise Board (issued by the CSRC with effect from 1 May, 2009). As opposed to 
the Main Board, the Growth Enterprise Board is aimed to provide a securities trading 
market for those small or medium size enterprises.  
33
 Notice of Enhancing the Quality of Listed Companies 2005, issued by the CSRC, 
with effect from 2 November, 2005. 
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B. ―Control‖  
The meaning of ―control‖ in terms of the ―state-controlled model‖ and 
―law-controlled model‖ refers to substantial direction and discretion over a company. 
In terms of the definition of ―controlling shareholder‖, the controlling status of 
shareholders is based on quantity calculations, and has a ―static‖ sense in this thesis in 
that the voting rights of the controlling shareholder are assumed not to vary due to 
daily transactions in the securities market or other activities such as rights issue or 
placement. Takeover regulations and the role of the market in corporate control are 
not approached in this thesis. 
 
1.3 Value of this research 
1.3.1 Historical background 
    This thesis must be placed against the background of economic and social 
development in China, which is currently in transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market-oriented economy. This involves the modernization of the 
financial system, the capital market, and the management of State-owned assets. 
While China struggles to qualify for market economy status in the WTO, it is also 
undergoing privatization in which capital flows from either overseas investors or 
domestic private investors.  
Corporate governance in China is subject to newly revised PRC Company Law 
and Securities Law that were promulgated in 2006, coupled with the ongoing reform 
of the sales of non-tradable shares of public listed companies since 2005. The 
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shareholding structures of Chinese public listed companies are also experiencing a 
transition from a traditional concentrated structure to a possibly more flexible 
structure. This thesis aims to explain the necessity and feasibility of improving 
corporate governance in state-held listed companies under China‘s unique political 
regime, economic structure, historical development, legal system, and cultural 
background to promote business efficiency and ensure social justice. 
 
1.3.2 Research methodology 
This research is carried out using a combination of methodologies to give a 
comprehensive but not abstract exploration of the topic.  
    Historical analysis is used to explore the development of shareholding structure 
in four stages: 1957-1978, 1978-1992, 1992-2005, and 2005 to the present. The 
unique characteristics of State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China are examined 
in Chapter III, and the Reform of Sales of Non-Tradable Shares of Public Listed 
Companies since 2005 are discussed in Chapter IV. Historical analysis is used again in 
Chapter VI to analyze the development of the rule of law and law reform in Chinese 
history.  
Comparative research between jurisdictions is adopted in Chapter V to study the 
historical development of independent directors in the United States and China, and of 
supervisory boards in Germany and China. Specifically, independent directors in 
China, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States are explored in terms of 
definition of independent directors and compositions of board and board committees; 
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and supervisors, supervisory board, and the co-determination system in China and 
Germany are compared. In the last section of Chapter V, independent directors are 
distinguished from supervisors in relation to their functions and rights, and the 
proposed new division of authority between independent directors and the audit 
committee of the board is examined. Chapter VI focuses on an analysis of the legal 
framework, objectives, and administration of the Temasek Holding of Singapore in 
relation to the state assets that it holds in contrast to those of the state-asset holding 
companies in China.  
Chapter V presents a case study of the Zhengzhou Baiwen Company Limited 
(―ZBW‖), which is a former state-held listed company on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange that was sanctioned by the CSRC for false disclosures in its listing 
documents and annual reports in 2001. The case is discussed in relation to the 
independence of independent directors in fulfilling their duties. 
 
1.3.3 Feasible recommendations 
From the beginning of this century, the world has faced a series of major 
corporate scandals, and corporate governance reform has attracted increasing global 
attention as a result. This thesis discusses and analyses corporate governance in 
state-held listed companies in China with a focus on the two-tier shareholding and 
two-tier board structure.  
As one of society‘s backbones, the law cannot grow without a social bedrock. 
Corporate laws, securities laws, and any other relevant laws are an amalgamation of all 
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elements of society in the process of respecting, protecting and delivering fundamental 
business rights in modern society. 
This research paper goes to the root of the problem in China: the corporate 
governance of state-held listed companies is not well governed under the 
state-controlled model because it is not able to address a number of thorny practical 
issues that apply to the governance structure, and specifically to the shareholding and 
board structure. These practical issues cannot be settled due to corruption, which occurs 
when the behavior of the state and business entities cannot be controlled by law because 
laws in place are not enforced. Corruption results in the non-enforcement of corporate 
governance, which in turn reinforces corruption. The rule of law is recognized as an 
effective approach to prevent state-held listed companies from falling into a mire of 
corruption and dictatorship, but in China the rule of law may not take effect because of 
the political obstacle of the one-party dictatorship of Communist Party of China (CPC). 
 
1.4 Organization and framework of this thesis 
This thesis is divided into three parts and seven chapters (see Figure 1.1). 
Chapters I, II, and III constitute the first part, which gives an overview of 
corporate governance in public listed companies in China. Chapter I addresses the 
research questions, arguments and research scope, followed by an explanation of the 
methodology and value of this research. Chapter II explores the state-controlled 
model by analyzing its common elements with the bank-based model and stakeholder 
model respectively, all of which are connected with the management of China‘s state 
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assets during its economic transition from a state-planned to a market-oriented 
economy through SOE reform. Chapter III investigates the underpinnings of the 
state-controlled model, which hinges upon and lies at the intersection of political 
control and economic reform, and looks at how well managed multi-level state assets 
are in China. 
The second part consists of Chapter IV and V., which explore the hallmarks of 
the model, that is, two-tier shareholding and a two-tier board in state-held listed 
companies. Chapter IV discusses the two-tier shareholding structure and the Reform 
of Sales of Non-Tradable Shares of Public listed Companies. Chapter V 
comprehensively explores the characteristics of two-tier boards by comparing 
independent directors in terms of definition, board composition, and board-committee 
composition in China, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It also 
distinguishes the supervisory board system in China and Germany, and explores the 
qualification, nomination, election, rights, and duties of independent directors and 
supervisors. In Chapters IV and V, the issue of whether state-held listed companies are 
well governed under the state-controlled model is addressed by exploring a number of 
practical issues arising from state-controlled ownership under the two-tier 
shareholding and two-tier board structure. 
Finally, the third part is composed of Chapter VI and VII. Chapter VI highlights 
that whether state-held listed companies in China are well governed under the 
state-controlled model depends on whether certain practical issues can be resolved 
under the current state-controlled model, and further examines the causes and 
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rationality of the failure of the model to work effectively. It is then proposed that 
corporate governance in state-controlled listed companies could be improved under a 
law-controlled model based on the progressive pursuit of the rule of law, or at the very 
least by the reform and enforcement of current laws. The five practical issues posed 
by Chapter IV and V are then resolved through such a process of law reform and 
enforcement. The Chapter VII gives some final reflections on the challenges and 
trends of corporate governance in Chinese state-held listed companies.  
 
Figure 1.1 Organization and Framework of this Thesis 
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Chapter II Corporate Governance Model 
 
―Let us not look back in anger, nor forward in fear, but around in awareness.‖ 
James Thurber, American Writer (1894-1961) 
 
The corporate governance of China‘s state-held listed companies is a mixed 
model with a variety of elements from the bank-based model (e.g., a creditor-oriented 
emphasis) and the stakeholder model (e.g., weak trade union rights and employee 
participation), and with its hallmarks of a two-tier share market and a two-tier board 
structure. In this thesis, this mixed model is termed the ―state-controlled model‖. 
Under the state-controlled model, governments exercise their control over the 
corporate affairs of state-held listed companies with ―substantial discretion‖.34 The 
state-controlled model is currently undergoing both political control and economic 
reform. This Chapter explores the state-controlled model‘s elements that it as in 
common with the bank-based model and stakeholder model in the Chinese context.  
 
2.1 Market-based model versus bank-based model 
2.1.1. Overview 
The ―bank-based model‖ is characterized by ―weak securities markets, high 
private benefits of control, and low disclosure and market transparency standards, 
with only a modest role played by the market for corporate control, but with a 
                                                        
34
 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman ―The End of History for Corporate Law‖ 
(2001) 89 Geo.L.J. 439, at 447. 
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possibly substitutionary monitoring role played by large banks.‖35 Under this model, 
the influence of banks is exerted through several roles, including those of ―important 
suppliers of external finance, [and] holders of firm equity and seats on the firm‘s 
management board.‖ 36  The banks and financial institutions usually play a 
predominant and central role in corporate monitoring.
37
 The advantage of this model 
is that given a bank‘s ―special position in the economy, the better information it has 
regarding corporations and the financial system, and the more efficient [its] 
monitoring and lending function.‖38 
In contrast to the bank-based model, the market-based model tends to rely on 
market activity such as takeovers to secure corporate control. In typical public listed 
companies with a dispersed ownership structure, a large number of investors have 
little incentive to be involved in monitoring or to control the corporation.
39
 In this 
case, the stock markets have four essential functions: (1) information aggregation on 
                                                        
35
 See Yuwa Wei, Securities Market and Corporate Governance (Ashgate Publishing, 
Ltd., 2009), at 81; See also Mayer Colin, ―Stock Markets, Financial Institutions, and 
Corporate Performance‖, in Capital Markets and Corporate Governance (edited by N. 
Dimsdale & M. Prevezer) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 179-94.See for reference 
Coffee, John C., ―The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control‖ (December 2000), Columbia Law and 
Economics Working Paper No. 182. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=254097 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.254097. 
36
 James Laurenceson & Joseph C.H. Chai, Financial reform and economic 
development in China (Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2003), 
at 88-9. 
37
 Barbara Cooper, The ICSA Handbook of Good Boardroom Practice (2
nd
 ed.) (ICSA 
Publishing, 2006). It affirms that there are other controlling shareholders inside those 
model-based companies: family control, governments, or other corporations. See 
Barbara Cooper, at 32. 
38
 On Kit Tam, The Development of Corporate Governance in China (Northampton, 
Ma: Edward Elgar Publishing 1999), at 33-4. 
39
 See Mayer Colin, ―Stock Markets, Financial Institutions, and Corporate 
Performance‖, in Capital Markets and Corporate Governance (edited by N. Dimsdale 
& M. Prevezer) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), at 188. 
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which to establish share prices that can help to monitor firms; (2) financing, or 
providing risk capital for investment; (3) diversification and hedging; and (4) 
corporate control, whereby managerial failure is corrected through the market 
mechanism.
40
 Roe (1993) suggests that shareholder diversification in an active stock 
market is the ―classic economic model of the public firm.‖41 
However, markets suffer from two drawbacks. The first is the separation of 
ownership and control, and the second is that the interests of stakeholders other than 
shareholders are not fully reflected.
42
 Tan et al. (2006) further generalize three 
inherent flaws in practice. First, directors may not have the expertise to fulfill their 
duties to shareholders; second, the external competitive market may not protect 
shareholders from incompetent management; and third, the securities market may not 
necessarily reflect the long-term value of a company.
43
 Similarly, the bank-based 
model, under which the problems of proxy fights or hostile takeovers seldom arise, 
suffers from weaknesses in practice, such as conflicts of interest due to banks serving 
more than one supervisory board and supervisory boards have a weak monitoring 
position as creditors and failing to pursue the interests of shareholders.
44
 
In China, the bank-based model is based upon the financing functions of banks 
as creditors, as their monitoring functions have shrunk to some extent because banks 
in China are forbidden to invest in listed companies. Hence, they monitor companies 
                                                        
40
 Ibid. at 179. 
41
 Mark J. Roe, ―Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the 
United States‖ (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 1927, at 1928. 
42
 Supra Note 39, at 191. 
43
 Tan Lay Hong, Tan Chong Huat & Long Hsueh Ching, Corporate Governance of 
Listed Companies in Singapore (Singapore: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2006).  
44
 Ibid. at 14. 
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by exercising the rights of creditors, rather than those of shareholders. 
 
2.1.2 China 
A. Financing functions 
Tam (2002) compares the main characteristics of the market-based and 
bank-based models. Using the same variables to explore state-held listed companies in 
China reveals that China‘s current model is similar to the bank-based model with 
regard to financing (see Table 2.1). 
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45
 The structure and conclusion of this table are based on the comparative table in On 
Kit Tam, ―Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China‖ (2002) 
37 Journal of Business Ethics 303, at 309. I further add into the table more 
information on China‘s part for supplementation.  
46
 See Erik Berglöf, ―Capital Structure as a Mechanism of Control: A Comparison of 
Financial Systems, in The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (edited by Masahiko Aoki, Bo 
Gustafsson & Oliver E. Williamson), at 237-62 (London: Sage, 1990). Berglöf defines 
financial system as ―institutional arrangements designed to transform savings into 
investments and to allocate funds among alternative uses within the industrial sector‖. 
He summaries three characteristics of market-oriented system, distinguished from 
market-oriented system: first, banks ―hold a higher share of total domestic financial 
assets; second, lending activity of banks is ―more directed to corporate financing‖; 
third, there are ―heavy concentration and substantial government ownership‖. 
Furthermore, costs of delegation from shareholders to managers shall be compared 
with the gains from risk spreading. 
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In China, banks are the main sources of external financing as creditors of 
corporations. According to recent statistics from the China Corporate Governance 
Report 2007,
47
 more than 70 percent of the debts of all Chinese enterprises are owed 
to commercial banks. The first annual report of the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC, established in 2003 to regulate the entire banking system in 
China) issued in 2006 indicates that the total loans of the Chinese banking institutions 
rose from RMB 16977.1 billion in 2003 to 23828.0 billion in 2006,
48
 a 40.4% 
increase. 
 
B. Monitoring function 
Banks, as creditors, not only provide most of the financial resources, but also 
serve to monitor corporate business. Under the bank-based model, the monitoring 
authority of the banks is exercised through the possession of voting power by direct 
stock ownership and control over investment companies or the stock deposited by 
stock owners through brokerages.
49
 Banks may display different behavior in different 
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positions. When a bank is a creditor, it tends to choose more conservative strategies of 
business to avoid risk, whereas when it is a shareholder, it has more incentive to run 
risks to obtain higher profits. When it is both creditor and shareholder, it will try to 
balance the capital structure with business risk.
50
 
The German universal bank system is famed for the dual role of its banks as both 
creditors and shareholders or quasi-shareholders (through proxy systems), in which 
the banks are facilitated to participate in corporate governance by exercising a 
controlling power over supervisory boards.
51
 In the typical Japanese main bank 
system, banks are involved in the private sector though their ownership of company 
stocks.
52
 The difference between Germany and Japan is that in the former the bank is 
usually represented on the supervisory board that oversees the company, whereas in 
the latter the banks do not tightly control the management or intervene inside the 
company unless the company is performing poorly and bad results are forecasted.
53
 
The bank-based model in China is distinct from that in Germany and Japan, as it 
is prohibited under the Commercial Bank Law for the commercial banks in China to 
undertake trust and investment business and securities dealing, and to invest in 
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 Commercial banks are not qualified to be shareholders by law, and are 
thus unable to play an active role in corporate governance, being confined instead to a 
more outside role as creditors. 
 
C. China‘s banking reform and treatment of non-performing loans (NPLs) 
(A) Before reform (late 1970s to mid-1990s) 
The development of the banking sector had a crucial impact on the growth of 
business enterprises, and especially SOEs, before the banking reform. Under the 
state-planned economic system, the banks were parts of the government mechanism, 
and were essentially passive providers of funds under the direction of the government. 
The banks in China have long been closely connected with SOEs, and have granted 
loans as a form of resource allocation under government guidance.
55
  
The ―big four‖ state-owned commercial banks – the Bank of China (BOC), 
Construction Bank of China (CBOC), Bank of Agriculture of China (BOAC), and 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) – were established between the late 
1970s and the early 1980s. The ―big four‖ have particular financing roles under 
government policy in the areas of foreign exchange, construction, agriculture, and 
industry and commerce, respectively. In a sense then, they are policy banks rather 
than commercial banks. 
Since 1983, the amount of direct bank loans with no interest granted to SOEs has 
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substantially reduced, and instead the banks have begun to increase the number of 
interest-bearing loans to SOEs.
56
 In an empirical study, Cull and Xu find a positive 
link between bank finance and SOE profitability in China in the 1980s, with a weaker 
link in the 1990s.
57
 The SOEs monopolized the market during the state-planned 
economy period when demand exceeded supply. However, as Karacadag recognizes, 
banks still ―have little incentive to exert market discipline over borrowers, particularly 
the large SOEs,‖ as governments make ―implicit guarantees‖ for loans.58 
 
(B) Post-reform (since the mid-1990s) 
A more systematic reform of banking was not initiated until the mid-1990s,
59
 
with the promulgation in 1995 of the Law of People’s Bank of China60 and the 
Commercial Bank Law.
61
 Banking reform was not carried out at the same time as the 
economic reform in 1978,
62
 but was instead launched based on the market economy 
system after the reform of corporatization in the early 1990s. In 1994, three policy 
banks were set up: the National Development Bank, Import and Export Bank, and 
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Agriculture Development Bank. The three banks took over the ―policy‖ functions of 
the ―big four,‖ which from then on began to act as real commercial banks. The current 
banking system in China, under the supervision of the CBRC, is composed of various 
levels of institutions. The People‘s Bank of China is the central bank; the principal 
parts of the system are the commercial banks, including the ―big four‖ state-owned 
commercial banks and other joint-stock banks; the institutions are the policy banks, 




In reality, the central government and the local governments still interfere with 
the capital market by directing bank loans,
64
 and bank lending is often biased in favor 
of SOEs.
65
 The banks may give loans to SOEs without taking account of the 
profitability of the enterprises,
66
 because the SOEs are the concern of governments, 




(C) Non-performing loans (NPLs) 
Bank loans are graded into five categories based on the evaluation of their 
inherent risk, an approach similar to that used by the US banking regulators.
68
 The 
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five grades are pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss. The last three 
grades are rated as non-performing loans (NPLs). Most NPLs in China are not secured 




There are three main approaches to deal with NPLs: write-offs and sale by asset; 
recapitalization; and inspection by the CBRC. 
 
a. NPLs write-offs and sales 
Four AMCs (China Cinda, China Great Wall, China Orient, and China Huarong) 
were set up in 1999 specifically to dispose of the NPLs of the ―big four‖ state-owned 
commercial banks. Their main technique of disposing of NPLs is asset securitization. 
The process comprises three stages: first buying bad assets from the banks, which 
receive cash to write off the NPLs, then packaging those assets by securitization, and 
finally selling them in a secondary market at a higher price for returns. 
 
b. Re-capitalization 
At the end of 2004, the BOC and CBOC were respectively recapitalized with 
22.5 billion US dollars from foreign exchange reserves. Hui Jin Holdings Company 
(Hui Jin) was set up for this purpose, the shareholders of which are the Ministry of 
Finance, People‘s Bank of China, and National Foreign Exchange Bureau. Hui Jin is 
the majority shareholder (85%) of the BOC and CBOC, on behalf of Chinese 
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In April 2005, the ICBC was recapitalized by Hui Jin with 15 billion US dollars. 
Later, in November 2008, it recapitalized the BOAC with RMB 130 billion. Hui Jin 
holds 50% of shareholdings of both ICBC and BOAC following re-capitalization. 
 
c. CBRC 
The CBRC has set up a tripartite coordination mechanism with two financial 
supervisory committees, the CSRC and China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC) of the central government. The coordination mechanism works through 
―co-supervisory meetings‖ and a ―continuous contact mechanism,‖ which is a channel 
for communication between the three Commissions to discuss specific issues.
70
 
The CBRC has adopted many measures to deal with NPL problems. For example, 
all commercial banks are required to have an internal control system to regularly 
evaluate the financial status of their clients.
71
 The CBRC collates client risk statistics 
and set up an early warning system in July 2004 that requires the major commercial 
banks to submit a monthly report.
72
 Furthermore, the CBRC assists the banks to 
improve their management of credit risk and due diligence.
73
 Moreover, the CBRC 
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The NPL ratios have declined due to write-offs and recapitalization. Furthermore, 
the banks have improved their lending decisions under the oversight of the CBRC. 
The most significant change for the ―big four‖ under the reform of the banking sector 
is that they have been transformed from wholly state-owned banks into joint-stock 
companies. In addition to the shareholding of Hui Jin on behalf of the state, the 
general public and foreign strategic investors such as the Bank of America and 
Temasek have minority shareholdings in the bank.
75
 Diminishing the amount of 
NPLs is the first step in the process of banking reform,
76
 but the banks are also 
improving their own internal control and risk management measures to better serve 
their role as creditors to enterprises. 
 
D. Legal protection of creditors under the Company Law and Bankruptcy Law 
(A) Going concerns 
The capital maintenance rule applies when the company is a going concern, and 
prohibits the issuing of shares under par value or capital reduction except in certain 
legitimate circumstances. When fundamental corporate changes are going to take 
place, creditors must be notified by the company and may, within a reasonable period 
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When any company is dissolved, a liquidation group must be formed within 
fifteen days of the occurrence of the cause of dissolution. The liquidation group of a 
public listed company is composed of the directors or any other persons determined at 
a shareholder meeting. The main functions of a liquidation group include evaluating 
the properties of the company, producing balance sheets and asset checklists, 
notifying creditors, handling the ongoing business of the company, paying off the 




There are several common protection arrangements for creditors during 
liquidation. For example, under the priority rule of corporate law, creditors have the 
privilege to claim corporate assets before shareholders. Creditors also have the right 
to appeal to the court to designate outside lawyers and accountants to form a 




The first Bankruptcy Law (annulled) in China was promulgated in 1986.
80
 The 
law only applied to SOEs, whose right to file for bankruptcy was restricted. Public 
utility enterprises or other enterprises with a crucial impact on the national economy 




In contrast, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (2006) confers freedom to all 
Chinese enterprises to initiate bankruptcy procedures, and offers some protection to 
creditors. It provides that the bankruptcy administrator has the right to plead to the 
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court for revocation of: (1) transactions in which corporate assets are transferred to a 
third party free of charge or at an obviously unreasonable price; (2) debt guaranteed 
by the company that has other sources of guarantee. The transactions and guarantees 
must have taken take place within the year before the People‘s Court accepted an 
application for bankruptcy.
82
 Transactions involving concealed or falsified corporate 




(C) Lifting the corporate veil 
Limited liability has been a fundamental tenet of company law since the late 
nineteenth century and the case of Salomon v. A Salomon and Co. Ltd
84
 that ruled that 
a company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders. Davies (2003) generalized 
two advantages to justify this tenet. First, it facilitates public investment, about which 
ordinary members of society have no professional knowledge, and second, it 
promotes the stable operation of a public securities market.
85
 
However, the possibility of the corporate abuse of this principle exists, because 
in practice the assets of shareholders are not completely separate from those of the 
company. Legal intervention by either statutory regulation or judicial decision will 
occur when creditors are not able to effectively protect themselves through existing 
contractual arrangements.
86
The underlying justification for the lifting of the corporate 
veil in common law is that the company in question, as a business form, has been used 
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for device or manipulation, for example as an agent for the company‘s controllers,87 




 or to evade legal obligations.
90
 However, this 
remedy is supported by the court only in exceptional circumstances and after close 
consideration. 
Before the Company Law was revised in 2006, the Supreme Court made it clear 
in the Reply of the Supreme Court to the Superior Court of Guangdong Province in 
1994
91
 that any company set up by an enterprise is a separate legal entity from the 
enterprise, and assumes legal liability by itself. If the company is not capitalized or is 
insufficiently capitalized by the enterprise, then it is not regarded as a separate entity, 
and its liability is assumed by the enterprise. 
―Lifting the corporate veil‖ was first brought in with the revision of the PRC 
Company Law in 2005. The revised law prescribes that where any shareholder of a 
company has severely abused the company as being a separate legal entity, and has 
injured the interests of any creditor, then the shareholder(s) shall be jointly liable for 
the debts along with the company.
92
 
However, this provision is too simple to be applied in practice,
93
 given China‘s 
status as a civil law country that does not officially recognize case law as a binding 
force in the civil law system. For example, it does not address whether the scope of 
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―creditors‖ should include parties to which a company is indebted due to tort or unjust 
enrichment,
94
 whether ―shareholders‖ should cover all shareholders, including 
minority shareholders, the extent of the creditor‘s burden of proof, and whether the 
creditor(s) in question should assume the whole burden? 
 
2.2 Stakeholder model 
2.2.1 Theoretical framework 
Freeman (1984) presents a broad definition of stakeholder in terms of business 
planning: ―[T]hose groups without whose support the organization would cease to 
exist‖95 and ―who can affect or are affected by the achievement of the organization‘s 
objectives.‖96 Dean (2001) suggests that those who ―participate in or are affected by 
the company, as individuals and groups, all merit consideration and involvement in its 
decision-making . . . have a stake in it.‖97 Dean divides stakeholders into ―primary‖ 
and ―secondary‖ groups. Primary stakeholders are those who ―count on a ‗strict 
business‘ basis for day-to-day participation, consisting of shareholders, managers, 
customers, employees, creditors, suppliers.‖ Secondary stakeholders ―have influence 
and effect in specific, important situations of concern to them,‖ such as ―the national 
and local media, the community and the environment.‖98 
Hemraj (2005) proposes that the stakeholder theory rests on the director‘s 
responsibility to consider stakeholders‘ interests and to balance the competing 
interests of stakeholders. However, the theory does not suggest that the company 
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should sacrifice the interests of shareholders for the benefits of other stakeholders.99 
The Hampel Report (1998) criticizes the theory:  
―The directors as a board are responsible for relations with stakeholders; 
but they are accountable to the shareholders. This is not simply a technical 
point. From a practica1 point of view, to redefine the directors‘ 
responsibilities in terms of the stakeholders would mean identifying all the 
various stakeholder groups; and deciding the nature and extent of the 
directors‘ responsibility to each. The result would be that the directors 
were not effectively accountable to anyone since there would be no clear 
yard stick for judging their performance.‖100 
 
 More broadly, this means that while continuing with its development and 
maximizing the benefits of shareholders, a listed company should assume social 
responsibility for the welfare, environmental protection, and public interest of the 
community.
101
 Freeman and Evan (1997) consider the firm as a framework of a series 
of multiple contracts among stakeholders.
102
 Corporate law, which considers the 
interests of social constituencies, is often criticized for only working within the range 
of private law, whereas it should also have meaning in the area of public law.
103
 
Wood and Jones (1995) integrate the stakeholder theory with the study of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), and suggest that the development of CSR has gained 
theoretical support from the stakeholder theory.
104
 The essence of social 
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responsibility is a ―concern for the ethical consequences of one‘s acts as they might 
affect the interests of others.‖105  
CSR originated from the voluntary charitable contributions of business.
106
 Clark 
(1916) was the first to make an official link between of social responsibility and 
business, stating that ―we need an economics of responsibility, developed and 
embodied in our working business ethics.‖107 Davis (1967) concludes from this 
statement that the business system does not exist by itself and that ―a healthy business 
system cannot exist within a sick society.‖108  
The UN Global Compact
109
 on CSR contains ten principles in the areas of 
human rights, labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption. The SA 8000 
Standard
110
 is an auditable certification standard for labor based on the convention of 
the International Labor Organization. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (2000)
111
 and the Communication on Corporate Social Responsibility
112
 
issued by the European Commission set out the duty of company and directors in 
terms of social and environment impact. The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act even requires 
each issuer to disclose whether or not it has adopted a code of ethics for senior 
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 Because social responsibility may vary with company 
characteristics, such as corporate size, industry, culture, and location,
114
 there is no 
uniform standard of CSR across jurisdictions, and the international, regional and 




2.2.2 Legal implications 
A. Overview 
The stakeholder theory is criticized for creating guidelines that are too vague to 
follow by law, as it is not clear ―to what each stakeholder is entitled‖ and ―how 
management should balance competing demands among stakeholders.‖116 In addition, 
the stakeholder philosophy may cause directors to lose the focus of their duties.
117
 
    In the United Kingdom, under Sec.172 of the Companies Act 2006, it is the duty 
of directors to have regard to the interests of the company‘s employees; to the need to 
foster the company‘s business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others; and 
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to the impact of the company‘s operations on the community and the environment.118 
In certain circumstances, it is also their duty to consider or act in the interests of the 
creditors of the company.
119
 
In UK common law, if a company is insolvent or close to insolvency, directors 
must consider the interests of creditors. In the case of Walker v. Wimbourne (1976), 
where the directors had improperly disregarded the interests of creditors, Barwick C.J. 
and Mason J. opined that creditors‘ interests might be prejudiced by the movement of 
funds between companies in the event of a company becoming insolvent.
 120
 
In the more recent case Re Welfab Engineering (1990),
121
 where directors had 
accepted an offer for the purchase of the company from a buyer who guaranteed to 
continue the business and maintain the employees, rather than accepting a higher cash 
offer, the directors were held not liable for the company‘s insolvency, as they had 
acted properly in taking into employment into account. 
In the USA, Section 2.01(b) of the Principles of Corporate Governance (1992) 
of the American Law Institute states that a corporation, in conducting its business, 
―may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as 
appropriate to the conduct of business‖ and ―may devote a reasonable amount of 
resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic 
purposes.‖122 
In some jurisdictions, such as the United States and Singapore, stakeholder 
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interests are implicitly recognized, and every stakeholder is protected through contract 






In China, stakeholders are expressly defined by corporate law and regulations. 
The PRC Company Law sets out the fundamental framework for stakeholders as 
follows: ―a company shall comply with not only law, but also social morality and 
business morality.‖124 A company is also required to act in good faith, accept the 
supervision of the government and the general public, and to bear certain social 
responsibilities. 
The Code of Corporate Governance of Public Listed Companies sets out the 
scope of stakeholders as ―creditors, employees, consumers, suppliers, the community, 
etc.‖125 In terms of employees, it states that feedback should be encouraged with 
regard to the company‘s operation, financial situation, and important decisions that 
affect employee benefits through direct communication with the board of directors, 
the supervisory board, and management personnel.
126
 The provisions of the PRC 
Company Law and the Code are written in a general way. The Code provides that a 
public listed company shall ―actively cooperate with its stakeholders and jointly 
advance the company‘s sustained and healthy development‖127 and shall ―provide the 
necessary means to ensure the legal rights of stakeholders‖, who ―have opportunities 
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and channels for redress for infringement of rights.‖128 However, how the company 
cooperates with its stakeholders, the ―legal rights‖ of those stakeholders, and the 
―opportunities and channels‖ to protect their rights are not clarified by law. As a result, 
the catch-all provisions are too abstract to have any legal force in the context of 
state-held public listed companies. 
The concept of the ―stakeholder‖ has only appeared in China in the past ten 
years.
129
 The China Corporate Governance Report 2007 cast its attention toward 
stakeholders, which were set as a research topic for 2007.
130
 Employees are perhaps 
the most significant stakeholders expressly named by the Code. This research on the 




    Employees, as crucial corporate stakeholders, have three categories of rights to 
participate in corporate governance: labor standards at the shop floor, as shareholders 
and representatives on the board of directors and board of supervisors, and free 
association and collective bargaining through trade unions.
131
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A. Labor standards 
The age of globalization has brought not only fairer and freer trade, but also 
greater concern and more care for human beings: ―Most workers are facing job losses, 
job security, unsafe working conditions, declining social services, and stagnating 
wages.‖132  Weak groups, and especially women, children, disabled people, and 
minorities, must be prevented from falling into complete poverty and further social 
polarization. 
Since 1919, the International Labour Organization has maintained and developed 
a system of Conventions and Recommendations on international labour standards that 
aims to improve working conditions, employment opportunities, and social security 
across the world. The ―core labour standards‖ comprise the eight Conventions of the 
International Labour Organization, which can be divided into four main themes: union 
rights, forced labour, discrimination, and child labour. These eight Conventions have 
been identified by the ILO‘s Governing Body as being ―fundamental to the rights of 
human beings at work‖133 and are reflected in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up Procedures in 1998, which obligate 
all ILO member states to respect basic worker rights. As at 31 January 2003, all 175 
member states of the International Labour Organization had ratified at least one of the 
eight fundamental conventions, and 84 had ratified all of them.  
China has ratified four of the eight Conventions, mostly on discrimination and 
child labour.
134
 The Labor Law stipulates that employees have the right to be treated 
on an equal basis in terms of employment opportunities, remuneration, taking rests, 
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having holidays and leave, receiving safety and sanitation protection, having 




Ensuring labor standards in China is not a problem of improving current labor 
standards, but of how to meet those standards in practice. Despite the strenuous and 
persistent economic reform in China, labor standards need to be met in all regions. 
Labor laws and regulations require more detailed drafting to meet international norms 
and practices, complemented by more specific rules on social security, employment, 
trade union and collective bargaining. Union rights, which are the most disputed 
standards, must be respected through the establishment of a tripartite structure in 
enterprises for equal negotiation and protection. Finally, promoting rational 
employment, raising wages gradually to fair levels, and improving the inefficient 
social insurance system are the most important approaches to achieve core labor 
standards. 
 
B. Participation in corporate governance 
Employees can participate in corporate governance either by representation on 
the board of directors or board of supervisors or by owning shares in a company. Such 
participation may reduce information asymmetry,
136
 constrain the discretionary 
power of management,
137
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Pursuant to the PRC Company Law, the required level of employee representation 
on the two boards is different: the board of directors can choose to have employee 
representatives as directors,
139
 whereas the board of supervisors must have 
shareholder representatives. The percentage of employee representatives on the board 
of supervisors must account for no less than one third of all supervisors, and must be 




(B) Stock ownership 
Awarding employees with shares is one of the exceptional circumstances under 
the PRC Company Law in which a company can repurchase its own shares, subject to 
approval at a shareholders‘ meeting.141 It is required that the source of funding for 
such buy-backs must be the after-tax profits of the company. Further, the shares 
repurchased by the company must not exceed 5% of the total shares already issued, 




C. Trade union 
(A) Trade union rights as one of the eight core labour standards  
Trade union rights mainly comprise two aspects: freedom of association and 
collective bargaining. The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to 
Organize Convention ensures the right to ―establish and, subject only to the rules of 
the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own choice without previous 
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authorization,‖ 143  ―to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their 
representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to 
formulate their programmes.‖144 Article 1 of the Rights to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention provides that ―workers shall enjoy adequate protection against 
acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment.‖ 
Trade union rights are established for employees because they run the risk from 
employers ―across the world, both public and private, of outright dismissal, wage cuts, 
bonus suspension, arbitrary transfers, harassment tactics.‖145 Against today‘s global 
background of market competition and trade liberalization, the contradiction between 
the pursuit of maximum profits by employers and the maximum benefits expected by 
workers worsens the relationship of contracting parties. The rights of free association 
and collective bargaining offer a weapon of power to workers. Such rights also help 
―build balanced economic growth, sustain purchasing power, improve human resource 
development, and divert wages to health and education investment.‖146 
 
(B) China 
Historically, the working class in China has been respected and admired as the 
leading class since the liberation and establishment of the PRC in 1949. Employees 
have the right to participate in and organize trade unions in accordance with the Labor 
Law.
147
 Trade unions should represent and safeguard the legitimate rights and 
interests of employees. There are two kinds of contracts between employers and 
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employees: ―labor contracts‖ that individual employee enter into with an employer, 
and ―collective contracts‖ that are entered into by the trade union of the company or 
by a group of employees by themselves together with the employer if there is no trade 
union. 
 
a. Labor contract 
One of the functions of the trade union of a company is to assist and direct 
employees, who are entering into the labor contracts with employers.
148
 When an 
employer unilaterally dissolves a labor contract, it must notify the trade union of the 
reasons in advance. If the employer violates the law or a labor contract, the trade 
union has the power to require the employer to engage in ratification. The employer 
must ―consider‖ the opinion of the trade union and notify it of the result in writing.149 
The word ―consider,‖ however, is quite vague. In a legal sense, ―consider‖ means 
―advisory,‖ rather than ―mandatory.‖ In other words, the trade union has no actual 
authority to change corporate decisions. 
 
b. Collective contracts 
The employees of an enterprise may get together as a party to negotiate with 
their employer to make a collective contract on matters of remuneration, working 
hours, breaks, vacations, work safety and hygiene, insurance, and benefits. The draft 
of the collective contract must be presented at meetings attended by all employees for 
discussion and approval.
150
 The collective contract may also be entered into with the 
employer by the trade union on behalf of employees where the company has set up a 
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The trade union supervises the employer‘s fulfillment of labor contracts or 
collective contracts. If an employee applies for arbitration or files a lawsuit, then the 
trade union should ―give support‖ to employees.152 The word ―support‖ here is also 
unclear, and it is not specified what kind of support should be given, and the extent to 
which the support will be considered appropriate to protect employees. The laws and 
regulations similarly do not specify the circumstances in and the procedures by which 
trade union can protect employees. 
Collective labor action is still rare in China, although there have been strikes and 
protests in the form of collective demonstration, petitions, and sit-ins at the entrances 
of government offices in some cities and towns.
153
 China is now taking its first steps 
toward maintaining the employment rate and advancing nationwide social insurance 
reform. However, the trade unions in China are still strictly controlled by 
government,
154
 a fact condemned in the surveys and reports of the ICFTU and 
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 The Chinese government was even brought up before the ICFTU on a 
charge of acting against workers‘ rights activists.156 
 
(C) Problems in China 
Workers in China are largely unaware of their legal rights, and are not familiar 
with how to exercise their rights by law. Most labor protests are spontaneous and are 
not organized by trade unions or through normative procedures.
157
 The current 
employment contract has administrative characteristics that are different from general 
commercial contracts between equal parties and create a power disparity between 
employers and employees. There is a lack of effective mechanisms for resolving labor 
disputes, because the current remedial approaches strictly follow a process that starts 
with internal mediation (no time-line limit by law) and continues to arbitration (45-60 
days
158
) and then to litigation (court of first instance: 6-12 months; court of appeal: 3 
months
159
). This process is time and cost consuming, making it difficult for 
economically disadvantaged employees to take measures to fully protect their rights. 
    The state-controlled model as applied to the state-held listed companies is 
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connected with China‘s overall management of state-assets during the economic 
transition from a state-planned to a market-oriented economy through SOE reforms. 
The political and economic underpinnings of the state-controlled model will be 
discussed in the next chapter. The hallmarks of the model, that is, two-tier 
shareholding and a two-tier board in state-held listed companies, are explored in 






















Chapter III Underpinnings of the State-Controlled Model 
 
―Throughout the world, the development of markets has often been related, if 
not to historical accidents, at least to the course of political and economic 
developments and geographical imperatives.‖  
 
Paul Horsnell, Oil in Asia: Markets, Trading, Refining and Deregulation 
(Oxford University Press, 1997) 
 
China‘s development in the past three decades has focused on its economic 
growth,
160
 but legal reform has also been undertaken since the early 1990s to build a 
preliminary framework for the rule of law.  
The state-controlled model, as a corporate governance model for state-held listed 
company, chiefly relates to how well the state assets of China are managed, which is 
at the very ―intersection‖ of political control and economic reform. 161  The 
state-controlled model has been underpinned by the government‘s political control 
and SOE reform in China, and is also connected with state asset management on a 
multi-level administrative basis. 
 
3.1 Political control by government 
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Politics is the major force shaping the state-controlled model of corporate 
governance for state-held listed companies in China.
162
 China is a unitary state in 
terms of power distribution structure. Local power is redistributed by the central 
authority, and is directed and supervised by the central authority, thus creating a 
uniform and efficient administration.  
National security and state sovereignty, which give China independent 
decision-making power, are regarded as primary by Chinese leaders. However, since 
China‘s entry into the WTO, intense competition and trade liberalization have had an 
impact on national agriculture and SOEs.
163
 
The political institutions broadly deal with the power-distribution structure, 
political party organization, and public arrangements.
164
 However, in this thesis, the 
functions of the government that are discussed are limited to those connected with 
corporate governance.  
John Adams believes that ―good government is an empire of laws.‖165 The 
famous Chinese jurist Jiang Ping states the limitations of both the public rights of 
governments and the private rights of private entities: ―private rights may have more 
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freedom to be exercised but they are always subject to the discipline of the market as 
the ―invisible hand‖ and government intervention as the ―visible hand.‖ Public rights 
may have more definite norms to be followed, but they may be involved with the 
individual will of the decision-maker.‖166 The relationship between government and 
corporate governance is governed by the mutual interplay between public governance 




The relationship of government to corporate governance is a dynamic and 
interactive process
168
 in which the government plays the roles of both regulator and 
participant. 
 
A. Government as regulator 
As a regulator, the government can control or affect the private sector through 
business policies and taxation systems.
169 
The government in China exerts a unique 
influence by means of issuing statutory regulations to strike a balance of interests 
between and among shareholders and stakeholders,
170
 and may prevent or punish any 
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expropriation and abuse resulting from unsound governance. The government 
estimates and adjusts its economic policies and revises its policies.
171
 Listed 
companies must thus keep up to date and comply with the regulations promulgated by 
the government.  
 
B. Government as participant 
The government may have a majority shareholding interest and exclusive 
access to resources in listed companies with a state-shareholding structure.
172
 In 
terms of its ―participant‖ role as a controlling shareholder, governments always have 
a ―comparative advantage‖ to achieve resources.173 The effectiveness of participation 
is premise on the existence of a good government that is transparent and responsible.  
 
3.1.2 Bank-based model 
One of the disadvantages of state-controlled ownership is the government‘s 
interference in the banks‘ business. In China, the government still exercises control 
over loan agreements between ―big-four‖ commercial banks and state-held listed 
companies. Governments often intervene in loan decisions.
174
 This controlling 
influence is also felt through the macro-economic policies of the central government 
and their implementation by local governments, who are under pressure to meet their 
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annual GDP targets. Administrative interference in decision-making about loans has 
given rise to banks ―absorbing bad loans from non-performing SOEs.‖175 
The ―big-four‖ commercial banks are not autonomous financial institutions, but 
rather are instruments that the government uses to control the market, and especially 
SOEs, for the political necessity of maintaining stability and employment.
176
 This is a 
regular practice in transitional economies. The banks become ―transfer agents‖ that 
transfer funds only in order to meet ―state-initiated commitments.‖177 As the former 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan, recognized, inefficient SOEs, 




Whether banks as creditors are able to effectively monitor corporate business 
thus depends on the presence of effective banking regulations and banking 
practices.
179
 The current responsibility of China‘s banks to check debtors is passive, 
in that they only check a corporation‘s financial credit and the operations of the 
supervisory board.
180
 Thus, in practice, the use and repayment of bank loans are not 
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3.1.3 Stakeholder model  
In the process of SOE reform, the question arises as to how well the government 
has coped with its changed role of being separated from enterprise but still monitoring 
business entities to some extent, and how it has dealt with the contradictions between 
traditional social equality and intense market competition. These questions are 
connected to other issues such as the loss of state assets, rising levels of 
unemployment, and the emergence of social upheaval.
182
 
Further to one of the disadvantages of state controlled ownership in the 
bank-based model having been discussed above in 3.1.2, the other disadvantage of 
state-controlled ownership is that governments may exercise their controlling power 
for multiple social purposes with little consideration of economic efficiency.
183
 The 
goals of state control of an enterprise are both commercial (wealth maximization for 
shareholders) and non-commercial, such as the maintenance of urban employment 
levels and the direction of sensitive industries.
184
 The government is also concerned 
with local economic growth and the development of municipal infrastructure, which is 
included in the evaluation indexes for the performance of local governments. The 
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state-controlled model, which is founded on the stakeholder model to some extent, is 
characterized in the inconsistent pursuit of often conflicting multiple targets at 
different levels of government and across different regions. Any SOE-affiliated 
companies within the same group, including state-held companies, share the burden of 
achieving the various social objectives of SOEs. This thesis examines the specific 
objective of employment.  
 
A. SOEs and the social insurance program 
    In terms of political ideology in China, consciousness of social class (―Jie Ji‖) 
and communist collectivism are highly valued. The employee, who is assigned to the 
―worker‘s class‖ (―Gongren Jieji‖), is recognized by the Preamble of the PRC 
Constitution as the ―leading class‖ since the liberation of China and the establishment 
of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.  
The social insurance system in China was established in 1951 to cover pensions, 
medical services, and worker‘s injuries. Under this system, SOEs bear a heavy burden 
of social responsibility as both manufacturing entities and social welfare providers.
185
 
    For a long time, ―unemployment‖ was not officially recognized in any socialist 
countries and was believed to be an exclusive phenomenon existing only in capitalist 
societies. At that time, those who had no jobs were deemed to be ―waiting for jobs.‖ 
National policies such as the ―uniform assignment of jobs‖ and ―low wages and a high 
rate of employment‖ were put in place to solve the problem of unemployment. All 
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workers were paid equally under the policy of the ―iron rice bowl,‖ which was neither 
fair nor efficient. 
The unemployment insurance (UI) system in China was first established in 1986 
when the Interim Provisions on Unemployment Insurance for Staff of State 
Enterprises
186
 were promulgated by the State Council. In 1993, the Regulations on 
Unemployment Insurance for Staff and Workers of State-owned Enterprises
187
 were 
enacted. These regulations extended the scope of the beneficiaries of UI to seven 
types, and provided for the collection and management of the UI fund. However, they 
still emphasized SOEs, and ignored unemployment in other types of enterprises, in 
this not being substantially different from earlier regulations. Since 1994, the 
establishment and perfection of the socialist market economy has been set as the 
objective of economic reform in China. As there are large numbers of displaced 
employees, further improvement of unemployment insurance system is vital. In 1999, 
the State Council promulgated the Unemployment Insurance Regulations, which were 
a ―revision, supplement and amendment‖ of the 1993 Regulations.188 Under the 
revised regulations, all unemployed staff and workers in business entities in urban 
areas, including state-owned enterprises, collective enterprises, foreign-funded 
enterprises, and private enterprises, are covered by unemployment insurance.  
 
B. Urban layoffs 




 See online: http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw66.htm 
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    Since 1994, economic reform has centered on the development of the market 
economy and the encouragement of competition in the domestic market. The 
increasing rate of unemployment has also been pushed to the top of the agenda. The 
―unemployment rate‖ was noted in the State Statistics Report in 1994 for the first 
time.  
The transition from state-planned to market-oriented economy has resulted in 
―urban layoffs.‖ ―Urban layoffs‖ refer to ―permanent workers of state-owned 
enterprises who had been employed before the labor contract system was established 
in China or whose labor contracts have not yet expired, [who] are laid off from their 
working positions for retrenchment. Their labor relations with SOEs have not been 
terminated.‖189  
To alleviate the problem of ―urban layoffs,‖ the ―Project of Reemployment‖ 
was initiated as a state policy. This project requires that every SOE establish a 
reemployment center that has three main functions. The first is distributing 
maintenance fees for layoffs which are provided jointly by the enterprise, government 
subsidy, and the UI fund (from UI agencies). The second is paying UI premiums for 
layoffs, and the third is helping laid-off employees to seek reemployment through job 
direction and training. 
At present, ―urban layoffs‖ are not included in the unemployment rate. The 
Project of Reemployment is a policy with Chinese characteristics under current 
national conditions, and represents a temporary stage in the transfer of layoffs from 
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SOEs to the market. However, increasingly the term ―urban layoffs‖ is being replaced 
by ―unemployment‖ in line with the progression to a market economy. 
 
3.2 Economic reform – SOE reform  
The official economic growth rate in China rose from 8% in 2002 to 11.4% in 
2007 following China‘s entry into the WTO in late 2001. China‘s GDP in 2007 
reached US$3.2 trillion, making it the world‘s fourth largest economy after the USA, 
Japan, and Germany.
190
 In 2007, 74.8 billion US dollars of foreign investment was 
put into use, an increase of 13.6% over the figure for 2006.
191
 China is stimulating its 
economic rise by expanding both export trade, mainly based on consumer goods, and 
domestic private consumption, although China‘s economic growth has been slowed 
by the global economic downturn since late 2008.  
 
3.2.1 Overview of SOEs 
There are three types of SOEs in China: (1) special enterprise, incorporated 
under the Law of the People's Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by 
the Whole People (―IEOWP Law‖), is run by the government for national defense, 
infrastructure, and other sectors of public interest; (2) solely state-funded company 
(―Guoyou Duzi Gongsi‖), which is a specific kind of limited liability company under 
the PRC Company Law, is 100% owned by the state. The SASAC are authorized by 
the State Council or the local people‘s government to act as the investor for 
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; and (3) state-held company (inclusive of its 
subsidiaries, affiliates and branches), which is incorporated either as limited 
companies or as joint stock limited companies, includes listed and non-listed 
state-held companies. A solely state-funded company or the SASAC (or its 




Based on political orientation (for example, privatization in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe) and financial orientation,
194
 SOE reform can have a range 
of targets, including the promotion of firm efficiency,
195
 relieving public budgets, the 
reduction of managerial abuse, or the improvement of resource allocation.
196
  
In China, the main purpose of SOE reform is to raise capital to overcome the 
financial losses and operational inefficiency of SOEs, which have caused and 
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accumulated a large amount of NPLs in the commercial banks.
197
 SOE reform has 
involved the corporatization and privatization of SOEs. SOEs are able to take 
profitable assets into newly incorporated companies which are then listed on the stock 
exchanges as state-held listed companies.
198
  
―Holistic‖ listing has been increasingly encouraged by the Chinese government 
since 2004
199
 to facilitate the restructuring of the central SOEs undergoing reform. 
Holistic listing means the listing of the whole group, rather than a single company of 
the group. This form of listing reduces the risk of tunneling from listed subsidiaries by 
the controlling shareholder, because the holding company of the group is subject to 
the same level of transparency as that of all other listed companies, and interests are 
centered on the same group.  
Eighty percent of the assets of the central SOEs have been capitalized into 
state-held listed companies.
200
 The statistics of the China Corporate Governance 
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 show that around two thirds of the companies listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange at the end of 2008 were state-held listed companies. According to Mr. 
Li Rongrong, Chairman of the SASAC, ―the state-held listed company is an essential 
component of SOEs.‖ As at the end of 2008, the number of state-held listed 
companies had reached 900, and their assets, turnovers, and profits accounted for 
29.2%, 40.9%, and 54.4% that of all SOEs, respectively.
202
 
SOE reform in China features three unique characteristics that are distinct from 
those of similar reforms in Western countries and East European countries. First, SOE 
reform in China is connected with China‘s economic transition from a state-planned to 
a market-oriented economy. Second, local governments have taken great 
responsibility for developing the local economy to further open it up to the outside 
world under governmental decentralization.
203
 Third, the privatization of SOEs in 
China has taken a gradual and informal approach. In the process of reform, numerous 
SOEs have failed to meet operational targets and are on the brink of bankruptcy. How 
the government manages such national assets is a crucial issue to the autonomy and 
vitality of state-held listed companies. 
 
3.2.2 Three Characteristics of SOE Reform 
A. China‘s economic transition from a state-planned to a market-oriented economy 
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    The past thirty years have witnessed a gradual
204
 and complex process of SOE 
reform in China in accordance with multiple and conflicting objectives. The 
adjustment of the institutional framework and policy by cautious degrees has ensured 
the stable persistence and progress of reform
205




The course of SOE reform in China can be divided into two phases.
207
 The first 
was an experimental stage governed by trial and error that ran from 1979 to 1992 
alongside the opening-up policy and economic reform. The second phase is from 
1993 until the present, which has seen the launch of corporatization following the 
promulgation in 1993 of the PRC Company Law. The classic governance structure 
involving a general meeting, board of directors, and management did not take shape 
until the legitimization of corporatization by the first Chinese Company Law in 
1993.
208
 China has made great efforts since the early 1990s to establish a socialist 
market economy with Chinese characteristics. During this transitional process, 
continuously deepening SOE reform has been initiated to promote efficiency, 
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profitability, and accountability by means of re-construction, mergers, privatization, or 
bankruptcy of unprofitable enterprises. Subsequently, more fierce market competition 
is leading China to re-construct its labor-management nexus and re-distribute social 
resources. 
The landmark dividing these two phases is the memorable tour of Southern 
China by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, when he delivered various speeches that 
determined the nature of China‘s economic reform, placing reform in the foremost 
position and underscoring that it depended on the concomitant development of 
science and technology and education. The well-known theory advanced by Mr. Deng 
was that the choice between a state-planned economy and a market-oriented economy 
should not be the essential difference between capitalism and socialism. They are two 
kinds of economic instruments available to any country. He further provided three 
criteria to evaluate the success of reform: (1) whether productivity has been boosted; 
(2) whether comprehensive national power has been enhanced; (3) whether people‘s 
living standard has been improved.
209
 Deng Xiaoping‘s speeches have served as the 
theoretical foundation for solving the long-term debate on the ideological issue of 
SOE reform and the move toward free trade.
210
 
Deng‘s notion of socialism with Chinese characteristics was interpreted by Hu 
Jintao, President of China and General Secretary of the Communist Party, as 
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―undertaking economic development as the central task and making a harmonious 
society with socialist democracy and culture.‖211 This centralization of economic 
development and opening up is the successor to the core tenets of the second and third 
generation of leaders of China, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, after the first 
generation of Mao Zedong. 
 
B. Decentralization 
China is a unitary state in which the authority of local governments is 
redistributed from the central government and is directed and supervised by the 
central authority, and national security (stability) and state sovereignty (independency) 
are paramount.  
The latest Guidelines of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) for National 
Economic and Social Development pushes the various government to accelerate the 
construction of ―serving government, responsible government, and legally governing 
government.‖212 Based on the ―scientific concept of development‖ and ―theory of 
harmonious socialist society‖ proposed by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao, the core leaders of the fourth generation, the political influence of government 
in the economics of the private sector is to be reduced and limited through the 
decoupling of government functions from enterprise management, asset management, 
and market mediation (expert and public consultation
213
). 
Power distribution generally ranges from extreme centralization to complete 
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 The power distribution structure in China is undergoing a 
transition from complete centralization to gradual decentralization, which is 
characterized by the following conditions concluded by Qian and Weingast: ―(1) 
There exists a hierarchy of governments; (2) The sub-national governments have 
primary authority over the economy within their jurisdictions; (3) The national 
government has the authority to police the common market.‖215 Applying these three 
conditions to China‘s current decentralization status, it can be concluded that the three 




(A) First condition  
 China has traditionally been a nation of centralized power. Before the opening 
up commenced in 1978, local governments had no independent powers, especially 
economic autonomy, and instead were effectively ―agents‖ of the central 
government
217
 that operated on the administrative orders of the central authority. All 
fiscal taxation revenues had to be submitted to the central government, and 
government grants and funding resources (based on a certain proportion of the 
revenues submitted the year before) were then disbursed from the central to the local 
governments. 
 
(B) Second condition 
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 Deng Wei, ―The Relationship between Central and Local Government under 




Since 1978, administrative power has been decentralized to local governments. 
Economic decentralization in particular has been a crucial step on the path of China‘s 
economic reform
218
 whereby local governments have obtained more autonomy to 
develop local markets to relieve the burden of the central government. From a 
macroscopic perspective, concentration has been replaced with coordination between 
regions and adjustment across the whole economic system. The new vertical 
administrative hierarchy has motivated local governments to seek rapid and 
innovative growth, rather than passively executing the orders of Central government. 
From 1979 to 1993, fiscal revenues were distributed based on profit-sharing terms 
through contracts made between the central and local governments. Since 1994, a 
separate tax system has been adopted to meet the requirements of the new market 
economy. Under this new tax system, the central government is in charge of industries 
with national or trans-regional interests, but local governments have the right to 
collect taxes from entities more closely related to the local context. 
 
(C) Third condition 
    In practice, the rights conferred on local governments may be unilaterally taken 
back by the central government at will by administrative order.
219
 An ―ad hoc‖ 
approach is adopted rather than a ―rule-based‖ approach, and no systematic 
regulations are followed by the government in respect of decentralization.
220
 In other 
words, the central government still maintains full discretion over policy-making in 
both the political and the economic sense. 
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From the economic perspective, privatization is a process in which state-owned 
property is transferred to the private sector.
221
 Privatization is a national economic 
means to promote market efficiency to cure the ―impaired profit-orientation‖ and 
maintain the ―balance between the public and private‖ economy.222 
Privatization is defined in a political sense as ―a combination of the reallocation 
of control rights over employment from politicians to managers and the increase in 
cash flow ownership of managers and private investors.‖223 The starting point of this 
argument is that the inefficiency of public enterprises is caused by political 
interference, rather than efficiency maximization, and thus privatization may work if 
it can control political abuse.
224
  
State ownership is considered to be inconsistent with enterprise efficiency,
225
 
because bureaucrats have virtually total power over firms and can direct them to 
pursue any political objective. State ownership is then an example of concentrated 
control with no cash flow rights and socially harmful objectives.
226
 Furthermore, 
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governments may be concerned with social stability, attracting investment, and 
securing a low unemployment rate.  
 
(B) Privatization in China 
The basic economic system in China aims to keep public ownership as the 
mainstay and allow diverse forms of ownership to develop synchronously.
227
 The 
private sector of the economy was for the first time recognized by the PRC 
Constitution, in which it is referred to as the ―individual economy,‖ which is to exist 
and develop within the limits prescribed by law as a ―complement to the socialist 
public economy‖ to be guided, supervised, and controlled by the state.228  The 
Amendment to the Constitution 1999
229
 changed the terms ―complement‖ and 
―socialist public economy‖ to ―constitute an important component of the socialist 
market economy.‖ The latest Amendment to the Constitution 2004230 supplements 
that the state shall encourage, support and guide the development of the private 
economy. 
Since 2005, non-state capital has been expressly permitted by law to enter what 
were once monopoly industries, such as the public utilities and infrastructure, social 
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undertakings (education, scientific research, health, and culture), financial services, 
defense-related science and technology, and other fields not forbidden by law.
231
 
Moreover, non-capital capital is now allowed to participate in the structural 




    For China, privatization is informal rather than officially pronounced, because 
―privatization‖ is a sensitive term in the arena of economic reform. Other terms are 
often used, such as ―corporatization,‖ ―ownership transformation,‖ or ―transformation 
of the system,‖ which are considered more compatible with the Chinese ideology of 
―a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.‖233  
Privatization is usually taken as ―an indispensable element in Chinese SOEs 
reform.‖234 In the process of SOEs reform, privatization is gradually progressing on a 
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 with shares of SOEs after corporatization being ―issued to the private 
investors while the state retains a controlling interest.‖ 236  In this case, the 
professional managers of the previous SOEs enter into operational contracts with 
governments which give them the authority to manage the companies.
237
  
In brief, the central government still retains macro-level control over the gradual 
progression of decentralization and privatization (along with SOE reform) in the 
transition from a state-planned to a market-oriented economy.  
 
3.3 Managing state assets in China 
3.3.1 Basic economic system and property rights 
The current basic economic system in China is set out in the Property Law of 
PRC, according to which ―public ownership plays a dominant role and diverse forms 
of ownership develop side by side in the socialist market economy system and 
safeguard the equal legal status and development rights of all market operators.‖238 
The term ―property‖ is defined by the Property Law as the ―exclusive ownership 
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of direct control enjoyed by the holder according to law over a specific res.‖239 The 
assets owned by the state consist of ―mineral deposits, waters, sea areas, urban lands 
and other lands prescribed by law, radio frequency spectrum resources, assets for 
national defense.‖240  
    In China, the administration of state assets by the government has a multi-level 
structure, as shown in Figure 3.1. On the first level, state-owned assets are recognized 
by the Law of the People's Republic of China on the State-owned Assets of Enterprises 




On the second level, the State Council can, on behalf of the state, exercise the 
ownership of state-owned assets by performing ―investor‘s duties and enjoy[ing] the 
rights and interests accordingly on behalf of the state.‖242  
At the next level, the State Council may authorize the local people‘s governments 
to act as investors along with itself.
243
 The State Council is in charge of central SOEs 
(typically large entities that are vital to the national economy, national security, major 
infrastructure, and essential natural resources), and local governments administer the 
remaining SOEs (usually small to medium-sized entities related to local industries).
244
 
At the fourth level, the SASAC and local branches of the SASAC are authorized 
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On Behalf of the State 
Authorization Authorization 
respectively by the State Council and local governments to manage and supervise 
SOE assets,
245
 except those related to financial institutions (for example, banks, 
securities companies, and insurance companies), the administration of which is 
authorized by the Ministry of Finance.
246
 The local branches of the SASAC are 
supervised by their respective governments and by the SASAC. 
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3.3.2 Separation of government bodies and enterprises 
Corporate governance in SOEs in China has undergone a host of reforms.  In 
addition to restructuring measures, at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central 
Committee, a ―Modern Enterprise System‖ was proposed as a corporate form 
compatible with the socialist market economy. This sets the ―separation of 
bureaucracy and business‖ as a goal.  Specifically, the SOAE Law, which governs the 
management of state-owned assets and deals with the rights and responsibilities of 
investors in relation to such assets, is based on the principle of the separation of 
government bodies and enterprises.  Section 6 of the SOAE Law provides that the 
State Council and local governments shall perform investor functions, which 
separates the functions of the administration of public affairs from the functions of the 
state-owned assets investor and stipulates non-intervention in the legitimate and 
independent business operations of enterprises.  Section 16 of the SOAE Law further 
provides that operational autonomy and other lawful rights and interests legally 
enjoyed by state-invested enterprises are protected by law.  
For instance, the prospectus for the CNPC‘s issuance of short-term financing 
bonds
247
 dated October 22, 2009 sets forth certain internal operational procedures and 
a description of the CNPC.  Reading this in conjunction with the SOAE Law reveals 
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that the CNPC is an independently operated corporation subject to state approval with 
respect to certain major corporate events, such as mergers, splits, an increase or 
reduction in registered capital, the issuance of bonds, distribution of profits, and 
dissolution, and petition for bankruptcy.  Such practice is consistent with the legal 
requirements of the SOAE Law that SOEs operate independently from the 






Before the SASAC was established in 2003, the rights of investors in SOEs were 
enjoyed by several Ministries or Commissions under the State Council. The Planning 
Commission had the authority to approve investment, the Economy and Trading 
Commission controlled operations, the Ministry of Finance had the right to transfer 
assets, and the Enterprise Working Commission controlled human resources. Due to 
the overlapping authority between these government agencies, SOEs often received 
various directions from the government.
249
 The difficulty was that property rights, or 
who was the ―investor,‖ had not been properly identified. This was not simply a 
problem of tracing funds but of assigning property rights and liabilities, such that ―the 
competing claimants － the various government departments and agencies often 
cannot reach consensus as to who is (or shall be) the ―investor.‖250  
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It was in these circumstances that the SASAC was set up to take on the 
responsibilities of investor and to supervise and manage the state-owned assets of 
enterprises (excluding the assets in the financial enterprises).
251
 It shoulders the 
responsibility for ―supervising the preservation and increment of the value of the 
state-owned assets‖ of the supervised enterprises.252 
 
B. Investors in the two types of companies 
(A) Non-listed holding companies 
There are two types of non-listed holding companies in which the SASAC 
performs the role of investor: pure holding companies and mixed holding companies. 
A holding company is said to be a ―pure‖ holding company if it ―exists solely for 
the purpose of owning stock in other companies‖ (exclusively having income deriving 
from participations in other companies).
253
 If the holding company also engages in its 
own business for trading, operations, and manufacturing, it is said to be a ―mixed‖ 
holding company.  
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a. Pure holding companies 
Pure holding companies are usually the controlling shareholders of companies in 
two lines of businesses: the operation or investment of state assets. The subsidiaries of 
pure holding companies may engage in one or both types of business: operation 
focuses on the restructuring of insolvent (or near to insolvent) SOEs, and investment 
involves choosing good projects and portfolios for investment to make profit and 
increase the value of state assets. 
Subsidiary SOEs are called state asset operating companies, or state asset 
investment companies, depending on their key business. For instance, the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), established on 29 September, 2007 as one of the 
largest state asset investment companies in China, is engaged in equity investments 
overseas. The Central Huijin Investment Company, formerly the biggest financial 
investment company in China, was merged with the CIC group as one of its 
subsidiaries (although it has continued to carry out its role in China‘s domestic 
banking reform of capitalizing state-owned and -controlled banks and other financial 
institutions). The CIC invests in banks, trust companies, and fund management 
companies to gain financial returns.
254
 The Shanghai state-owned Assets Operation 
Co., Ltd. (SHAOC) is a typical state assets operation company that was founded on 
October 15th, 1999. The SHAOC restructures assets by acquisition, management, or 
divestment. It strives to ―provide services for the synergistic consolidation of SOEs 
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and the withdrawal of those state assets from non-strategic industries.‖255 
 
b. Mixed holding companies 
Mixed holding companies are usually a group of companies with a variety of 
subsidiaries in a chain of businesses in a specific industry involved with capital, 
technology, manufacturing, or marketing. Mixed holding companies are often the 
largest company in an industry on the national or local level. An example is the China 
National Tobacco Corporation,
256
 which was previously a government agency that 
was transformed into an SOE.  
Similarly, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), established on 
September 17, 1988 by the Ministry of Petroleum Industry, is China‘s largest oil and 
gas producer and supplier. The CNPC is a typical mixed holding company, with 161 
directly-held subsidiaries and integrated businesses that cover ―petroleum exploration 
and production, natural gas production and pipeline transportation, refining and 
marketing of crude oil and oil products, oilfield services, engineering construction, 
petroleum equipment manufacturing, as well as capital management, finance and 
insurance services.‖257  
 
(B) Public listed companies 
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Since 2006, the SASAC has directly held shares in state-held listed companies, 
rather than being an investor in the non-listed holding companies.
258
 The SASAC has 
announced that it will invest in more Chinese listed companies as the controlling 
shareholder from 2010.
259
 Figure 3.2 demonstrates that the SASAC leapfrogs the 
non-listed holding companies to become the controlling shareholder of State-held 
listed companies. 
 










Taking out the holding companies in the middle will turn the three-level structure 
into a two-level structure. This two-level administration may help the SASAC to gain 
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more direct access to the businesses of listed companies and reduce the costs incurred 
by having holding companies. Nevertheless, the existence of holding companies 
between the SASAC and listed companies may act as an ―isolation strip‖ to separate 
bureaucracy from business in accordance with the principle of the separation of 
government bodies and enterprises enshrined in the SOAE Law. Furthermore, the 
―investor‖ role of the SASAC blurs the distinction between its functions of 
shareholder and regulator of state-held listed companies. In the event of shareholder 
lawsuits being filed by minority shareholders, whether legal proceedings would 
follow general commercial (corporate) or administrative legal procedures has not been 
clarified by any statute or regulation. 
 
C. Investors‘ rights 
As an investor in SOEs, the SASAC has two main supervising functions: 
regulation and control. 
 
(A) Regulation 
The SASAC drafts laws and regulations on the management of state-owned 
assets, and has established a series of rules to supervise the management of 
state-owned assets in respect of statistics, reporting, and evaluation.
260
 State-held 
listed companies are required to report on operations, assets, market information, 
shareholdings, employees and other information to the SASAC within two working 
                                                        
260
 Supra Note 26, at 396. 
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a. Distribution control 
    The proceeds of investment are collected by the Ministry of Finance and 
monitored by the SASAC.
262
 The proceeds consist of dividends; profits; income from 
the transfer of state assets or state-owned shares or from liquidation, and other 
proceeds.
263
 Profits are calculated as 5% or 10% (in accordance with the industrial 
categorization declared by the SASAC and Ministry of Finance) of the net profits that 





b. Human resources control 
    The SASAC has the authority to appoint and dismiss directors, supervisors and 
senior executives (―top management‖) of non-listed holding companies.265 The top 
management appointed by the SASAC would be punished should great losses of state 
assets or poor decision-making arise.
266
 As the members of the top management team 
                                                        
261
 The Notice of Establishing Information Reporting System concerning the 
Operations of State-held Listed Companies, issued by the SASAC, with effect from 
19 January, 2010. 
262
 Art.5, the Interim Measures for the Administration of the Collection of Proceeds 
from State-owned Capital of Central Enterprises, issued by Ministry of Finance and 
SASAC, with effect from 11 December, 2007. 
263




Supra Note 241, Sec.22.
 
266
 Supra Note 18, at 21. 
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of holding companies are at the same time senior officials in the central government, 
it seems that such companies are more like an agency of the government, and in this 
case business has not practically been kept away from the bureaucracy. 
The SASAC has no authority to directly appoint the top management in 
state-held listed companies (in which corporate governance is strictly regulated by  
corporate statutes and listing rules), but it can still control several aspects, including 
the nomination of top management, the procedures for general meetings and board 
meetings, and the determination of reserved matters to be approved by by special 
resolution, all of which can be set out by the corporate statutes without prejudice to 
the applicable laws. 
 
c. Major events and financial control 
    The SASAC reviews the budgets and financial reports of SOEs, and monitors 
their business operations by annual and ad hoc auditing.  It is also responsible for the 
approval of major events by the provisions in the constitutional documents of the 
listed company with respect to the investment, guarantee, restructure, pricing of 
transference of shares, and liquidation.
267
 Directors appointed or nominated by the 
SASAC must report such major events to the SASAC. If SOEs lose their 
state-controlled status through restructuring or share transfer, then the SASAC must 
                                                        
267
 The transference of State-owned assets is usually through following ways: auction, 
gratuitous grant, agreement, or takeover in secondary market. However, there exist 
problems in this process. For example, what is the test to judge whether there is a loss 
of state assets if transferring; when the SASAC have the power to make approval, 




report the event to the State Council for final approval.
268
 
In summary, the state-controlled model in China underpins both political control 
and SOE reform. SOE reform in China is connected with China‘s economic transition 
from a state-planned to a market-oriented economy, and local governments have taken 
on responsibility for the development of the local economy to further open up the 
Chinese economy to the outside world by the gradual and informal approach program 
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Chapter IV Two-tier Shareholding Structure 
 
―Every law has no atom of strength, as far as no public opinion supports it.‖ 
    Wendell Phillips, American leader against slavery 
 
4.1 Shareholding structure  
4.1.1 Two types of ownership structure 
As early as 1932, Berle and Means recognized the value of the ―separation of 
ownership and control‖ in the corporate system and ―a wider dispersion of stock 
ownership.‖269 Jensen and Meckling (1976) support and develop the findings of Berle 
and Means.
270
 However, La Porta et al. (1999) show that companies are typically 
controlled by families or the state.
271
 Claessens et al. (1999) confirm that the 
family-control model is displayed in more than half of all East Asian corporations,
272
 
and Becht et al. (1999) also find an the extraordinarily high degree of concentration of 
shareholder voting power in Continental Europe compared with that in the United 
                                                        
269
 Berle, Adolf A. & Means, Gardner C., The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property (New York, Macmillan, 1932), at 47. 
270
 See generally Michael Jensen & William Meckling, ―Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure‖ (1976) 3 J.Fin.Econ. 
305. 
271
 Through investigation of ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy 
economies, it is found that relatively few of the subject firms are widely held except 
for those in economies with very good shareholder protection. Hence, the firms are 
typically controlled by families or the state. See Supra Note 269. 
272
 The investigation of ultimate control patterns in 2980 publicly traded companies 
in nine East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), it is concluded that large family control 
in more than half of East Asian corporations, and significant cross-country differences 
do exist. See See Stijn Claessens et al., ―Who Controls East Asian Corporations?‖, 
Working Paper, 1999. 
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States and the United Kingdom.
273
 
The corporate governance of public listed companies may differ due to different 
ownership structures, levels of board performance, and investor relations. It is 
recognized by Howson (2005) that the standard of good governance in a large public 
company with a diffuse shareholding population will be different from that of a 
closely held company. In the latter context, owners can negotiate the governance of 
the firm, or at least fully understand how the company is to be governed. In contrast, 
in widely held companies, public shareholders may ―have no real expectation that 
their ownership interest will be coupled with a control right.‖ Instead, their interest 
―may be limited by the circumstances to a purely economic interest to receive 
dividends or to be able to transfer the stock to capture accumulated value.‖274  
 
A. Companies with a dispersed shareholding structure  
This type of company is usually widely owned by a large number of shareholders, 
and is the traditionally prevailing corporate form in the United States and United 
                                                        
273
 The finding is the extraordinarily high degree of concentration of shareholder 
voting power in Continental Europe relative to the USA and the UK. See Becht, 
Marco & Röell, Ailsa, ―Blockholdings in Europe: An International Comparison‖ 
(1999) 43 European Economic Review 1049. 
274 
 See generally Nicholas C. Howson, ―Regulation of Companies with Publicly 
Listed Share Capital in the People‘s Republic of China‖ (2005) 38 Cornell Int‘l L.J. 





 Here there is a separation of ownership and control that can create 
problems between shareholders and management. Strategies to overcome this are 
either to give more power to shareholders or to enhance the liability of directors. 
 
B. Companies with a concentrated shareholding structure 
This type of company is usually controlled by one or a few controlling 
shareholders. In a company with a concentrated shareholding structure, ownership and 
control are closely related, particularly in family-owned or state-held companies.
276
 
Table 4.1 shows the ownership distribution of Chinese public listed companies 
between 1994 and 2005. It reveals that the aggregate ownership of the five top 
shareholders is mostly between 50 and 75 percent of the total, and accounts for the 
majority shareholding structure. The controlling shareholders are usually from among 
the top five shareholders. 
                                                        
275
 See generally J. Armour, B.R. Cheffins & D. Skeel Jr., ―Corporate Ownership 
Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom‖ 
(2002) 55 Vanderbilt Law Review 1699. See Fama, Eugene F. Fama & Jensen, 
Michael C., ―Separation of Ownership and Control‖ (1983) 26 Journal of Law & 
Economics 301. See also supra Note 270. For ownership structure comparative 
research between the United States and United Kingdom, see Alan Dignam & 
Michael Galanis, ―Corporate Governance And the Importance of Macroeconomic 
Context‖ (2008) 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 201; see also Brian R. Cheffins, ―Law as 
Bedrock: The Foundations of An Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public 
Companies‖ (2003) 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1. 
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 For comparative research between Germany and Canada, see Aviv Pichhadze, 
―Mergers, Acquisitions, and Controlling Shareholders: Canada and Germany 
Compared‖ (2003) 18 B.F.L.R. 341. For comparative research of listed companies 
between Germany and the United Kingdom, see Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, 
―Why Are the Levels of Control (So) Different in German and U.K. Companies? 
Evidence from Initial Public Offerings‖ (2003) 19 J.L. Econ. & Org. 141; see also 
Mahmut Yavasi, ―Shareholding and Board Structures of German and UK Companies‖ 
(2001) 22(2) Comp. Law. 47. For China, see for example Pistor Katharina & 
Chenggang Xu ―Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from 
China‖ (2005) 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 184. 
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Table 4.1 Ownership Distribution of the Five Top Shareholders of Chinese Public 




















and <=50/ as 
a percentage 





and <=70/ as 
a percentage 








1994 168 7/4.16% 50/29.76% 74/44.05% 37/22.02% 
1995 252 4/1.59% 75/29.76% 115/45.36% 58/23.02% 
1996 512 10/2.00% 125/24.41% 260/50.78% 117/22.85% 
1997 718 13/1.81% 179/24.93% 355/49.44% 171/23.82% 
1998 825 13/1.58% 196/23.76% 402/48.73% 214/25.94% 
1999 923 11/1.19% 212/22.97% 461/49.95% 239/25.89% 
2000 1060 10/0.94% 251/23.68% 555/52.36% 244/23.02% 
2001 1136 11/0.97% 282/24.82% 598/52.64% 245/21.57% 
2002 1199 12/1.00% 293/24.44% 647/53.96% 247/20.60% 
2003 1261 16/1.27% 303/24.03% 689/54.64% 253/20.06% 
2004 1351 15/1.11% 310/22.95% 761/56.33% 265/19.62% 
2005 1342 17/1.27% 353/26.30% 754/56.18% 218/16.24% 
 
4.1.2 Two-tier shareholding structure 
It should be noted that the economic implications of maintaining a concentrated 
shareholding by means of prohibiting the public trading of state-owned shares (before 
2005) to a certain degree have shaped and reinforced the state-controlled model in its 
reliance on the financing functions of bank-based model, as banks still have a 
dominant role in the financing of public listed companies due to the restricted number 
of alternative funding channels by way of public trading. 
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 The statistics are from the CCER database (―Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Shi Chang 
Shu Ju Xi Tong‖), which is jointly developed by Sinofin Information Services and 
China Center for Economic Research. 
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A. Nature of the two-tier shareholding structure 
As at 31 December, 2009, there were a total of 1,718 Chinese public listed 
companies. The basic information on these public listed companies for the eight years 
ending 2009 is given in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Overview of Public Listed Companies in China  












shares (billion) / 
as % of total 
shares 
2002 1224 587.55 203.68 383.87   65.33% 
2003 1287 642.85 228.43 414.42  64.47% 
2004 1377 714.94 260.65 454.29  63.54% 
2005 1381 762.95 291.48 471.47  61.80% 
2006 1434 1489.76 563.78 925.98  62.16% 
2007 1550 2241.69 1033.15 1208.54  53.91% 
2008 1625 2452.29 1257.89 1194.40  48.71% 
2009 1718 2616.29 1975.95  640.34  24.48% 
  
In China, public listed companies held by the state have a two-tier shareholding 
structure that divides shares into two categories: non-tradable shares and tradable 
shares. Non-tradable shares are usually composed of (1) state shares (―Guojia Gu‖), 
which refer to shares owned by solely state-funded companies or SASAC, who are 
authorized by the central government or provincial governments to invest in Chinese 
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 The statistics are from the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission, 





 (2) legal person shares (―Faren Gu‖), which are shares owned by 
a business enterprise and can be divided into the three categories of a. state-owned 
legal person shares (―Guojia Faren Gu‖), which refer to shares held by state-owned 
enterprises (exclusive of solely state-funded companies);
280
 b. social legal person 
shares (―Shehui Faren Gu‖), which refer to shares owned by a domestic enterprise 
(―non-SOE enterprise‖). Non-SOE enterprises fall outside of the definition of SOEs 
discussed in Section 3.2.1 of Chapter III;
281
 and c. Foreign capital legal person shares 
(―Waizi Faren Gu‖), which refer to shares held by foreign enterprises from overseas, 
Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan.
282
  
There are three types of tradable shares: (1) A-shares, which are denominated in 
Yuan and only issued to domestic institutions or individual investors; (2) B-shares, 
which are only issued to foreign investors and are traded on the Chinese stock 
exchanges in foreign currency; and (3) H-shares, which are traded on the Hong Kong 
Stock exchange and do not fall within the scope of this research. 
Table 4.2 shows that the majority of shares during the period 2002 to 2007 were 
non-tradable shares. The percentage of non-tradable shares has decreased since 2006 
from 62.16% to 24.48% by the end of 2009, largely due to the Reform of Sales of 
Non-Tradable Shares of Public listed Companies in May 2005. 
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Article 2, Provisions of Supreme People’s Court on the Freezing and Auction of 
State-owned Shares of Listed Companies, issued by the Supreme People’s Court, with 






 Annette Kleinbrod, The Chinese Capital Market: Performance, Parameters for 
Further Evolution, and Implications for Development (Wiesbaden: Deutscher 
Universitats-Verlag, 2006), at 85. 
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B. Three-phase development of a two-tier shareholding structure in state-held listed 
companies 
(A) First stage (1957－1978): whole ownership and strict control over SOEs by 
governments 
After the foundation of the People‘s Republic of China in 1949 and the series of 
socialization transformations in the following 8 years, a unitary administrative system 
based on a planned economy and a central authority was established in 1957. The 
state was not the ultimate owner, but rather the agent of the ultimate owner, which 
was Chinese citizens. However, this kind of ownership was too abstract to be 
exercised, so the state in the form of the central and local governments exercised 
ownership rights on behalf of the Chinese people, including the possession, us, and 
transfer of assets. No enterprise had a distinct legal personality, and thus the 
ownership of the assets of SOEs was attributed to the state and all profits were 
submitted to the state coffers. Employment and wages were also arranged by the state. 
 
(B) Second stage (1978－1992): Autonomy for SOEs 
After reform and opening up to the outside world in 1978, enterprises were given 
more freedom to manage their operation and distribute their profits, and productivity 
and efficiency substantially increased as a result. Despite the fact that it was required 
that government and enterprises should be separate, the government still had 
far-reaching bureaucratic control and influence over enterprises. Before the launch of 
SOE reform in 1978, the general manager and Party secretary (―Dangwei Shuji‖) were 
90 
 
parallel positions that constituted the top management of SOEs. The general manager 
was in charge of the business operations as the agent of government.
283
 The Party 
secretary fulfilled the task of ―supervising the implementation of the guiding 
principles and policies of the Communist Party‖284 in the enterprise. The general 
manager was either appointed by the government or was elected in a meeting of 
employee representatives. However, the manager elected in a meeting of employee 
representatives still had to be approved by the government.
285
All SOEs were assigned 
to be supervised by specific government agencies.
286
 This sort of 
government-enterprise relationship arrangement promoted productivity to some extent 
and enhanced the efficiency of SOEs though the uniform distribution of resources 
between industries.  
This process of granting autonomy to SOEs was principally carried in four 
phases
287
: (1)1978 - early 1980s, when the sources of liquid funds for SOEs were no 
longer grants from governments, but loans from banks;
288
 (2) mid-1980s: previously, 
all of the profits of SOEs had to be submitted to the central government, but from this 
point 55% of profits had to be submitted as income tax, and the remainder were 
                                                        
283 
Law of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, with effect from 
August 1, 1988, Sec.7. 
284
 Ibid. Sec.8. 
285
 Ibid. Sec 44. 
286
 Ibid. Sec 56. 
287
 For a detailed discussion of the four stages between 1978 and 1992 in the 
economic implications of reform in China, see generally Wei Chi & Yijiang Wang, 
―The ‗Grabbing Hand‘ and Corporate Governance in China‖ in Changing Corporate 
Governance Practices in China and Japan: Adaptations of Anglo-American Practices 
(Edited by Masao Nakamura) (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 87-112. 
288
 Supra Note 18, at 10-11. See also Peter Ho, Institutions in Transition: Land 
Ownership, Property Rights, and Social Conflict in China (Oxford University Press, 
2005); Donald Clark, "What's Law Got To Do with It? Legal Institutions and 
Economic Reform in China" (1991) 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1. 
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distributed between SOEs and the local government;
289
 (3) late 1980s-1992: advent 
of the contract responsibility system between the government and SOEs (with distinct 
contract terms across industries and regions). This brought financial incentives to 
SOEs, because they submitted only a certain ratio of their profits and the wages of 
employees distributed by governments were related to the economic earnings 
accordingly;
290
 (4) Post-1992: SOE managers were officially conferred by law 
autonomy over 14 areas of operation in their enterprises, including production, pricing, 
sales, procurement, foreign trade, investment, use of retained funds, disposal of assets, 




(C) Third Stage (1992－Present): the deepening SOE reform 
a. Corporatization 
The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were opened in December 1990 
and July 1991, respectively. In October 1992, the 14
th
 Chinese Communist Party 
Convention ratified the establishment of a socialist market economy system, and 
launched reform to set up a ―modern enterprise system‖ for the corporatization of 
SOEs starting in 1993. Four conditions had to be satisfied to establish a modern 




 Provisional Regulation on the Contracting and Operational Mechanism of the 
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, promulgated by the State Council 
on
 
February 1988. For empirical study of contract responsibility system, see generally 
Mary M. Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, ―Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: 
Evidence from China‖ (2001) 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 168; Mary M. Shirley & Lixin 
Colin Xu, ―Information, Incentives, and Commitment: An Empirical Analysis of 
Contracts between Government and State Enterprises‖ (1998) 14 J.L. Econ. & Org. 
358. 
291
 Regulation on Transforming the Management Mechanism of State-owned 
Industrial Enterprises, promulgated by the State Council on July 1992. 
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enterprise system: (i) the clarification of property rights (―Chanquan Mingxi‖); (ii) the 
clarification of rights and responsibilities (―Quanze Mingque‖); (iii) the separation of 
bureaucracy and business (―Zhengqi Fenkai‖); and (iv) scientific management 
(―Guanli Kexue‖).292 The Company Law was promulgated in 1993, which laid the 
legal framework for a number of SOEs to be transformed into either limited liability 




b. ―Grasping the large, releasing the small‖ 
Since the mid-1990s, the strategy of SOE reform has changed from concentrating 
on every individual SOE to the whole economic system to achieve the sustainable 
development of SOEs. The policy of ―grasping the large and releasing the small‖ was 
adopted and written into the Ninth Five Year Plan for 1996-2000. 
―Grasping the large‖ means retaining large SOEs (500 to 1000 enterprises) in 
state ownership and making them conglomerates under the modern enterprise 
system.
294
 ―Releasing the small‖ means pushing the medium-sized and small SOEs to 
the market by listing on the stock exchanges or sale to private buyers.
295
 
c. State-held listed companies 
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 Decision on Establishing Socialist Market Economy System, passed by the Third 
Plenary Meeting of 14
th
 Communist Party Session, November 1993. 
293
 As at the end of 2007, around 63% of the Central SOEs (with the affiliates) have 
been corporatized, according to the statistics of SASAC. See supra note 26, at 26. 
294
 Becky Chiu & Mervyn K. Lewis, Reforming China's State-owned enterprises and 
banks (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub., 2006), at 66. 
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 Ibid. See also Julia Ya Qin, ―WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-owned 
Enterprises (SOEs)—A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol‖ (2004) 7 J. 
Int'l Econ. L. 863; Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "Riding Two Horses: Corporatizing 
Enterprises and the Emerging Securities Regulatory Regime in China" (1993) 12 
UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 62. 
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    In 1999, SOE reform was directed toward adaptation to the economic system and 
growth, with the shareholding structures of many SOEs being changed to the 
state-held or state-participating (of which the state is not controlling shareholding) 
form.
296
 The current Eleventh Five Year Plan from 2006 to 2010 sets out to facilitate 
the appropriate flow of market capital and drive state capital to key industries related 
to national security and economy lifelines.
297
 
Figure 4.1 shows that during SOE reform, traditional SOEs have plucked out 
their profitable assets (which have been converted into non-tradable shares owned by 
the state) to incorporate new companies that are then listed on the stock exchanges, 
and the traditional SOEs have then become the holding company of the newly 
established listed companies. After listing, the remaining shares, which are bought by 
the general public, become tradable shares. This, in essence, is the operation of the 
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 Decision of CPC Concerning SOE Reform and Development, passed by the Fourth 
Plenum of the 15
th
 Communist Party Central Committee on September 22, 1999. 
297
 It was passed by the Fifth Plenum of the 16
th
 Communist Party Central Committee 

































China is a socialist country with a principal ideology based on Communism since 
the last century that advocates public ownership rather than private ownership. The 
capital market was once regarded in China in the same manner as capitalism, and was 
rejected until Deng Xiaoping‘s Southern Speech in 1992. Since then, the role of the 
capital market has been positively acknowledged to serve as a platform for SOE 
reform through fund-raising and corporatization. Governments play a prominent role 
in this process. It is to ensure an economic system with public ownership as the 
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 Guy S. Liu & Pei Sun, ―Ownership and Control of Chinese Public Corporations: A 
State-dominated Corporate Governance System‖ in Kevin Keasey, Steve Thompson & 
Mike Wright (edited) Corporate Governance: Accountability, Enterprise and 















principle that the shareholding structure of public listed companies is divided into 
tradable and non-tradable shares to give a two-tier market. This division is a result of 
mandatory regulation, rather than the free choice of the market.  
 
4.2 One-tier shareholding: a more flexible shareholding structure－Reform of 
Sales of Non-Tradable Shares of Public Listed Companies (May 2005－Present) 
4.2.1 Pre-reform 
Under the two-tier shareholding structure,
299
 there are three main differences 
between tradable and non-tradable shares. The first regards pricing, in that the price 
for non-tradable share is measured by the net assets of previous SOEs and other 
Chinese enterprises, whereas the issue price of shares tradable to the public is 
calculated following the market practice, and is usually higher than that of 
non-tradable shares. The second regards share transfers, in that the transfer of 
non-tradable shares requires a contract between seller and buyer. State-owned shares 
even require evaluation and approval by administrative procedures, whereas tradable 
shares can be freely transferred on the stock exchanges at trading prices set by the 
market. The third regards benefits. The benefits for holders of tradable shares are 
dividends and profits when they sell the shares, whereas shareholders of non-tradable 
shares are prohibited from transacting their shares on the stock exchanges, but usually 
                                                        
299
 It is also called as ―split-equity structure‖ or ―redesignation plan for domestic 
shares‖. See Sandra P. Kister, ―China's Share-Structure Reform: An Opportunity to 
Move beyond Practical Solutions to Practical Problems‖ (2006) 45 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l L. 312, at 312; Paul B. McGuinness, ―An Overview and Assessment of the 
Reform of the Non-Tradable Shares of Chinese State-owned Enterprise A-Share 
Issuers‖ (2009) 17(1) 41, at 44. 
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have controlling power over the company. 
There are many disadvantages to the division of shares in this way. First, it 
causes conflicts of interest between shareholders of tradable and non-tradable shares, 
because the former focus more on the fluctuation of the share price, especially if they 
are short-term investors, whereas the latter take more care of the net asset value per 
share, because it is the responsibility of the holders of non-tradable shares from the 
government to ensure the value of assets without loss. The accretion of asset value 
depends mainly on profits.
300
 Second, it is unfair to the holders of tradable shares, 
because this division gives one share a different price and different associated rights, 
which ―distorts the stock market‘s pricing mechanism.‖301 Third, it also creates a 
conflict of functions for the government as a market regulator and a large market 
participant. Fourth, it makes the abuse of power by controlling shareholders more 
possible by controlling the board of directors and board of supervisors, such as the 
infringement of minority shareholders‘ rights and of the assets of public listed 
companies by illegal related party transactions. 
 
4.2.2 Process of reform 
An initial pilot project to decrease the holding of state-owned shares
302
 was 
carried out from September 1999 to December 2000. This experiment aimed to adjust 
                                                        
300
 Alexander Frednck, Banking Financing & Accounting (Lotus Press, 2005), at 58; 
See also Stavros A. Zenios, Financial Optimization (Cambridge University Press, 
1996), at 149. 
301
 Supra Note 299, at 323. 
302
 This policy was brought forward on the fourth Plenary Meeting of 15
th
 
Communist Party Session, September 1999. 
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state-held listed companies without affecting the government‘s position of control. 
However, in the pilot companies, proposals were not tabled by public shareholders 
and the project had to be terminated. Later, in June 2001, a second pilot project was 
launched to raise funds for social insurance.
303
 However, this was still not acceptable 
to public investors, and the experiment was again terminated. The failure of the 
second pilot project created panic in the capital market, which then experienced a 
four-year bear market until June 2005. As PRC Premier Wen Jiabao stated, ―Lack of 
knowledge and imperfect market regulation have caused the bear market.‖304 The 
failure of the pilot project to decrease the holding of state-owned shares was a result 
of the irrational valuation of state assets, which was based on the maintenance and 
increase of asset value and ignored the interests of holders of shares.
305
 A pricing 
system following arms-length-transaction principles had not yet been set up. 
In April 29, 2005, the Reform of Sales of Non-Tradable Shares of Public listed 
Companies in A share market was launched by the issuance of the ―Notice of Sales of 
Non-Tradable Shares of Public listed Companies‖ by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC). Any public listed company that fulfils the requirements of the 
reform is conferred privileges by the CSRC in relation to application for re-financing. 
Although many disputes have arisen since the launch of the reform, it is the 
Chinese government‘s firm resolution to promote a freer market economy through this 
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 Zhang Shenhuai, Legal Research of Controlling Power in the Chinese Listed 
Companies (Law Press China, 2007) (in Chinese), at 143. 
98 
 
means. Learning from the failure of the pilot projects, the Chinese government is 
aware that an approval procedure is required, and thus any controlling shareholder of 
a state-held listed company is required to disclose the minimum stake percentage to 
be held after the completion of the transfer. This minimum stake percentage must be 
reported for examination and approval, especially in pivotal sectors and industries 
critical to the nation‘s security and interests. 
Each public listed company must set out its own proposal in a ―process of 
negotiation through which the non-tradable and tradable shareholders decide how 
much of a payment in shares the non-tradable shareholders must transfer to the 
tradable shareholders in order for their shares to gain liquidity in the market.‖306 
There is no uniform criterion for financing for companies. Instead, the proposal of 
each company requires board approval to convene a general meeting at which 
majority approval from holder of tradable and non-tradable shares must be obtained.  
The legal nature of payment is still controversial. Some scholars think it should 
be regarded as consideration as a cost to gain the right for shares to be tradable. 
Others believe it should be restitution for the unjust enrichment of tradable 
shareholders that results from the overflow of benefits gained by non-tradable 
shareholders after they are allowed to sell their shares, because the original price of 
non-tradable shares is usually lower. Another point of view considers that the payment 
constitutes damages arising from breach of contract, because there is a statement in 
the prospectus and listing proclamation of all public listed companies that the shares 
                                                        
306
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of promoters, that is, non-tradable shares, shall not be publicly tradable.
307
 
There are commonly three types of proposals: (1) non-tradable shares are 
proportionately given to the holders of tradable shares free of charge; (2) holder of 
tradable shares can obtain an amount of cash paid by the holders of non-tradable share, 
who are not willing to lose control by giving up their shares; (3) the holders of 
tradable shares have the right to compensation for the difference when the share price 
falls to a stipulated point in the future. The pricing method of a proposal depends on 
the circumstances of the listed company in question. 
When the proposal of a listed company is approved and completed, the originally 
non-tradable shares become ―released shares,‖ and are subject to trading restrictions 
for a period of 12 months. When this lock-up period expires, shareholders whose 
released shares account for no less than 5 percent of the total shares of the public 
listed company can sell no more than 5 percent of the shares owned in the next 12 
months, and no more than 10 percent in the next 24 months.
308
  
The transfer pricing of the state-owned shares of listed companies is based on the 
transaction price of the listed companies‘ shares in the securities market.309 The 
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 Art.3, Guiding Opinions on the Listed Companies’ Transfer of Original Shares 
Released from Trading Restrictions, with effect from April, 2008. 
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 Art.6, Interim Measures for the Administration of State-owned Shareholders’ 
Transfer of Their Shares of Listed Companies, issued by the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission on 30 June 2007, with effect from 1 July 2007. 
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SASAC has the authority to examine and approve the transfer of state-owned 
shares.
310
 If a share transfer is likely to have a significant influence on key national 





As at 31 December 2009, around 476.78 billion shares (out of aggregated 626.37 
billion non-tradable shares) had been released since the Reform in 2005.
312
 A further 
68.38% of the released shares have had their trading restrictions lifted, and 12.66% of 
these unrestricted released shares have been sold to the public.
313
 The reform has 
made it possible to treat the holders of tradable and non-tradable shares equally and to 
further distribute the profits across all shareholders in public listed companies, but has 
also revolutionized China‘s stock market and raised fresh concerns over the reform of 
corporate governance in China.  
While listed companies with non-tradable shares have been achieving the goal of 
their reform (the release of non-tradable shares and their further sale to the market), 
the listed companies, particularly former state-held listed companies, have also been 
undergoing transition from a state-concentrated shareholding structure to a more 
flexible structure of private ownership and a more diffuse ownership structure (a 
                                                        
310
 The income from transfer is required to place into the China‘s National Social 
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dispersed shareholding structure with no controlling shareholder), although some are 
still controlled by the state.
314
  
In general, the ultimate goal is to eliminate the division between tradable and 
non-tradable shares, and to form an integrated pricing system so that each shareholder 
can trade shares based on the market price. This means that shareholders will be 
concerned not only with net assets, but also with the positive cash flow and 
performance of companies in the market. In the long term, this should increase the 
confidence of investors, and improve corporate governance in listed companies.  
The transacting of released shares is still subject to the approval of the 
SASAC,
315
 but the more liquid capital market will probably create more 
opportunities for takeovers and will have a greater impact on the corporate 
governance of listed companies. Notably, when previously non-tradable shares are 
sold in the market, the stock price may fall as the supply exceeds demand, which will 
remain the same as before.
316
 
This reform is an institutional arrangement for listing non-tradable shares in the 
A-share market, so it is ―highly topical issue within the context of the Chinese equity 
                                                        
314
 The tradability of the previous non-tradable shares does not mean that the state 
has to actually sell it shares. ―The State can choose to remain in control just by not 
selling them.‖ See Goergen, M., Manjon, M. & L. Renneboog, "Recent Developments 
in German Corporate Governance" (2008) 28 International Review of Law and 
Economics 175, at 191. 
315
 Supra Note 309, Art. 8. It is required that ―a shareholder owning or controlling no 
less than 5% of the shares of the listed company shall have the obligation of 
disclosure when selling the unrestricted released shares‖.  
316 
Supra Note 307, at 115. The public shareholders shall have anticipated such losses 
from the falling share price, on the condition that the losses had been calculated into 
the pricing of proposal. 
102 
 
market.‖317 It is expressly provided by the Guiding Opinions on Share-trading 
Reform of Listed Companies
318
 that the reform of non-tradable shares is ―a turning 
point to solve the issue of appropriation of the capital of listed companies and illegal 
related party transaction by controlling shareholders.‖319 As the reform involves only 
the transfer of state-owned shares within the two-tier shareholding structure, it is 
perhaps ―too early to gauge‖ the effectiveness of this reform ―in resolving the milieu 
of problems that beset some of the SOEs,‖320 and whether tunneling by controlling 
shareholders (discussed below in 4.4.2 of this chapter) will be completely eliminated 
or whether controlling shareholders participate more positively in the governance and 





4.3.1 Three governance organs 
There are three governance organs in a Chinese public listed company: the 
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 It is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, State-owned Assets 
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 In some common law jurisdictions such as Singapore, UK, ―member‖ rather than 
shareholder is used, specifically referring to those who subscribe to the memorandum 
and whose names are on the company register. That is to say, member is the legal 
shareholder, excluding beneficiary shareholder. In Chinese corporate context, there is 
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shareholder‘s general meeting, the board of directors, and the board of supervisors. 
The three organs are arranged in a triangular structure with the shareholder‘s general 
meeting at the top (see Figure 4.2). Corporate governance in China follows a two-tier 
board system in which the two boards function separately at the same level under the 
general meeting. Directors and supervisors (exclusive of employee representatives) 
are elected and removed at the general meeting. 
 







The distribution of power between the corporate organs is determined by law, the 
shareholders‘ subscription agreement or the company‘s articles of association,322 
depending on the doctrinal arrangement of shareholders and the board of directors, 
whether the contractual model, delegation model, or statutory model.
323
  
The contractual model is reflected in the cases of Automatic Self-Cleansing 
Filter Syndicate Co v. Cuninghame
324
 and Quin & Axtens v. Salmon,
325
 in which the 
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articles of association are held to be a contract under which shareholders have no 
authority over matters that have been assigned to the board of directors to manage. 
Under the model of delegation, the general meeting is the supreme organ of the 
company. The board of directors obtains its powers delegated from shareholders, who 
substantially control the board by amending the articles of association.
326
 The 
statutory model involves statutory intervention in corporate governance. The rationale 
for this is first that the internal enabling rules for corporations to govern their power 
distribution may not be efficiently designed, and second that efficient rules that are 
adopted may be changed from time to time.
327
 In modern corporate statutes in various 
jurisdictions, the board of directors is generally conferred management power, save 




In the context of the three-organ corporate framework in China, power and 
authority follows a mixed model that contains the elements of contractual, statutory 
and delegation models. The powers of the three organs are mandated by law, and the 
articles of a company determine matters not expressly regulated by law. Public listed 
companies usually follow the draft articles contained in the Articles Guidelines when 
setting out their articles of association. 
Corporations have multiple interacting and interlocking constituents, the interests 
                                                                                                                                                              
CA; Scott v. Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582. 
325
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328
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of which either converge or diverge depending on the circumstances.
329
 This requires 
an organizational arrangement that counterbalances the constituents and eliminates 
possibly abusive behavior. Accordingly, the general meeting has the right to approve 
decisions about fundamental corporate matters, the board of directors manages 
corporate operations, and the supervisory board monitors the business operations of 
the whole company. 
 
4.3.2 General meeting 
The shareholder‘s general meeting is termed the ―company‘s supreme organ of 
authority‖330 in the PRC Company Law, which also determines how resolutions are 
passed at a general meeting. An ordinary resolution must receive more than half of the 
votes owned by all participating shareholders, whereas a special resolution must 
receive no less than two thirds.
331
 
Election, dismissal, remuneration, and reports to be approved (typically annual 
financial budget plans, profit distribution plans, and loss recovery plans) of the 
directors and supervisors (excluding those who are e employee representative), and 
other ordinary matters related to corporate business and operations should be passed 
by ordinary resolution. Other fundamental matters, including the increment or 
reduction of share capital, the issuance of corporate bonds, assignment, division, 
change of business form, restructuring, winding-up, or the amendment of the 
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4.3.3 Role of shareholders 
The nature of shares is summarized in Borland’s Trustee v. Steel Brothers & Co 
Ltd. to consist of three components: interest, liability, and ―a series of mutual 
covenants made by all the shareholders inter se.‖333 The role of shareholder can take 
the form of owner, beneficiary, or guardian.
334
 The ―beneficiary‖ form, which is 
based on trust law, denies the shareholder discretional control over corporate 
business.
335
 The ―guardian‖ form gives the shareholder some specific and restricted 
functions as a watchdog to monitor management.
336
 
The owner form consists of a mixture of rights, including possession, use, 
security, and transfer.
337
 Shareholder ―ownership‖ is based on the agency theory and 
the shareholder-centered view of the corporation,
338
 which holds that the share is a 
                                                        
332
 The general meeting has statutory right to decide the fundamental changes of the 
company. See Russell v. Northern Bank Development Corp Ltd [1992] 1 W.L.R.588. 
For the right to alter the articles, see Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 
Ch. 656; see also Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd v. Shirlaw [1940] A.C. 701. 
333
 [1901] 1 Ch 279, at 288. 
334
 See Jennifer Hill, ―Vision and Revisions of the Shareholder‖ (2000) 48 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 39. 
335 
Ibid. at 44-7. 
336
 See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, ―The Legal Roles of Shareholders and 
Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking‖ (1969) 57 CAL.L.REV. 1. See 
also Peter V. Letsou, ―Shareholder Voice and The Market for Corporate Control‖ 
(1992) 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 755; Jeffrey N. Gordon, ―Shareholder Initiative: A Social 
Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law‖ (1991) 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 
347. 
15
 See A.M. Honoré, Chapter V of ―Ownership‖, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(edited by Guest Anthony Gordon) (Oxford University Press, 1961) 107-47. 
338
 Supra Note 323, at 554; Supra Note 334, at 42-4. 
107 
 
proprietary interest that justifies the shareholder‘s pursuit of profit maximization.339  
Shareholders are usually categorized as the owners or ―principals‖ of a company. 
They delegate their decision-making power to directors, who are their ―agents.‖ One 
assumption of this theory is that the goals of the principal and agent conflict.
340
 The 
owners are referred to as ―residual claimants‖ who bear ―residual risk,‖ or the ―risk of 
the difference between stochastic inflows of resources and promised payments to 
residual claimants.‖ As residual claimants, shareholders benefit themselves with 
whatever remains after the company has fulfilled its liabilities against its creditors.
341
 
Agency problems arise from internal interactive relations between three actors－
shareholders, the board of directors, and management － and the downward 
delegations of their respective functions and duties. This can be traced back to as early 
as 1776 in the ―Wealth of Nations‖ by Adam Smith, who argues that the directors of a 
company are not likely to be as careful with other people‘s money as with their 
own.
342
 The agency relationship based upon the separation of ownership and 
management is ―a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
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delegating some decision making authority to the agent.‖343  
How to solve agency problems is an important issue in the survival of 
organizational forms.
344
 The agency problem is controlled by decision systems that 
separate management (initiation and implementation) by agents from control 
(ratification and monitoring) by residual claimants. 
A company is founded on a ―nexus of contracts.‖345 The company statutes 
usually ―provide the terms of the contract by which shareholders purchase 
management‘s undivided loyalty to their welfare,‖ where the key term is the 
management‘s fiduciary duty to operate the company for the maximization of 
shareholder wealth.
346
 It is impossible to write ―complete contracts‖347 for three 
reasons. First, it is difficult for people to think ahead and plan for all contingencies. 
Second, it is hard for the contracting parties to negotiate, especially when prior 
experience may not be a helpful guide. Third, it is difficult for plans to be written 
down in such a way that an outside authority, such as the court, will be able to 
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4.3.4 Shareholders‘ ordinary rights 
When the company is a going concern, every shareholder has participation rights 
and the right of access to corporate information.
349
 When the general meeting 
demands a director, supervisor, or senior manager to sit in the meeting as a non-voting 




A public listed company is also required to publicize its financial status, business 
operations, and material litigations, and must disclose its financial reports once every 
six months in each fiscal year.
351
 Every shareholder is entitled to review the articles; 
the register of shareholders and corporate bonds; the minutes of the general meetings, 
board of directors meetings, and board of supervisors meeting; and the financial 
reports. Furthermore, detailed information on the candidates for directorships and 
supervisor positions must be disclosed to shareholders, including their personal 
particulars, relationship with the company or controlling shareholders, and 
shareholding in the company.
352
 
The revised Company Law (2006) introduces the new requirement that the 
remuneration packages of directors, supervisors, and senior managers of a company 
must be regularly disclosed.
353
 Following the revised Company Law, the CSRC now 
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requires remuneration to be disclosed in the annual reports of listed companies, 
including the earnings of each director, supervisor, and senior manager in terms of 
salary, bonuses, and allowances. Procedures and evaluations must also be disclosed. 
Any public listed company who disobeys this requirement must give an appropriate 
explanation to the CSRC in advance. 
In reality, however, the remuneration of individuals are not disclosed in the 
annual reports of some large public listed companies,
354
 and are instead replaced with 
the total amount earned by all of the directors, supervisors, and senior managers of the 
company. The explanation for this practice is that remuneration packages should be 
commercial secrets, as they are crucial to maintaining a company‘s human resources. 
Whether the CSRC finally approves this practice has not been publicly declared, but 
this explanation is not convincing. If remuneration should be confidential for large 
companies, then it should also be so for small and medium-sized companies. 
 
4.3.5 Controlling shareholder 
A. Overview 
In Japan and Germany, ownership structure and voting rights may help to 
counteract the overwhelming power of controlling shareholders. In Japan, Keiretsu, or 
cross-shareholding, refers to a group of firms or financial intermediaries that own 
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stakes in each other.
355
 Such bundling of equity effectively promotes some degree of 
integration, performs a monitoring role,
356
 and prevents unexpected strategic 
corporate changes.
357
 Most importantly, it makes it difficult for controllers to extract 
private benefits from control.
358
 In Germany, big banks are both shareholders and 
creditors, and play an active part in corporate governance. Furthermore, they are 
involved in corporate management by voting rights deriving not only from their own 
held shares, but from those of other shareholders through proxy systems.
359
  
The PRC Company Law defines the ―controlling shareholder‖ as: (i) a 
shareholder whose stock occupies more than 50% of the total equity stock of a joint 
stock limited company; or (ii) a shareholder whose shareholding is less than 50% but 
is still larger than that of any other shareholder, so that the largest shareholder is still 
able to have a dominant influence over corporate matters.
360
 That is to say, the 
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controlling shareholder is restricted by law to be the sole majority shareholder in the 
company. 
Controlling shareholders normally control human resources, such as the 
appointment or removal of directors or senior executives, and decision-making over 
important matters in corporate operations, such as investment strategy or the 
distribution of dividends. According to a survey by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the 
board chairman of 94% of the sample companies are majority shareholders,
361
 and 




The CG Code expressly provides that ―the controlling shareholders shall 
nominate the candidates for directors and supervisors in strict compliance with the 
terms and procedures provided by law,‖ 363 ―the election of directors, supervisors, 
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senior executives or other personnel shall not be subject to the approval of the 
controlling shareholders,‖ and ―with respect to corporate operations, the controlling 
shareholders shall not directly or indirectly interfere with the company‘s decisions or 
business activities.‖ 364  It may seem unnecessary to expressly provide these 
requirements in the CG Code, because such illegal behavior distinctly contravenes the 
PRC Company Law in respect of legal procedures regarding decision-making and 
personnel election,
365
 but the CG Code aims to stipulate acceptable behavior by 
controlling shareholders in black and white. 
 
B. Duty of controlling shareholder in China 
The voting powers of shareholders should not be regarded as being fiduciary, like 
those of directors, to be exercised in the best interests of the company or any other 
shareholder.
366
 ―The starting point is the proposition that in general the right of a 
shareholder to vote his shares is a right of property which the shareholder is free to 
exercise in what he regards as his own best interests.‖367 The majority rule allows 
majority shareholders to exercise their shareholding rights in their own interests, on 
the condition that the resolution of the majority ―is not brought about by unfair or 
improper means, and is not illegal or fraudulent or oppressive towards those 
shareholders who oppose it.‖368 A court would not be justified in intervening in a case 
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―merely because the minority alleged that the commercial judgment of the majority 
was wrong‖ or if ―it was alleged that the majority had a personal interest in the 
subject-matter of the resolution.‖369  
In the United Kingdom, for such equitable grounds to be secured, controlling 
shareholders are bound to act ―bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole‖ in 
cases of alteration of the company articles.
370
 The US authorities recognized the 
fiduciary duties borne by controlling shareholders in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert
371
 
and Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.
372
 In the latter case, the court considered 
it proper to ―analyze the action of controlling shareholders in the particular case‖ and 
to ask whether they can ―demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for their 
action.‖373 
 In China, the CG Code stipulates that controlling shareholders owe a ―duty of 
good faith‖ toward ―the listed company and other shareholders.‖374 For example, 
controlling shareholders ―are forbidden to engage in the same or similar competitive 
business as that of the listed company.‖375  The question arises as to how the 
controlling shareholders of a public listed company can be prevented from 
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expropriating the interests of listed company or other shareholders by taking 
advantage of their privileged position to gain additional benefits. ―Other shareholders‘ 
legal rights and interests‖ is ambiguous in legislation (literally, with reference to 
non-controlling shareholders), and whether the controlling shareholder in question 
breaches the duty of good faith is decided by the court depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
 
4.4 Practical issues arising from state controlled ownership under the two-tier 
shareholding structure for state-held listed companies 
Beyond the mandates of law, there are no identical corporate governance 
arrangements for public listed companies, because the relationships and interactions 
between and within shareholders, the board of directors, and the board of supervisors 
vary from company to company.  
The securities market has its surges and failures, with expansion and recession of 
business cycles on a global basis. However, all countries have found that the securities 
market functions well if the regulatory framework is systemic and enforceable, and if 
investors are free to make rational choices. 
In the past, the Chinese stock market was considered akin to a ―slot machine‖ 
and the investors gamblers,
376
 because there were no effective regulations and 
adjustments to catch up with the disorderly market.
377
 After a nearly five-year 
                                                        
376
 See also Noëlle Trifiro, ―China's Financial Reporting Standards: Will Corporate 
Governance Induce Compliance In Listed Companies?‖ (2007) 16 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. 
L. 271, at 272. 
377
 The report of Tomasic & Fu (2006) is based on an empirical study of corporate 
governance through interviews in China‘s top 100 public listed companies. It finds 
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contraction of the stock market from 2001 to mid 2005, the market experienced a 
boom from early 2006 until late 2008. During this period, the market share value of 
Chinese public listed companies increased by 10 times, boosted by the entrance of a 
number of blue-chip and red-chip stocks into the A-share market.
378
 Since the reform 
of non-tradable shares in 2005, the whole stock market in China has made renewed 
progress, with the shareholding structure, investment products and transaction rules 
all improving. 
There are two principal reasons why shareholders invest in the securities market. 
The first is the expectation of receiving share profits, or ―cash flow rights,‖ and the 
second is the expectation of being able to exercise control over assets, or ―control 
rights.‖379 Investors put corporate governance ―on a par with financial indicators 
when evaluating investment decision.‖ It has also been found that ―an overwhelming 
majority of investors are prepared to pay a premium for companies exhibiting high 
governance standards. Premiums averaged 12-14% in North America and Western 
Europe; 20-25% in Asia and Latin America, and over 30% in Eastern Europe and 
Africa.‖380 Strong protection for investors is associated with effective corporate 
                                                                                                                                                              
that China‘s company and securities laws have not provided as strong legal protection 
of investors as might be expected by investors. See generally Tomasic Roman & Fu 
Jian, ―Legal Regulation and Corporate Governance in China‘s Top 100 Listed 
Companies‖ (2006) 27(9) Company Lawyer 278. 
378
The source of news is from the website of Xin Hua Net, available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-11/19/content_7102654.htm 
379
 Low Chee Keong, Corporate Governance: An Asia-Pacific Critique (Hong Kong: 
Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2002), at 6. 
380 ―Global Investor Opinion Survey: Key Findings‖ by McKinsey & Company in 
July 2002. 201 responses were received from professional investors from institutions 
with an estimated USD 9 trillion assets under management and covered 31 countries 









The controlling shareholder is the largest shareholder in the company and has 
ultimate control over corporate business.
383
 In state-held listed companies, the state, 
as the holder of non-tradable shares comprising typically state-owned shares (state 
share and state-owned legal person shares, is the controlling shareholder.
384
 The 
remaining shares of a company that are not owned by the controlling shareholder(s) 
are held by non-controlling shareholders. Thus, the holders of tradable shares in 
state-held listed companies are in effect minority shareholders.
385
  
Local and central governments, who hold non-tradable shares on behalf of the 
state, have less incentive to ensure good corporate governance to protect minorities 
because non-tradable shares are not listed for public transaction, and any fluctuation 
in share prices has no direct financial impact on the government.  




 La Porta et al. (2000) generalizes that ―Recent research on corporate governance 
around the world has established a number of empirical regularities. Such diverse 
elements of countries‘ financial systems as the breadth and depth of their capital 
markets, the pace of new security issues, corporate ownership structures, dividend 
policies, and the efficiency of investment allocation.‖ See La Porta Rafael, 
Lopez-de-Silanes Florencio, Shleifer Andrei & Vishny Robert W., ―Investor 




 See the definition of controlling shareholder in Chapter I, Supra Note 24. 
384
 See Table 1.2 in Chapter I.  
385
 It is expressly stated by OECD that ―in the state‘s interest to ensure that, in all 
enterprises where it has a stake, minority shareholders are treated equitably, since its 
reputation in this respect will influence its capacity of attracting outside funding and 
the valuation of the company. It should therefore ensure that other shareholders do not 
perceive the state as an opaque, unpredictable and unfair owner. The state should on 
the contrary establish itself as exemplary and follow best practices regarding the 
treatment of minority shareholders.‖ See Supra Note 210, at 33. 
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Clearly, minority shareholders in state-held listed companies in China are not 
well protected under the two-tier shareholding structure where the state is controlling 
shareholder for several reasons. First, the interests of minority shareholders are 
infringed upon due to the tunneling behavior of the controlling shareholder. Second, 
minority shareholders may not be able to effectively exercise their rights to protect 
themselves under the cumulative voting system. Finally, minority shareholders may 
not able to effectively exercise their rights to protect themselves by derivative action. 
 
4.4.1 Empirical study 
    Jensen and Meckling (1976)
386
 and Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
387
 revealed that 
the concentration of share ownership allows large investors to efficiently monitor 
management. However, a very strong ownership concentration may result in poor 
investor protection.
388
 La Porta et al. give two reasons why ownership in countries 
with poor investor protection is more concentrated. First, large shareholders may need 
to own more capital to exercise control over a firm to avoid expropriation by the 
management. Second, due to poor protection, small investors may be unwilling to buy 
shares or may seek to buy them at low prices, which may indirectly result in 
                                                        
386
 Supra Note 270. 
387
 See Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., ―Large shareholders and Corporate 
Control‖ (1986) 94(3) Journal of Political Economy 461. The large shareholders in 
their sample are: families, pension and profit-sharing plans, and financial firms.  
388 
La Porta et al. (1998) disclose that the concentration of ownership of shares in the 
largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections. See La Porta 
Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes Florencio, Shleifer Andrei & Vishny Robert W., ―Law and 






State controlled ownership through being the controlling shareholder in listed 
companies reflects that public authority over the private sector is a ―legitimate private 
right under the market economy.‖ 390  Empirical studies on the effect of state 
ownership on company performance have returned the contradictory findings that 
they either enhance or reduce firm performance.
391
 Thus, when the controlling 
shareholder of a listed company is the state, the monitoring of management is not 
necessarily effective.
392
 This criticism of state controlled ownership has two 
rationales. First, it is recognized that the state plays the dual roles of market regulator 
and player in commercial business, which often have conflicting functions.
393
 Second, 
corporate costs increase when firms are used by politicians for political or social 
purposes,
394
 because the government considers all of the social constituents of a firm 




4.4.2 Infringement on the interests of minority shareholders due to tunneling by 




 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), at 10. 
391
 Mak Yuen Teen, ―Ownership & Performance‖ (2005) Corporate Governance 
Executive, Vol. 3 Issue 1, Corporate Governance & Financial Reporting Centre of 
Business School, National University of Singapore, at 20 and 9. 
392
 Zhang Zongxin & Sun Yewei, ―The Optimization of Ownership Structure and 
Improvement of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies‖ (2001) 1 Economic 
Review 36 (in Chinese), at 37; See also Donald C. Clarke, ―The Independent Director 
in Chinese Corporate Governance‖ (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 125, 
at 141. It is recognized by Qian (1996) that political control could reduce agency 
problem; in other words, it may prevent managers from acting for their own interest at 
the expense of firm. Qian Yingyi, ―Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and 
Political Control‖ (1996) 4(2) Economics of transition 427. 
393
 Supra Note 390. 
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As has been stated, as part of SOE reform in China, traditional SOEs have 
extracted their profitable assets to incorporate new companies listed on the stock 
exchanges, and themselves have become the holding companies of these 
newly-established listed companies by holding non-tradable shares which are 
converted from the extracted assets. Economic conditions mean that these mixed 
holding companies are in great need of cash, because they must maintain their own 
business. This motivates them to tunnel assets from their listed subsidiaries to survive. 
Tunneling is defined by La Porta et al. (2000) as the transfer of assets and profits by 
controlling shareholders for their own benefit.
396
 In China, there are two types of 
tunneling: illegal guarantees and the occupation of company funds. 
 
A. Company guarantees  
All corporate guarantees must be approved either by an ordinary resolution of 
shareholders at the general meeting or by two thirds of the directors (option selected 
by the company to be set out in the articles of association). Independent directors 
should issue independent comments on the guarantees in the company‘s annual report. 
In particular, material guarantees (where the guaranteed amount exceeds 30% of the 
company‘s total assets within a year) must be passed by special resolution at a general 
meeting.
397
 Further, the Securities Law stipulates that public listed companies are 
                                                        
396
 See generally Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Andrei Shleifer, ―Tunneling‖, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion 
Paper, No. 1887. 
397
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 122. 
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prohibited from providing guarantees to the controlling shareholder.
398
 Further, 
There are three problems with guarantees in China. 
(i) The amounts guaranteed by many public listed companies (compared with the 
assets) exceed their own risk-bearing abilities. According to a survey of annual reports 
of all public listed companies in Shanghai conducted by the Shanghai Stock exchange 
in 2005, 54 companies guaranteed sums that exceeded 50% of their own net assets, 
and 15 companies guaranteed sums that exceeded 100%.
399
 
(ii) Controlling shareholders seek indirect ways to acquire guarantees from 
public listed companies. For example, they may ask a listed company to provide 




(iii) The chairman of the board of directors may have the power to influence 
decisions about guarantees. Table 4.3 shows that in 39.9% of state-held listed 
companies, the chairman of the board has the power to influence guarantee decisions. 
It is noteworthy that in 41.2% of the state-held listed companies in the Table the 
influential power is listed as being held by ―others,‖ reflecting that there may be more 
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Table 4.3 Survey of Influential Power over Guarantee Decisions in 










All sample 36.5% 4.0% 1.2% 13.0% 45.2% 
State-held listed 
company 
39.9% 4.7% 1.7% 12.4% 41.2% 
Private listed 
company 
27.8% 2.2% 0.0% 14.4% 55.6% 
 
B. Occupation of company funds
402
 
Table 4.4 shows that in the 147 sample listed companies, controlling 
shareholders occupied RMB 31.57 billion of company funds as at 30 June 2006. RMB 
19.28 billion of the 88 state-held listed companies was held by holding companies, 
with an average of RMB 219.09 million being occupied for each state-held listed 
company. In accordance with the latest announcement by the CSRC, RMB 6.99 
billion in 30 listed companies was still occupied by the controlling shareholders as at 
May 2008, and several companies had been disciplined by the CSRC and had been 




Table 4.4 Occupation of the Funds of Public Listed Companies by the 




 Number Percent (%) 
Sum of 
occupation As 




State-held 88 59.86% 19.28 61.06% 
                                                        
401
 Ibid. at 74. 
402
 Fund occupation is normally an illegal act in that controlling shareholder‘s 
diversion of company‘s fund for his own use.  
403
 Available on the website of SASAC: http:www.sasac.gov.cn 
404






59 40.14% 12.29 38.94% 
Total  147 100% 31.57 100% 
 
According to a survey by the SASAC, the occupation of funds by controlling 
shareholders occurs in 70% of listed companies that have suffered losses for two 
consecutive years.
405
 In addition to internal governance problems in the listed 
companies themselves, such illegal activities are due to two external factors. First, 
SOE reform has failed to completely separate the holding company from the listed 
company, which may not be an actual separate entity. Second, the supervision of listed 
companies is so weak, and legal punishment insufficiently rigorous for such 
contraventions. For instance, it was publicized in the press that the chairman of a 
company listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was fined just RMB 300,000 by the 
CSRC for allowing the occupation by the controlling shareholder of company funds 
of as much as RMB 2.5 billion (accounting for 96% of the company‘s net assets).406 
 
C. Legal liability 
There are three types of legal liability arising from tunneling. 
    a. Civil liability. The Company Law gives only general guidance that the 
―controlling shareholder should not take advantage of its relations with the 
                                                        
405
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subsidiaries to cause any loss or damages to the company or other shareholders.‖ A 




b. Administrative discipline by the CSRC. This takes the form of (1) deprivation 
of qualification for fund-raising and the issuance of securities if the occupation action 
or illegal guarantee is not eliminated,
408
 and (2) a warning or fine where disclosure is 
not made or falsely made.
409
 
c. Criminal offences  
Any director, supervisor, or senior executive who has breached his or her 
fiduciary duty and has caused the company to suffered great losses is guilty of an 
offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
three years or both. If the company has suffered substantially great losses, then the 
conviction is a fine and imprisonment for between three and seven years.
410
 However, 
exactly what constitute ―great losses‖ and ―substantially great losses‖ are interpreted 
by the courts, who also decide the amount of the fines. 
These offences are also applicable to a controlling shareholder who has 
instructed a director, supervisor, or senior executive to carry out such offences. Where 
the controlling shareholder is not a natural person, for example a company, the 
                                                        
407
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 21. See also Regulation Regarding Fund Use Between Listed 
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408
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 Supra Note 5, Sec.193. 
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company is liable to a fine and the managers who directly participated in the offences 
will receive the same penalties as the director, supervisor, or senior executive in 
question.  
 
D. In practice 
In 2005, the CSRC issued the regulation ―Notice of Enhancing the Quality of 
Public listed Companies,‖ which requires the repayment of diverted funds by the end 
of 2006.
411
 The repayment can be made in cash or through assets. Where the 
controlling shareholder does not have sufficient cash flow for repayment, the 
company can buy back the shares of controlling shareholders and cancel them. The 
novation of a company‘s loan liabilities to controlling shareholders is also allowed by 
the CSRC to solve the problem of outstanding funds that have been diverted by the 
controlling shareholder.  
It is unsatisfactory that the CSRC officially controls these administrative 
disciplines to mitigate illegal fund diversion by controlling shareholders, rather than 
legally punishing them. Effectively, the controlling shareholder in question is not 
legally liable as long as it is able to repay by the due time. The government‘s concern 
for holding companies under the SOE reform is no justification for discharging the 
legal liabilities of the controlling shareholders in question by means of issuing 
regulations to demonstrate its legitimate appearance. In effect, the tunneling of 
                                                        
411
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controlling shareholders causes loss and damages to a company, and the interests of 
minority shareholders are infringed upon by such illegal activities. This is a case in 
which the rule of law is not genuinely and substantially pursued and enforced in 
China. 
 
4.4.3 Inability of minority shareholders to effectively exercise their rights to protect 
themselves under the cumulative voting system 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 state that all shareholders 
of the same class should be treated equally.
412
 The CG Code emphasizes the 
protection of minority shareholders, while requiring that fair treatment be extended to 
all shareholders.
413
 Given the disadvantageous position of minority shareholders in 
state-held listed companies due to their weak voting power and information 
asymmetry,
414
 there are a few legal provisions specifically designed to protect 
minority rights (although these cannot go too far, otherwise the distinction between 
the small and large stakes of the company based on majority rules may disappear).
415
 
The cumulative voting system was newly incorporated into the revised Company 
                                                        
412 
Supra Note 390, at 32.  
413
 Supra Note 10, Art.2. 
414
 Professor Robin Hollington explains the disadvantaged position of minority 
shareholders in his book that ―the minority shareholder might conceivably be worse 
off in the long run by negotiating a customized agreement, because the mere fact that 
the parties have concluded, or have even just tried but failed to conclude, such an 
agreement may in certain circumstances be held to exclude any equitable constraints 
on the behavior of the majority, and the protection afforded by the agreement, a 
fortiori an unconcluded and therefore ineffective agreement, may be less than that 
which would have been afforded in equity‖. See Robin Hollington, Shareholder’ 
Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at 4. 
415
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Law in 2006. It basically means that when the shareholders‘ meeting elects directors 
or supervisors (exclusive of the supervisors who are employee representatives), it may 
adopt a cumulative voting system, as permitted by the articles of association or an 
ordinary resolution passed in a general meeting.
416
 The CG Code requires that listed 
companies that are no less than 30% owned by controlling shareholders adopt a 
cumulative voting system, and stipulate the implementing rules for such a system in 
the articles of association.
417
 
Cumulative voting system is a voting system under which a shareholder is 
allowed to multiply his or her voting rights by the number of nominees for the board 
of directors or supervisors so that he or she can focus on one particular seat and cast 
all of his or her votes for a single nominee of his or her choice. In contrast, in a 
regular voting system, shareholders cannot cast more than one vote per share to any 
single nominee. The process of cumulative voting is thought to provide minority 
shareholders (investors who control fewer votes) with the ability to ―exert a 
considerable amount of influence‖ on the outcome of elections.418 
    Cumulating voting is optional, and thus companies may choose not to implement 
it (unless otherwise required by law). Nevertheless, increasing numbers of public 
listed companies in China are adopting cumulative voting, probably to demonstrate 
their willingness to keep up with best practice in corporate governance to attract 
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 This has positive significance for the recognition of the 
cumulative voting system by legal rules, but its implementation is inevitably subject 
to various external factors, such as the controlling shareholder‘s interests. Two 
problems are encountered in practice that prevents minority shareholders in state-held 
listed companies from effectively exercising their rights to protect themselves. 
 
(A) Nomination is still under the control of controlling shareholders 
a. Who has the right to nominate? 
The PRC Company Law is silent on the nomination of the board. It is thus 
generally regulated by the articles of association of each company. However, there are 
still two ways to nominate the non-independent directors under the PRC Company 
Law: first, shareholder(s) that separately or aggregately hold no less than 10% of the 
company shares have the right to request the board to convene a extraordinary general 
meeting (EGM)
420
 to nominate non-independent directors; second, no less than ten 
days before the date of the shareholders‘ meeting, shareholders separately or 
aggregately holding no less than 3% of the company shares have the right to make a 
nomination proposal to the board, which will then submit to the general meeting for 
resolution.
421
 In particular, to nominate independent directors, the ID Guideline 
provides that the board of directors, supervisory board and shareholders who hold 
                                                        
419
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 Supra Note 4, Sec. 101. 
421
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Table 4.5 shows that listed companies in which the top six to ten shareholders 
own not less than 3% of shares constitute less than 10% of the total listed companies 
in China. Table 4.6 shows that of the shareholders owning tradable shares, the 
companies whose top two to top seven shareholders own not less than 3% of shares 
account for the highest (2.31%) and the lowest (0.07%) of the total in the years from 
2003 to 2005, demonstrating a very low percentage of 3% shareholding among 
general public shareholders. Thus, even if the top 10 shareholders‘ ownership could 
be aggregated (Table 4.7), there would still be less than 50% of public listed 
companies in which the top ten shareholders as parties in concert would be entitled to 
nominate candidates. 
It is common practice in Chinese state-held listed companies that the candidates 
are pre-determined by the controlling shareholders, taking into account the view of 
the top 5-10 shareholders. The proposition of the candidates is then submitted for 
approval to the board of directors, which convenes a general meeting to pass the 
resolution.
424
 Thus, candidates are mostly still nominated by the controlling 
                                                        
422
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shareholders, who have a distinct advantage over minority shareholders due to their 
statutory rights to propose candidates (threshold of 3%)
425
 and to request the board to 




                                                                                                                                                              
Securities Daily (in Chinese), 6 April 2004. 
425










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2000 1060 1059 654 383 223 108 43 18 4 4 1 
2001 1136 1135 707 428 229 114 40 11 5 2 2 
2002 1200 1199 779 475 266 127 46 13 3 2 2 
2003 1266 1260 845 536 297 141 54 21 8 4 6 
2004 1354 1351 927 591 335 164 68 25 11 3 13 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2000 1060 99.91% 61.70% 36.13% 21.04% 10.19% 4.06% 1.70% 0.38% 0.38% 0.09% 
2001 1136 99.91% 62.24% 37.68% 20.16% 10.04% 3.52% 0.97% 0.44% 0.18% 0.18% 
2002 1200 99.92% 64.92% 39.58% 22.17% 10.58% 3.83% 1.08% 0.25% 0.17% 0.17% 
2003 1266 99.53% 66.75% 42.34% 23.46% 11.14% 4.27% 1.66% 0.63% 0.32% 0.47% 
2004 1354 99.78% 68.46% 43.65% 24.74% 12.11% 5.02% 1.85% 0.81% 0.22% 0.96% 
2005 1343 99.93% 69.92% 44.53% 24.50% 11.54% 5.06% 1.79% 0.37% 0.22% 0.22% 
 
 
Table 4.6 Top 10 shareholders (tradable shares) owning not less than 3% of shares (2003-2005) 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2003 1266 133 21 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 
2004 1354 127 22 5 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 
2005 1343 175 31 8 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 







1.66% 0.39% 0.24% 0.16% 0.08% 0 0 0 0 




2.31% 0.60% 0.22% 0.15% 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 





1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 1-10 
2003 1266 202 246 272 301 327 346 362 401 424 
2004 1354 264 327 358 385 395 412 429 464 481 




1-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8 1-9 1-10 
2003 1266 15.96% 19.43% 21.48% 23.78% 25.83% 27.33% 28.59% 31.67% 33.49% 
2004 1354 19.50% 24.15% 26.44% 28.43% 29.17% 30.43% 31.68% 34.27% 35.52% 






(B) Do minority shareholders have enough votes for their candidates? 
The formula to determine the number of shares necessary to elect a given 
number of directors is 
X = (Y * N1) / (N2 + 1) + 1,
427
 
where X = the number of shares needed to elect a given number of directors, 
  Y = the total number of shares at the general meeting, 
  N1 = the number of directors one desires to elect, and 
  N2 = the total number of directors to be elected. 
    In the formulation, the variable N2 is inversely proportional to X, which means 
that the fewer the total number of directors to be elected, the greater the number of 
shares minority shareholders need to own. The number of directors and proportion of 
independent directors are provided by the corporate laws and regulations (discussed in 
Chapter V). 
What is noteworthy is that the variable N1 is directly proportional to X. For 
example, if an election is for 5 directors, the company has 1000 shares (with one vote 
per share, 800 shares owned by one controlling shareholder, and 200 shares owned by 
minority shareholders), and all of the shareholders have attended the general meeting, 
then, under the cumulative voting system, the number of shares that minority 
shareholders need to elect one director is: 
X = (1000*1)/(5+1)+1 = 167.66. 
The number of shares needed by minority shareholders to elect two directors is: 
X = (1000*2)/(5+1)+1 = 334.33. 
The number of shares needed by minority shareholders to elect three directors is: 
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X = (1000*3)/(5+1)+1 = 501. 
Thus, when minority shareholders wish to elect more candidates, they need more 
shares for the election. If minority shareholders hold a very small number of shares 
compared with the total number of company shares, then it is difficult for them to 
elect their directors. In the foregoing case, minority shareholders who hold 200 shares 
of the company are able to elect just one director.  
 
4.4.4 Inability of minority shareholders to effectively exercise their rights to protect 
themselves by derivative action  
A. Common law 
The fundamental rule in Foss v Harbottle
428
 is that the company is the proper 
plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong done to a company. If the wrong is 
ratifiable by a simple majority of the resolution in a general meeting, then no 
individual shareholder may bring an action.
429
 Jenkins LJ explains in Edwards v. 
Halliwell when this rule does not apply: (1) ―if the alleged wrong is ultra vires the 
corporation because the majority of members cannot confirm the transaction;‖ (2) ―if 
the transaction complained of could be validly done or sanctioned only by a special 
resolution or the like, because a simple majority cannot confirm a transaction which 
requires the concurrence of a greater majority.‖430 
The only exception to the rule from the case of Foss v Harbottle is ―where the 
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429
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action in his book Shareholders’ Rights (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004): ―(a) the action is 
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wrong amounts to a ‗fraud‘ and wrongdoers are in control of the company.‖431 The 
ability of a shareholder to file a lawsuit must be decided as a preliminary matter 
before the trial. The ―fraud‖ must be understood in its ―wide sense‖ as comprising not 
only fraud at common law but also fraud in the wider equitable sense of that term, as 
in the equitable concept of fraud in terms of power. This involves with the ―use of 
directors‘ powers intentionally or unintentionally, fraudulently or negligently, in a 
manner which benefits themselves at the expense of the company. It does not require 
ownership of controlling state of the company. It is sufficient that the person together 
with other people can get a majority of the company.‖432 
 
B. Statutory derivative action 
(A) Singapore  
    Pursuant to the Singapore Companies Act, a shareholder may seek court relief 
where
433
 (a) the company‘s affairs are being conducted; and (b) the director‘s powers 
are being exercised in one of the following four ways: ―(i) in an oppressive manner 
vis-à-vis the member(s); (ii) in disregard to the member(s)‘ interests as member(s); (iii) 
unfairly discriminates against members, or (iv) is prejudicial to members.‖434 The 
court may accordingly make a variety of orders, among which minority shareholders 










 Supra Note 328, Sec. 216(1). 
434
 In the case of Over & Over Ltd v. Bonvests Holdings Ltd. and Another [2008] 
SGHC 226, the High Court is of the opinion that ―there was no meaningful distinction 
between all four limbs in s.216‖; ―[R]ather than distinguishing one ground from the 
other in Sec.216, the four grounds ought to be considered as a compound one‖. The 
Court has observed that ―the touchstone in any oppression action is fairness‖. 
435
 Supra Note 328, Sec. 216(2). In the UK, the personal remedy for an aggrieved 
136 
 
    The statutory derivative action is provided for by Section 216A of the Singapore 
Companies Act on the three conditions that ―(i) the complainant has given 14 days‘ 
notice to the directors of the company of his intention to apply to the Court if the 
directors of the company do not bring, diligently prosecute or defend or discontinue 
the action; (ii) the complainant is acting in good faith; and (iii) it appears to be prima 
facie in the interests of the company that the action be brought, prosecuted, defended 
or discontinued.‖ 436  However, this provision is not applicable to public listed 
companies. 
 
(B) The UK 
The ―derivative claim‖ under the UK Companies Act 2006 has two elements: ―(i) 
in respect of a cause of action vested in the company, and (ii) seeking relief on behalf 
of the company.‖437 The cause of action arises from ―an actual or proposed act or 
omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director 
of the company.‖438 In particular, Section 369 to Section 373 of the UK Companies 
Act 2006 provides statutory remedies in the specific case of ―unauthorized donations 
                                                                                                                                                              
shareholder based on ―unfair prejudice‖ is provided by Section 459(1) of the UK 
Companies Act 1985.
435
 It was common for judges to ask whether the majority had 
infringed the ―legitimate expectations‖ of the minority in spite of their ―extraneous 
equitable considerations and constrains‖. Such expectations are ―what the shareholder 
initially bargained for‖, as stated by Lord Wilberforce that ―a visible departure from 
the standards of fair dealing and a violation of the conditions of fair play on which 
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely‖. See Re 
Kong Thai Sawmills [1978] 2 MLJ 227, at 227. In the case of O’Neil v. Phillips [1999] 
1 WLR 1092, Lord Hoffman deviates from the use of ―legitimate expectation‖; 
instead, the equitable principles would be adopted: ―equitable considerations make it 
unfair for those conducting the affairs of the company to reply upon their strict legal 
powers‖, so ―unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules or in using the rules in a 
manner which equity would regard as contrary to good faith‖. 
436
 Supra Note 328, Sec. 216A(3). For Singapore statutory derivative action, see also 
Pearlie Koh Ming Choo, ―The Statutory Derivative Action in Singapore – A Critical 
and Comparative Examination‖ (2001) 13 Bond Law Review 64, at 86. 
437
 Supra Note 118, Sec. 260(1). 
438







Before the Company Law was revised in 2006, there were no express provisions 
in the 1993 Company Law and sectoral regulations concerning the shareholder‘s 
derivative claims against the offending corporate personnel. For the first time, Section 




The defendant in a derivative suit covers not only directors, senior executives, 
and supervisors, but also any person who has caused the company‘s loss. The law 
does not specify that controlling shareholders must be the defendant, but when the 
controlling shareholder in question has met the requirements for cause of action, he or 





                                                        
439
 Sec. 369(1) of UK Companies Act 2006 provides that it ―applies where a company 
has made a political donation or incurred political expenditure without the 
authorization required‖. Section 369(3) requires that the directors in default shall fall 
in either of the two scenarios: ―(1) the directors shall be those who, at the time the 
unauthorized donation was made or the unauthorized expenditure was incurred, were 
directors of the company by which the donation was made or the expenditure was 
incurred‖; or (2) the directors shall be ―the directors of the relevant holding  
company where (i) that company was a subsidiary of a relevant holding company, and 
(ii) the directors of the relevant holding company failed to take all reasonable steps to 
prevent the donation being made or the expenditure being incurred‖. 
440
 Xiao Huang, ―Shareholders Revolt: The Statutory Derivative Action in China‖ 
CLPE Research Paper 49/2009, Vol.05 No.09, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1516448, at 7. 
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     To be a proper plaintiff, shareholders should separately or aggregately hold no 
less than 1% of the total shares of a company for a period of at least 180 consecutive 
days on or before the damage or loss to the company is caused.
441
 The threshold of 
1% is to prevent minority shareholders from abusing the right of appeal so that the 
normal operations of the company are not affected. The 180-day rule aims to prevent 
people from intentionally buying shares for speculative profit-making through 
litigation after learning that the company‘s interests have been infringed.442 
 
c. Procedure 
Before a derivative claim is filed, shareholders must ask the board of supervisors 
in writing to initiate a lawsuit; if any supervisor is the person who has caused the 
company‘s losses, shareholders shall write to the board of directors alternatively.443 If 
the board fails to do so within 30 days of the date of receiving the request, then the 
                                                        
441
 Art.4, Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the PRC 
Company Law (Interpretations of PRC Company Law), issued by the Supreme 
People‘s Court on 28 April 2006, with effect from 9 May 2006. 
442
 The scope of plaintiff for legal proceedings is narrower than the counterpart of 
Singapore. For personal remedy under Section 216 of Companies Act of Singapore, 
any member or holder of a debenture of a company could be a complainant. For 
derivative action under Section 216A, the court has greater discretion: in addition to 
the company member, ―any other person who, in the discretion of the Court, is a proper 
person to make an application‖. In common law, the plaintiff may not be a member of 
the company at the time of alleged wrong; but he must be a member at the time of 
bringing the action. See the classic case Seaton v. Grant (1867) LR 2 Ch App.459. In 
that case, the plaintiff sustained a great loss by speculating in the company shares. 
And then he purchased five shares and filed the suit. As stated by Sir G. J. Turner, LJ, 
―although I by no means approve of such conduct, yet I cannot venture to say that for 
this reason the Court ought to interfere upon motion to deprive a Plaintiff of his rights, 
if, upon the hearing, he should appear to be entitled to anything.‖ 
443
 See for example Hao Ling v. Wang Jiyan, decided by Beijing No,1 Intermediate 
Court (2009) No.5142. In this case, the plaintiff is both the shareholder and supervisor 
of the company. She filed the derivative claim as shareholder against the executive 
director of the company. The Court takes the position that the internal remedy 




shareholders can proceed to derivative action.
444
 The pre-suit procedural requirement 
―provides companies with the opportunity to exhaust internal remedies first and to 
involve centralized management in the decision of whether to sue or not.‖445 
The exception to this rule is that in emergency situations, failure to file an 
immediate claim may cause unrecoverable damages to the company, and thus proper 
shareholder(s) can, on their own behalf, directly file a lawsuit to the court instead of 




d. Cause of action 
There are two elements of cause of action. The first is that the defendant has 
contravened corporate law or the constitutions of the company, and the second is 
when such contravention has caused loss or damage to the company. The intentions 
and knowledge (for example, whether the defendant acted in good faith in the 
interests of the company) of the accused are not reviewed by the courts.  
 
(B) Judicial application 
a. From rejection to acceptance  
Since the establishment of the stock exchanges in 1992, the law has remained 
silent in relation to derivative claims, despite the fact that ―disputes between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders have not been uncommon in 
China.‖447 Although a number of directors, supervisors and top executives have 
received administrative disciplines from the CSRC or been referred for criminal 
                                                        
444
 See for example Zhou Yuchao v. Zhao Yu, decided by Foshan Intermediate Court 
of Guangdong Province (2007) No.348. 
445
 Supra Note 440, at 9. 
446
 See for example Xu Wenxing and others v. Wu Yongjian, decided by Beijing No.2 
Intermediate Court (2009) No.11811. 
447
 Supra Note 440, at 11. 
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The Chinese courts tend to refuse to hear such cases because minority 
shareholders are ―unsuitable‖ to be the plaintiff. For instance, Chengdu Hong Guang 
Company Limited (which was the first listed company to commit the criminal offence 
of ―fraudulent financial reporting‖ and was finally delisted) was punished by the 
CSRC in 1998 for illegal transactions, and Henan Lian Hua Monosodium Glutamate 
Ltd. (―Lian Hua Wei Jing‖, listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange) was punished by 
the CSRC for expropriation by controlling shareholders, yet the courts refused to 
accept the litigation of investors due to their status as an ―inappropriate plaintiff.‖ In 
the case of ―Ning Guang Xia,‖ investors claimed for compensation, but this was not 
accepted by the court. The response of the court was that ―the case shall await further 
interpretations of laws and regulations concerned.‖449 
In early 2002, the regulation Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in the Securities 
Market was issued by the Supreme People‘s Court to affirm the principle of the 
legitimacy of civil compensation. In December 2002, Mr. Li Guoguang, then 
Vice-President of the Supreme People‘s Court, announced in a conference on national 
adjudication work for civil and commercial laws that ―shareholders shall have the 
right to file derivative suits and the courts shall accept the claims.‖450 However, the 




 Ning Guang Xia was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange since 1994. It was 
one of the best ―blue-chip‖ stocks with the second most mark-up of all Chinese stocks. 
False profit-making: RMB 771.56 million (1998 to 2001). It was required by the 
CSRC to pay a fine of RMB 0.6 million in 2002. After restructure, it is re-listed since 
December 16, 2002 under Special treatment (ST), which was a signaled stock whose 
financial status is treated as not normal by the stock exchange. This type of treatment 
has been taken by Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges since April 22, 1998. 
450
 The speech in Chinese was reported by Xia Hua News Agency, available online : 
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speech of Mr. Li has been treated by the courts as ―reference instead of formal 
authority to hear the cases.‖451 
During the period January 2003 to June 2004, it was reported in the press that the 
directors or senior management of over 10 public listed companies had absconded 
overseas with nearly RMB 10 billion, which had caused substantial losses to public 
companies and public investors.
452
 Following such reports, the Supreme People‘s 
Court published the draft Regulations on Several Issues Concerning Trials for 
Corporate Suit (No.1) for public consultation and comments. The draft provides basic 
guidelines for the acceptance of derivative actions,
453
 but indicates that ―China still 
plans to set highly restrictive requirements for plaintiff shareholders.‖454 Section 44 
of the draft Regulations requires that the plaintiff shareholder(s) must meet two 
conditions: (1) they must have held the company‘s shares when the interests of 
company were infringed and continue to hold them; (2) they must hold at least 1% of 
the company shares.  
The draft laid a solid foundation for the subsequent revision of the Company Law 
in 2006, which officially provides that derivative action shall be accepted by all levels 
of courts in China, but requires that the 1% ownership requirement is kept and 





b. Adjudication in practice 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-12/11/content_656845.htm 
451
 It was stated by the Shenzhen Intermediate People‘s Court when it dismissed the 
appeals from an investor (Mr. Zhao Xinxian) against the director of San Jiu Medical 
& Pharmaceutical Cp., Ltd in 2003. 
452
 Available online: http://fz.tx.gov.cn/dt.asp?id=254 
453
 Art. 43-5. 
454
 Supra Note 440, at 12. 
455
 Supra Note 4, Sec.152. 
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(a) Traditional stance in common law jurisdictions 
As a time-honored remedy across jurisdictions, derivative action represents an 
effective way for shareholders, and especially minority shareholders, to seek relief on 
behalf of the company.  
The courts traditionally demonstrate an unwillingness to interfere with a 
commercial entity‘s business judgment and internal management for reasons of 
majority rule,
456
 because the majority shareholders, who usually have a majority 
stake, can exercise their rights to their own advantage.
457
 The courts are also aware of 
the potential motivation of greenmail by unscrupulous minority shareholders, the 
presence of which is determined by the court by distinguishing personal interests from 
company interests based on the facts of each case.
458
 The court may refuse to grant 
relief if minority shareholders ―bring an action after an unreasonable lapse of time or 
when they seek equity from the courts with unclean hands.‖459 The courts are not 
willing to open the floodgates of litigation. 
 
(b) Limited number of derivative suits involving listed companies 
According to the Chinese law database ―LawinfoChina‖460 (the largest and most 
complete legal database in China), approximately 140 derivative lawsuits were heard 
by the Chinese courts in the period 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2009. Only one 
derivative claim was filed by minority shareholders of a listed company (heard and 
                                                        
456
 L. S. Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law (7
th
 ed.) (London: Butterworths, 






 See Nurcombe v. Nurcomber [1985] 1 All ER 65. 
460
 The database of ―LawinfoChina‖ is operated by the LawinfoChina Co., Ltd., 
which is a legal information and education company, established by Peking University 
through its Legal Information Center. The ―LawinfoChina‖ provides the subscriber 




decided upon by the Superior Court of Anhui Province in 2004
461
). All of the other 
derivative actions involved non-listed companies. 





 directors, and senior executives.
464
 In all cases the courts carefully 
reviewed the claimant‘s shareholding status to decide whether the plaintiff met the 
legal requirement.
465
    
 
(c) State-held listed companies 
    Derivative claims by minority shareholders of listed companies are clearly rare 
in China, as no judgment on such a case could be found in the Chinese law database 
of ―LawinfoChina‖ since the Company Law was revised in 2006. 
In the particular case of state-held listed companies, the difficulty for the Chinese 
courts is not in hearing the cases or delivering orders, but in dealing with the conflicts 
between the interests of individuals (minority shareholders) and the state (the 
government as controlling shareholder). Lawsuits in China involving the interests of 
the state (e.g., state-owned shares) ―are usually handled in line with political priorities 




It is difficult for the courts in China to rule against the government for three 
                                                        
461
 See AnHui Fengyuan Pharmaceutical Company Limited v. Cheng Wenxian, 
decided by the High Court of Anhui Province (2004) No.62. 
462
 See for example Real Estate Company of Nanchang District of Wuxi Municipal v. 
Heng Tong Group, decided by the Intermediate Court of Wuxi (2000).  
463
 See for example Shanghai Jinren Glass Mechanics Limited Company v, Yao 
Moumou, decided by Shanghai No.2 Intermediate Court (2009) No.510. 
464
 See for example Li Xiaozhaong v. Jin Rongzhong and others, decided by 
Nanchuan People‘s Court of Chongqin (2006) No.538. 
465
 See for example, Jiang Zhiling v. Shen Lvsui, decided by Beijing No.2 
Intermediate Court (2009) No.09350. In this case, the Court dismissed the case 
because the plaintiff is not a shareholder but director of the company. 
466
 Supra Note 162, at 259. 
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reasons. The first is that judicial justice in China is closely connected with the 
bureaucracy, given that the financial budgets of the courts (for example, the salary of 




The second is that misconduct is generally punished by the CSRC, and the 
minority shareholders of listed companies (specifically state-held listed companies) 
cannot effectively make derivative claims. In a typical case, the CSRC officially 
arranges for corrective action against illegal fund-diversion by the controlling 
shareholders of state-held listed companies, rather than legally punishing them. That 
is to say, the controlling shareholder in question is not legally liable as long as he or 
she is able to repay by the due time. 
The third is that the Chinese government may have less incentive to ensure good 
corporate governance because non-tradable shares are not listed for public transaction, 
and thus fluctuations in share prices have no direct financial impact on the 
government. However, this does not justify the government paying no attention to the 
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 Available online: http://www.city.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/xxsb/699434.htm 
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Chapter V Two-tier Board Structure 
―A robust and pragmatic governance framework provides a balance between 
accountability and responsiveness, between empowerment and organizational 
alignment, and between risks and returns.‖ 
 
Temasek Review (2009) 
 
5.1 Overview of the board of directors 
The board of directors is crucial to corporate governance, as it acts as a bridge 
between shareholders and executives. The board is in charge of the business 
management of the company. Both the UK Combined Code
468
 and the Corporate 
Governance Code of Singapore
469
 take the effectiveness of the board as the main 
principle of corporate governance by stating that the board is ―collectively responsible 
for the success of the company.‖  
 
5.1.1 Responsibilities of the board of directors 
In China, the board of directors of public listed companies must comprise 5-19 
persons and may include democratically elected employee representatives of the 
company.
470
 The board focuses on the business operations of the company. Under 
Section 47 of PRC Company Law, the board has the authority to determine the 
―operation plans and investment programme.‖ 471  Related to this authority, the 
shareholder‘s general meeting has the power to decide the ―operation guidelines and 
                                                        
468
 The Combined Code of UK, A.1. The Combined Code was first issued in 1998 
and has been revised in 2003, 2006 and 2008. The current 2008 edition applies to the 
accounting periods beginning on or after 29 June 2008. 
469
 The Code of Corporate Governance (2005), Principle 1. The Code of Corporate 
Governance, issued in July 2005, took effect from AGMs held on or after 1 January 
2007. Listed companies should disclose their corporate governance practices and 
explain deviations from the Code of Corporate Governance in their annual reports for 
AGMs held from 1 January 2007 onwards. 
470
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 109. 
471
 Ibid. Sec.47(3). 
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investment plan‖ pursuant to the provision in respect of the general meeting‘s 
authority under the PRC Company Law. 
472
 The terms ―plan‖ and ―guidelines‖ in 
terms of operations and ―programme‖ and ―plan‖ with respect to investment are not 
further statutorily defined. The relative authority over operations and investment of 
the board and the general shareholders is not ascertained by law, and should thus be 
clarified in the articles of association.  
A board of directors can enhance its effectiveness by ―permitting directors both 
to use and develop expertise in specialized areas and to focus their energies on a 
subset of issues confronting the corporation.‖473 The board formulates the regulations 
that distinguish the duties and functions of the various committees of the board,
474
 




5.1.2 Internal control 
A. Internal control in common law jurisdictions 
The UK Turnbull Review defines an internal control system as encompassing ―the 
policies, processes, tasks, behaviours and other aspects of a company [that] facilitate its 
effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond appropriately to significant 
business, operational, financial, compliance and other risks to achieving the company‘s 
objectives.‖476 In Singapore, internal control has a broader scope than in the UK 
Turnbull Review, extending to the ―risk management policies and systems established 
by the Management‖ and ―accounting control,‖ which are expressly stipulated by the 




 Lynne L. Dallas, ―The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors‖ (2003) 
40 San Diego L. Rev. 781, at 789. 
474
 See also Conference Board Inc. (Canada), ―Corporate Governance Best Practices: 
A Blueprint for the Post-Enron Era‖ by Carolyn Kay Brancato & Christian A. Plath 









 of Singapore and the SGX Listing Manual.
478
 The Singapore Code 
of Corporate Governance requires an audit committee comprising internal or external 
auditors to annually review the effectiveness of control, and stipulates that the board 
―should comment on the adequacy of the internal controls in the company‘s annual 
report.‖479 In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the annual report of a 
company to contain an internal control report that specifies the ―responsibility of 
management for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting.‖ Moreover, a registered public accounting firm that 
issues the audit report for the company must attest to the assessment made by the 





Pursuant to Section 47 of the PRC Company Law, the board of directors is in 
charge of the internal administration structure and business operations.
481
 The 
Guidelines on Comprehensive Risk Management in Central Enterprises issued by the 
SASAC, which requires the establishment of comprehensive internal control systems 
in central SOEs.
482
 The establishment and maintenance of internal control are the 
board‘s main corporate governance responsibilities, 483  which covers financial, 
                                                        
477
 Sec. 199(2A) and 201B(5)(ii); 
478
 Singapore Listing Manual, Rule 719. 
479
 Supra Note 469, Guidelines 12.1 and 12.2. 
480 
Supra Note 113, Sec.404.  
481
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 47 (8) and 47(10). 
482
 It is issued by the SASAC, (2006) No.108, with effect from 6 June, 2006. The 
Article 3 and 34 require that ―the system comprises of reporting, approval, liability, 
inspection, evaluation of the risks in operation, finance, market, law and strategies‖. 
483
 Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code (The Turnbull 
Guidance) 1999, §15. 
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operational, and compliance control.
484
 The purpose of internal control is to ―ensure 
the reliability of financial statements, to facilitate corporate officers‘ knowledge of 
their corporation's business practices and to prevent public misstatements, fraud, and 
the misuse of assets.‖485 How shareholders strike a balance between making the 
board accountable and giving the board sufficient space to manage the company 
depends on how the internal control system works.
486
 
    The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges demand that each listed company 
include an internal control report (evaluated by auditors) in its annual report.
487
 
Internal control is a long-term task for the survival of public listed companies under 
intense market competition. Well-organized internal control involves an integrated 
system with multiple offices.  
    Internal control in a typical trading company can be taken as an example. The 
trading team is at the front desk; risk control and legal teams are in the middle; and 
the finance team (settlement, accounts, and treasury) constitute the back office.  A 
flow chart of internal control process is presented in Figure 5.1. When the trading 
team is going to make a deal with a new counter party, it submits an application for 
approval and registration to the risk control department authorized by the board of 
directors. When the counter party is not new, then it is subject to credit review by risk 
control by checking the credit limit. In the execution of transaction, the deal recap 
                                                        
484
 Melvin Avon Eisenberg summaries the historical development of the widening 
meaning of internal control in his research paper of ―The Board of Directors and 
Internal Control‖ (1997) 19 Cardozo L.R. 237. 
485
 Wilson Meeks, ―Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should 
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell An End to Corporate Criminal Liability?‖ (2006) 
40 Colum.J.L.& Soc.Probs. 77, at 90-1.  
486
 Philip Wickham & Peter Townsend, ―The Non-executive Director: A Management 
Perspective‖ (1994) 15(7) Company Lawyer 211, at 212. 
487
 The Internal Control Guidelines of Listed Company, issued by Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges, with effect from July 1, 2006; The Internal Control Guidelines of Listed 
Company, issued by Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, with effect from July 1, 2007. 
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sent by the counter party must be verified against the deal sheet produced by the 
internal system upon entry of the deal particulars. The contract of sale or purchase is 
then prepared by appropriate time to send to the counter party. The counters to the 
contract from the counter party are also subject to internal examination, and risks with 
respect to payment terms, pricing quotations, and legal compliance should be 
reviewed and identified. If the terms of the counters deviate from the standard format, 
then the trading team may seek the approval from management based on the business 
considerations. If no discrepancy is found, then the trading team shall proceed with 
the contract signing and filing. The finance team in the back office deals with the 
payment matters (such as applying to the bank for issuing letter of credit) within the 
authorized limit in accordance with the board resolution. The settlement and account 
entry must also be completed in due course. 
A sound system of internal control ―reduces, but cannot eliminate, the possibilities 
of poor judgment of decision making, human error . . . and the occurrence of 
unforeseeable circumstances.‖488 Internal control provides ―reasonable‖ rather than 
―absolute‖ control to achieve the company‘s business aims.489 Hence, the effectiveness 
of the internal control system is regularly updated and adjusted by the board of directors. 
   
                                                        
488
 Supra Note 477, §22. 
489
 See the explanation of ―reasonable test‖ in Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, 
―The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties‖ (2004) 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
1149, at 1195-6. 
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Internal examination of 
the contract counters 
Figure 5.1 Flow Chart of Internal Control 
Front office 
 







Entry of deal particulars to 
produce deal sheet 
Prepare contracts for sending 
to counter party 
Discrepancy? 
Inform trader for 
resolution (if the change 
is minor) 
Contract and supporting 




Submit new c/p application for 





Monitor signed contract 
received from Counterparty 
Settlement Process  
(Billing & Payment) 
  
Accounting Entry  
Contract Counters / 
revised contract from 
counterparty 
Match deal recap with deal 
sheet entry  
End 
Deviation Issue - 










Risk control to check credit 










A. Who are the directors? 
A director is sui generis in character, and can mean trustee, agent, or managing 
partner at different times.
490
 A director is defined in corporate law of the United 
Kingdom and Singapore as ―any person occupying the position of director, by 
whatever name called,‖491 including both de jure directors and de facto directors.492 
Moreover, the UK Companies Act defines a ―shadow director‖ as a person ―in 
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are 
accustomed to act,‖ but it excludes those who give advice in a professional capacity 
or give directions or instructions to subsidiaries.
493
 The PRC Company Law does not 
give any general meaning or specific classification of ―director.‖ 
The clear division of responsibility between board and executive must be 
pursued to ensure the balance of power and avoid the concentration of power in one 
person (Chairman or CEO).
494
 For this reason, the chairman and chief executive 
officer (CEO) must be separate persons. Under the PRC Company Law, directors may 
concurrently be senior executives. In 10.1% of Chinese listed companies, the 
chairman and the CEO is the same person.
495
 Even if the two positions are separately 
held, it is common for one party to have controlling power over the other side, 
                                                        
490
 See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gullier [1942] 1 All ER 378, 387; see also Re Lands 
Allotment Co [1894] 1 Ch. 616, at 631 and JJ Harrison (Properties) v. Harrison 
[2002] 1 B.C.L.C. 162, 173. 
491
 Supra Note 118, Sec.250; Supra Note 328, Sec.4. 
492
 In the case of Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd. [1994] 2 BCLC 180, the Court identifies 
that ―to establish that a person is a de facto director, it is necessary to pleas and prove 
that he undertakes functions in relation to the company which could properly be 
discharged only by a director‖. 
493
 Supra Note 118, Sec.251; See Ultraframe v. Fielding [2005] EWHC 1638. 
494
 Supra Note 468, A.2; Supra Note 469, Guidelines 3.1 
495
 Supra Note 361, at 34. 
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demonstrating a formalistic separation and actual integration.
496
 
There is no provision in the PRC Company Law concerning the election of 
directors.
497
 The CG Code requires that detailed information about the candidates for 
directorship be publicly disclosed before the convening of the shareholders‘ 
meeting,
498




In practice, the election process may not be as ―open, fair, impartial and 
independent‖ as required by the CG Code.500 Around 40% of listed companies in 
China have no specific internal rules in their articles concerning detailed nomination 
and voting procedures for directors.
501
 According to a survey by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, there are five forms of nomination, including nomination by shareholder(s), 
by the board of directors, by the chairman, by the board of directors after discussion 
between the chairman and the majority shareholders, and by the nomination 
committee of the board. Of these, the first (nomination by shareholders) and the 
fourth (nomination by the board of directors after discussion between the chairman 
                                                        
496
 The Section 120 of Company Law 1993 (annulled) provides that ―the chairman is 
authorized to exercise partial powers of the board during the closure time of board 
meeting‖. This provision, failing to provide the specific scope of the powers for 
chairman to exercise, has been removed by the revised Company Law 2006. But the 
other powers remain in Company Law 2006, such as presiding over general meeting, 
calling and presiding over board meeting, and checking the implementation of board 
decisions. See Sec.102 and 110, PRC Company Law. 
497
 The Shanghai Stock Exchange released a new regulation Guidelines of 
Appointment and Conduct of Directors in the Public Listed Companies, which came 
into force on 25 August 2009. The Article 8 of the Regulation provides the 
requirement of the candidate for a director of public listed company: ―he/she shall not 
be punished by the CSRC or publicly criticized for more than two times by the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange over the latest three years‖. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
has not yet given such guidance. 
498
 Supra Note 10, Art.29. 
499
 Ibid. Art.30. 
500
 Ibid. Art.28. 
501
 Supra Note 361, at 83. 
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and the majority shareholders) are the most common in listed companies.
502
 The 
survey finds that the nomination of directors in state-held listed companies in China is 
substantially influenced by the controlling shareholders.
503
 
     
B. Director‘s duty 
The director has two duties under the PRC Company Law: duty of loyalty 
(―Zhongshi Yiwu‖) and duty of diligence (―Qinmian Yiwu‖).504  
 
(A) In the context of common law jurisdictions 
a. Fiduciary duty  
    Fiduciary duty in common law jurisdictions is deeply entrenched in the equity 
and trust laws, and is one of the fundamental assumptions from which duties derive. 
Fiduciary duty in common law jurisdictions has developed into a more systematic 
framework of key elements based on certain common law rules,
505
 supplemented 
with the additional touchstones in various jurisdictions for the evaluation of a 
director‘s duty, such as independent judgment,506 fairness to the company,507 and 
confidentiality.
508
 There are three basic elements of fiduciary duty in common law.  
First, the director must be honest and have good faith (bona fide) in the 
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company‘s interests. This is a subjective test as to the director‘s state of mind.509 
Nevertheless, in the absence of evidence on this subjective state of mind, the test 
follows an objective approach to discover the director‘s reasonableness in the 
transaction.
510
 In the case of a group companies, Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v 
Lloyds Bank Ltd (1970) Ch 62 held that ―each company in the group is a separate 
legal entity and the directors of a particular company are not entitled to sacrifice the 
interest of that company.‖ The essence of the fiduciary obligation lies in the 
―surveillance and justiciability of motive,‖511 so that the duty may only be evaluated 
by motive rather than by results.
512
 However, propriety of motive is not provided for 
in law and is difficult to prove.
513
  
    Second, the director must exercise his or her powers for proper purposes. 
Directors shall be liable if they have ―exercised their powers for a purpose different 
from that for which the powers were conferred upon them‖ by law or by articles.514 
There are three approaches: the first approach is a strict standard of equity law applied 
to a trustee, who must exercise the power for the specific purpose of the 
beneficiary.
515
 The second approach is to determine whether the director does so 
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honestly and in good faith with the best interests of the company in mind.
516
 This 
approach overlaps the first element of fiduciary duty. The third approach is to 
determine the substantial purpose for which the power has been exercised, such as 
whether the purpose of the allotment was to raise funds or to dilute the plaintiff‘s 
shareholding to a minority
.517
 
    Third, a director should avoid conflicts of interest. This element is composed of 
two rules: the non-conflict rule and the non-profit rule. Judge Vinelott in the Movitex 
case
518
 clarifies two categories of conflict: one between duty and personal interest 
and the other between the company‘s interest and the director‘s own interest. This 
includes both direct interest and indirect interest, which may be obtained from 
usurping the company‘s opportunity, or the misuse of information or property.519 It is 
immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information, 
or opportunity.
520
 As Lord Macmillian states in the Regal case
521
 ―directors are 
accountable for any profit which they made if it was by reason and in virtue of their 
office,‖ a director of a company must not accept a benefit from a third party conferred 




Both the UK and Singapore corporate laws require disclosure as a statutory 
                                                        
516
 Supra Note 505. 
517
 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821. For the share issue to 
create voting power, see Mills v. Mills 60 C.L.R. 150. See also Clemens v. Clemens 
[1976] 2 All E.R. 268. 
518
 MovitexLtd v Bulfield (1988) BCLC 104 
519
 See Canadian Aero Service v O’Malley (1973) 40 DLR (3d) 371, Bhullar v 
Bhullar Re Bhullar Bros Ltd (2003) EWCA 424, Boardman v Phipps (1967) 2 AC 46, 
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley (1972) 2 All ER 162. 
520
 Supra Note 118, Sec.175(2). 
521
 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Hudson (1978) 52 ALJR 399. 
522





 The time limit in the UK is a little ambiguous, as it requires the declaration to 
be made before the company enters into the transaction or arrangement.
524
 In 
Singapore it is much clearer. For an interested transaction, the director must declare 
―as soon as practicable after the relevant facts have come to his knowledge.‖525 For 
other arrangements, declaration should occur after he or she becomes a director or 
takes possession of the property.
526
 Disclosure relieves criminal liability but not civil 
liability.
527
 The consequence of disclosure is subject to the company‘s authorization, 





b. Duty of diligence
529
 
 The landmark Australian case Daniels v. Anderson
530
 distinguishes the extent 
of duty between executive and non-executive directors. For executive directors, the 
standard of care is objective, and refers to a reasonable man of ordinary prudence 
running the company. The duty is not only judged on the substantial elements of the 
business decision itself, but also more importantly on the procedural aspects, such as 
whether the director is enquiring and keeps him or herself informed about decisions, 
whether he or she is taking any further decisions, and whether he or she is supervising 
how the executives are implementing the decision. That is to say, a director should 
                                                        
523
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take as much care in the affairs of the company as he or she would reasonably take in 
his or her own affairs. For non-executive directors, the test is also objective, although 
the demands are understandably less than those for executive directors. Non-executive 
directors must acquire at least a rudimentary understanding of the business and should 
assume a continuing obligation to keep themselves informed about corporate activities. 
Another Australian case ASIC v. Rich
531
 even held that the legal duties imposed on 
the chairman of the board may be extended. 
The English case Re Barings Plc (No.5)
532
 approved the Daniels judgment and 
confirmed that directors remain responsible for the performance of delegated 
functions and have, both collective and individually, a continuing duty to acquire and 
maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the company‘s business.533  
―Reasonableness‖ in law is used as a standard, and is defined by Black‘s Law 
Dictionary as involving the determination of ―whether someone acted with 
negligence‖ or ―exercised the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and 
judgment.‖534 In the UK, duty of reasonable care and diligence is a statutory duty.535 
The UK Companies Act defines this ―reasonable‖ standard of care and diligence as 
that which ―would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with (a) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that a person is reasonably expected to discharge the 
responsibilities that the director has assumed.‖536 
The touchstones of the duty of care and diligence as set out in the cases of 
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Daniels v. Anderson and Re Barings Plc were adopted by the Singapore court in the 
case of Lim Weng Kee v PP.
537
 The Court held that the standards shall be the same for 
both civil and criminal breaches of duty.
538
 This duty is recognized as ―not fixed but a 
continuum‖ and will not be ―lowered to accommodate any inadequacies in the 
individual‘s knowledge or experience‖ or be ―raised if he held himself out to possess 
some special knowledge and experience.‖539 
The business judgment rule is applied to review the duty of diligence. Three 
presumptions are generalized by the ALI: ―(i) the director is not interested in the 
subject matter of the decision; (ii) the director is informed with respect to the business 
judgment to the extent he reasonably believes appropriate under the circumstances; 
and (iii) the director rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best 
interests of the company.‖540 A sharp distinction has been drawn by the ALI between 
the ―reasonableness‖ standard of duty of care and ―rationally belief‖ in a business 
judgment rule. The ―rationality‖ standard is intended to permit a significantly wider 
range of discretions than ―reasonableness,‖ which is less easy to satisfy.541 Thus, 
directors would be given ―a safe harbor from liability for business judgments‖ that 
may not arguably meet the ―reasonableness‖ standard but could fall inside the 
―rationality‖ standard. 542  For such wider arrangements, Eisenberg explains the 
difficulty for the court to ―distinguish between bad decisions and proper decisions 
that turn out badly‖ considering the incomplete information and potential risks 
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The Delaware approach to the business judgment rule is summarized in Re Walt 
Disney Company
544
 as being to serve to protect and promote the role of the board, 
because courts are not well equipped to engage in post hoc substantive reviews of 
business decisions.
545
 The presumptions of the business judgment rule apply when 
there is no evidence of ―fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing in the usual sense of personal 
profit or betterment‖ on the part of directors.546 
The US-originated concept of the business judgment rule has found its way to 
other jurisdictions both through express statutory provision and implicit judgments. 
For example, the Australian Corporations Act 2001 includes the business judgment 
rule, which adds to the three ALI presumptions the fourth presumption that a director 
shall make the judgment in good faith for the proper purpose, but still insists on the 
―rationality‖ standard.547 The German Corporate Governance Code includes the 
term ―business judgment rule‖ while adopting the ―reasonableness‖ standard.548 The 
Singapore High Court implied the ―judicial endorsement of sanctity of business 




(a) Fiduciary duty 
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 German Corporate Governance Code, §3.8. The German Corporate Governance 
Code is adopted by Government Commission of Germany on 26 February, 2002 and 
comes into force on 26 July, 2002. 
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 [2004] SGHC 158. 
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    The term ―duty of loyalty‖ in China was legally transplanted550  from the 
―fiduciary duty‖ of common law jurisdictions into the PRC Company Law (1993) by 
simply stating that ―directors and managers shall faithfully perform their duties and 
protect the interests of the company‖ without any statutory definition.551 The ―duty of 
loyalty‖ is expressly confirmed by the revised PRC Company Law (2006), which 
specifies a variety of forbidden acts, including misappropriating company funds, 
depositing company funds into an account under the director‘s own name or any other 
individual‘s name; accepting commissions on transactions, illegally disclosing the 
company‘s confidential information, and causing losses to the company by taking 
advantage of related party relations.
552
 
The literal meaning of ―loyalty‖ is that directors should be loyal to the company 
such that their activities do not infringe upon the interests of the company. Due to the 
lack of conceptions of equity and trust in corporate law in China, an executive 
director is not a trustee, but merely an employee. Hence, a director is not considered 
to be ―fiduciary‖ in China, but should be loyal to the company as an employee 
according to the employment contract between the director and the company. For a 
non-executive director, who is usually not an employee of the company, shall also 
meet the statutory requirement for ―duty of loyalty‖. 
 
(b) Duty of diligence 
In China, the duty of diligence was provided for in the 2006 PRC Company Law 
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for the first time, but the law does not give substantive content to this duty. The 
Articles Guidelines add that the director should have knowledge of the operation of 
the company and certify the periodical and annual reports.
553
 
The latest Guidelines for Appointment and Conduct of Directors in Public Listed 
Companies
554
 issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange requires that ―directors should 
act in the best interest of the company, and their decision shall be made based on the 
consideration of what a similar person would do in similar circumstances.
555
 When 
the director is absent from board meetings for no less than one third of all meetings 
held in the same year, the supervisory board of a listed company should investigate 
the conduct of the director in question and disclose their investigation results to the 
public.
556
 If a director is absent from one half of all meetings without appropriate 
cause, then it will be announced by the Shanghai Stock Exchange public that he or she 




b. Judicial application 
There are three types of legal liability arising from a breach of directors‘ duties: 
(i) civil liability, in which the director ―shall be liable for compensating for the losses 
that has been caused to the company‖558 unless he or she is able to make the defense 
that ―he or she has challenged the resolution to the board and the dissenting opinion 
has been recorded in the minutes of the board meeting;‖ 559  (ii) administrative 
discipline is meted out by the CSRC for misconduct by directors of listed companies 
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that breaches the provisions of the Securities Law;
560
 (iii) criminal liability, in which 
the criminal conviction of tunneling by a director, supervisor, senior executive, or 
controlling shareholder in relation to the tunneling discussed in the Chapter IV is also 
taken as a breach of a director‘s duty of loyalty and diligence.561 
 
(a) Duty of loyalty 
    According to the ―LawinfoChina‖ database, approximately 38 lawsuits 
concerning a breach of loyalty duty were heard by the Chinese courts between 1 
January 1993 and 31 December 2009. All of the claims involved non-listed 
companies. 
The Chinese courts review the specific facts and circumstances involved with 
such breaches to determine whether or not the director has breached the duty of 
loyalty, but have not developed any rules or situations for applying corporate law to 
the duty breach (or at least, their rules are not reflected in the case summaries 
published and collected in the database of judicial cases).
562
  
It is a fundamental principle that the courts will not second-guess business 
decisions with the advantage of hindsight.
563
 However, in certain circumstances, a 
court may grant whole or partial relief, if it thinks fit and it appears to the court that 
the director has acted honestly and reasonably and that he or she ought fairly to be 
excused for the negligence, default, or breach.
564
 The procedural arrangements for 
directors for disclosure and reporting relieve a director from the risks or expenses of 
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 Thus, the law sets out a range of procedural requirements for 
directors to justify their actions before a court.
566
 In accordance with the PRC 
Company Law, only a few acts of directors can be discharged in circumstances in 
which a director is interested, directly or indirectly, in a proposed transaction or such 
arrangements as holding office or owning property to provide loans or guarantees to a 
third party, self-dealing with the company, taking up business opportunities belonging 
to the company by taking advantage of his or her position, or engaging in a business 
similar to that of the company.
567
 A director must declare the nature, fact, or extent of 
interests or conflicts and obtain approval at a general meeting or board meeting, or in 
the manner set out in the articles of company.  
 
(b) Duty of diligence 
    Sixteen lawsuits were found in ―LawinfoChina‖ relating to breaches of diligence 
duty filed by companies or their shareholders against directors, supervisors, or top 
executives for the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2009. None of the lawsuits 
involved public listed companies. 
According to official statistics,
568
 over 700 directors of listed companies in 
China received administrative discipline from the CSRC between 2001 and 2008. As 
at the end of 2008, three lawsuits had been filed by directors against the CSRC for the 
disciplines imposed on them. One of the claims was thrown out by the court, which 
decided that it had no jurisdiction over the time-barred case.
569
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In the other two cases, both courts decided in favor of the CSRC. One case 
concerned the application of the Securities Law to administrative discipline by the 
CSRC, challenged by Mr. Huang Yong, Deputy Chairman of Shenzhen Heguang 
Commercial Company Limited in 2007.
570
 The other case was a benchmark case, and 
was the first case in China in which the court decided the duty of diligence of a 
director of a listed company. The claimant was Mr. Ding Liye, director of Shenxin 
Taifeng (Group) Company Limited (ST Company), who was given a fine of RMB 
30,000 by the CSRC because the disclosure of ST Company contained false records, 
misleading statements, and major omissions. In this case, Mr. Ding authorized another 
person to attend the board meeting at which the impugned disclosure was discussed 
and approved. The Court held that the director could not rely on his absence from the 
meeting to justify his breach of duty of diligence. The Court also rejected the claims 
of Mr. Ding on the fine imposed on him by the CSRC.
 571
 
    The duty of diligence is still new to the courts in China, and there have been only 
a few court decisions on the matter over the past few years since the revised PRC 
Company Law came into effect in 2006. The Chinese courts have not clarified their 
position on the implications of the duty of diligence. When judges review the 
circumstances and effects of the impugned conduct, they often take into consideration 
the duty of diligence together with the duty of loyalty. In other words, they view it in 
conjunction with the overarching background of the factual matrix, which may 
                                                                                                                                                              
Limited, was liable on conviction to a fine of RMB one hundred thousand by the 
CSRC in 2001. His appeal to the CSRC was rejected by CSRC in Feb 2002. Then Mr. 
Lu filed a claim to the No.1 Intermediate People‘s Court against CSRC in May 2002 
and the claim was thrown out by the Court. His appeal to the High Court of Beijing 
was dismissed. 
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comprise clear evidence of disloyalty or non-diligence that amounted to the breach.
572
 
The duties of loyalty and diligence are themselves ―a notoriously complex instrument 
of corporate governance in definition, application, and enforcement, regardless of the 
nationality or state of development of the jurisdiction implementing it.‖573 Because 
the duties of directors are not specifically spelt out by legislation in China, the courts 
usually observe the facts by observing the conduct itself (either a single act or a 
course of conduct), the cumulative effects of the conduct (loss or damage to the 
company, if any) and the knowledge of the director, supervisor and senior executive in 
question, rather than setting strict guidelines as to what may constitute a breach of 
duty. Scrutiny of the duty of loyalty and duty of diligence of the defendant follows an 
objective standard, which means that the defendant‘s performance is evaluated in 
accordance with their involvement in the functions and occurrences.
574
  
     
5.2 Two-tier boards 
The one-tier or unitary board structure is based on the board of directors as the 
sole authority over the management of the company. The directors of one-tier board 
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share a ―common responsibility,‖ whether executive or non-executive, inside or 
outside, independent or non-independent. The one-tier structure ensures information 
sharing or communication.
575
 In contrast, the two-tier or dual board arrangement 
focuses on the internal monitoring of management, where a clear ―division of duties 
between organs‖ is made.576  
All joint stock companies (including listed and non-listed companies) in China 
are required by the Company Law to have two-tier boards. This was transplanted and 
incorporated from Germany into the 1993 Company Law. At the same time, the board 
of directors of all public listed companies should have independent directors 
according to the ID Guideline of the CSRC.
577
 The compulsory inclusion of 
independent directors was transplanted from the United States. Since 2002, all public 
listed companies in China must have independent directors and a supervisory board as 
part of their internal governance structure. 
 
5.2.1 Independent directors 
A. Historical development 
(A) United States 
    Before the Great Depression of the 1930s, the United States had always pursued 
a ―classic liberalism‖ or ―laissez-faire‖ economic policy.578 Based on the tenets of 
―individual freedom and limited government,‖ 579  government interference in 
economic development was seen as unnecessary, and individual property rights and 
                                                        
575
 Supra Note 51, at 106. 
576
 Ibid. at 107. 
577
 Supra Note 11. 
578
 Supra Note 106, at 8-10. 
579
 See David Conway, Classic Liberalism: The Unvanquished Ideal (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1998). See also Razeen Sally, Classic Liberalism and International 
Economic Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History (Routledge, 2002). 
167 
 
the free market were strongly respected and protected.
580
  
Since the 1930s, government intervention has been exercised to correct and 
regulate the underlying flaws in the market, such as ―unscrupulous monopoly, high 
unemployment, income inequality and massive pollution by industrialization.
581
 The 
US federal government once adopted the ―laissez-faire‖ policy in economy during 
earlier years and began to exercise its intervention where market flaws came forth and 
economic defects were out of control in the late 1930s. 
In the 1960s, the increasingly serious failure of the function of the board of 
directors was witnessed in US companies with a widely dispersed ownership structure. 
The independent director system was then introduced to try to strengthen the board 
and control the management in such companies.
582
 
    In the traditional business of the United States, which is dominated by public 
companies with a dispersed ownership, German-style social democracy would not be 
applicable.
583
 In the political view of Roe, there are two reasons for such unsuitability. 
First, there are fewer social conflicts due to the high mobility of the population and 
economy,
584
 and, more importantly, Americans have a ―long and deep 







The development of independent directors in China has gone from individually 
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voluntary establishment to being a nationwide mandatory requirement. In 1993, Qing 
Dao Beer was the first Chinese listed company to voluntarily set up an independent 
director system. The Guidelines of Articles of Association 1997 (Annulled)
586
 
encouraged public listed companies to introduce independent directors into their 
boards. 
In 2001, the ID Guideline was issued requiring that each public listed company 
elect qualified persons to be independent directors. The timeline was that by June 30th, 
2002, at least two members of the board of directors had to be independent directors, 
and by June 30th, 2003, at least one third of the board had to be independent.
587
 The 
rising percentage of independent directors in listed companies is shown in Table 5.1. 
Up to 2001, the average percentage of independent directors was pretty low at less 
than 10%. This increased to 22.09% in 2002. Since 2003, the average percentage has 
risen to over 30% under the requirements of the Guideline. 
 











1998 9.86 0.26 2.16% 
1999 10.19 0.49 4.15% 
2000 10.07 0.96 8.78% 
2001 9.99 0.57 5.52% 
2002 10.54 2.26 22.09% 
2003 10.54 3.18 30.34% 
2004 10.41 3.30 31.93% 
2005 10.34 3.30 32.08% 
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B.  Implications of independent directors 
Different jurisdictions have different legal interpretations of the term 
―independent director.‖ Donald C. Clark (2007) uses the term ―non-management 
director‖ as a general concept before distinguishing its various manifestations of 
―independent director,‖ ―outside director,‖ and ―disinterested director.‖589 He defines 
a ―non-management director‖ as a person who ―is not a member of senior 
management team,‖ which is a common negative feature of independent, outside, or 
disinterested directors.
590
 The different implications of the three specific conceptions 
are that an ―independent director‖ focuses on solving agency problems and balancing 
the interests of different groups,
591
 an ―outside director‖ is not be an employee of the 
company,
592
 and a ―disinterested director‖ is entitled to have conflict-of-interest 
transactions disclosed to them for approval.
593
 
    The term ―outside‖ is replaced with ―non-executive‖ in the UK Combined Code. 
A non-executive director is not involved in the executive work of the company, in 
contrast to the case of ―executive directors.‖594 Directors are usually categorized into 
executive and non-executive directors.
595
 Executive directors devote themselves 
almost in a full-time capacity to corporate affairs, whereas non-executive directors do 
not. Thus, in a more strict way, an outside or non-executive director is not allowed to 
hold a post in the company. Being outside or non-executive is one of the conditions of 
                                                        
589
 Donald C. Clark ―Three Conceptions of the Independent Director‖ (2007) 32(1) 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 77, at 78-83. 
590
 Ibid. at 78. 
591
 Ibid. at 84-5. 
592
 Ibid. at 99-100. 
593
 Ibid. at 102 and 105. 
594
 See also Black, Bernard S., Cheffins, Brian R. & Klausner, Michael D., "Outside 
Director Liability" (2006) 58 Stanford Law Review 1055. 
595
 Derek Higgs, ―Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive Directors‖ 
(2003). See also supra Note 469, Guidelines 2.5. 
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independence. An independent director should be both non-executive and 
disinterested.  
    The term ―employee‖ is defined by Black‘s Law Dictionary as ―a person who 
works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied 
contract of hire.‖596 Strictly speaking, a person is not qualified as an independent 
director if he or she is employed by the company. Such employment relations are 
excluded by law in most jurisdictions,
597
 and the relations between the independent 
director and company are in effect,founded upon a relationship of mutual trust and 
confidence. 
 
C. Comparative research 
A clear understanding of independent directors in Chinese public listed 
companies can be gained through a comparison of Singapore (Code of Corporate 
Governance), the United Kingdom (Combined Code), and the United States 
(Sarbanes Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) Listed Company 
Manual)
598
 with respect to the definition of independent directors and compositions 
of the board and board committees. 
 
(A) Definition of independent director 
a. Structure 
    Table 5.2 shows that all four jurisdictions have inexhaustibly specified examples 
of non-independence. In addition, China sets out another two requirements: having 
                                                        
596
 Supra Note 530. 
597
 Supra Note 469, Guidelines 2.1; See also supra Note 113 and 468. 
598 
The US listed companies referred to in this section are limited to the companies 




basic knowledge of corporate operations and possessing five years of relevant 
working experience in the law, economics, or other industry-related area. 
 
b. Scope of examples 
    The examples of circumstances in which persons would be non-eligible as 
independent directors throughout the four jurisdictions cover relationships of 
employment, family, transaction, and professional service. Furthermore, in the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Singapore, cross-directorships or cross-executives are 
also considered. Under the UK Combined Code, a director is considered 





c. Meaning of independence 
The meaning of ―independence‖ in China and the United Kingdom has two 
aspects: independence from management and independence from substantial 
shareholding. The definition of non-independence in relation to substantial 
shareholding in China is that a director holding more than 5% or being one of the five 
largest shareholders of the listed company is non-independent. The UK Combined 
Code adopts a more flexible term of ―significant shareholder‖ to describe substantial 
shareholding.  
The dual standard of independence is not pursued in the United States, where 
independence from management is the sole standard. The Singapore Corporate 
Governance Code requires the chairman of the nomination committee of the board to 
                                                        
599
 The Monetary Authority of Singapore has also supposed the criterion of service 
period to be incorporated into its current definition of what is an independent director. 
Gabriel Chen, ―MAS tightens governance‖, Strait Times, 18 May, 2010. 
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be independent from both management and substantial shareholding, but the other 
independent directors are not required to meet the dual standard. The dual standard of 
independence gains supports from surveys conducted in Singapore that shows that 
96% of CEOs and company secretaries and 82% of institutional investors were of the 




The considerations of the Singapore government are that, first, the interests of 
substantial shareholders are more often aligned with those of all shareholders of the 
company; second, directors who are substantial shareholders do not pose 
principal-agent problems; and third, the pool of talent is possibly limited.
601
 If the 
third reason sounds credible, the other two reasons are not sufficiently convincing. It 
is difficult to see how, in a listed company with a concentrated shareholding structure, 
an independent director can be truly independent from the management when he or 
she is not independent from the controlling shareholder,
602
 how the interests of the 
majority and minority can practically be aligned, and how independence can survive 
this dilemma.  
 
d. Catch-all provision 
In addition to the examples specified, the discretion to determine the exact 
                                                        
600
 See ―Corporate Governance and Directors‘ and Officers‘ Liability Survey of 
Listed Companies in Singapore 2005, Conducted by the Corporate Governance and 
Financial Reporting Centre of the Business School, National University of Singapore, 
and commissioned by Jardine Lloyd Thompson Private Limited; and see ―Corporate 
Governance Survey of Institutional Investors 2005, conducted by Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, Investment Management Association of Singapore and Corporate 
Governance and Financial Reporting Centre of the Business School, National 
University of Singapore. 
601
 See Singapore Ministry of Finance‘s Comments on the Revised Code, 11 July 
2005. 
602
 See Michelle Quah, ―New Governance Code a Disappointment‖, The Business 
Times, 18 July 2005. 
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standard of non-independence is left to companies and the CSRC in China, to 
companies in Singapore, and to the board of directors in the United Kingdom and 
United States.  
 
e. Summary 
The examples of the non-independence of independent directors are similar 
across the four countries studied. However, the meaning of independence is different. 
China has gone a step further to consider the influence of substantial shareholding in 
addition to that of management, probably because the controlling shareholder has a 


















1.Having basic knowledge on the 
operation of public listed 
companies and familiar with the 
relevant laws and regulations;  
2. Having more than five years' 
work experience in law, economics 
or other fields. 
Examples of non-independence: 
 
1. Holding a position in a public 
listed company or its affiliated 
enterprises, immediate family 
members, and major social 
relations.  
 
2. Holding more than 1% of the 




1. Being employed by the 
company or any of its related 
companies for the current or any 
of the past three financial years. 
 
2. Having an immediate family 
member who is, or has been in 
any of the past three financial 
years, employed by the company 
or any of its related companies as 
a senior executive officer whose 
remuneration is determined by 
the remuneration committee. 
 
3. A director, or an immediate 
family member, accepting any 
compensation from the company 




1. Having been an employee of 
the company or group within 
the last five years. 
 
2. Having, or having had 
within the last three years, a 
material business relationship 
with the company either 
directly, or as a partner, 
shareholder, director, or senior 
employee of a body that has 
such a relationship with the 
company. 
 
3. Having received or receiving 
additional remuneration from 
the company apart from a 




1. Being an employee, or whose 
immediate family member is an 
executive officer, of the 
company (not independent until 
three years 
after the end of such 
employment relationship). 
 
2. Receiving, or whose 
immediate family member 
receives, more than $100,000 
per year in direct compensation 
from a public listed company, 
other than directors and 
committee fees and pension or 
other forms of deferred 
compensation for prior service 
(provided such compensation is 
                                                        
603
 Supra Note 11, Art.2 and3. 
604
 Supra Note 469, Guidelines 2.1, 2.2. 
605
 Supra Note 468, A.3.1. 
606
 Supra Note 113, Sec.301; Supra Note 598, 303A.02. 
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listed company directly or 
indirectly, or the natural person 
shareholders of the 10 largest 
shareholders of the public listed 
company, or being an immediate 
family member of such a 
shareholder. 
 
3. Holding a position in a company 
that holds more than 5% of the 
outstanding shares of a public 
listed company directly or 
indirectly, or of the company that 
ranks as one of the five largest 
shareholders of a public listed 
company, or being an immediate 
family member of such an 
employee.  
 
4. Providing financial, legal or 
consulting services to a public 




1. Any other qualifications decided 
by the articles of association; and 
 
2. Any other qualifications decided 
than as compensation for board 
service for the current or 
immediate past financial year. 
 
4. A director, or an immediate 
family member, who is a 
substantial 
shareholder of or a partner in 
(with 5% or more stake), or an 
executive 
officer of, or a director of any 
for-profit business organization 
to which the company or any of 
its subsidiaries made, or from 
which the company or any of its 
subsidiaries received, significant 
payments in the current or 
immediate past financial year. As 
a guide, payments aggregated 
over any financial year in excess 
of S$200,000 should generally 




If the company wishes, in spite 
of the existence of one or more 
of these relationships, to consider 
the director as independent, it 
the company‘s share option or 
a performance-related pay 
scheme, or being a member of 
the company‘s pension 
scheme. 
 
4. Having close family ties 
with any of the company‘s 
advisers, directors, or senior 
employees. 
 
5. Holding cross-directorships 
or having significant links with 
other directors through 
involvement in other 
companies or bodies. 
 
6. Representing a significant 
shareholder.  
 
7. Having served on the board 
for more than nine years from 




The board should state its 
reasons if it determines that a 
director is independent, 
not contingent in any way on 
continued service) (not 
independent until three years 
after he or she ceases to receive 
more than $100,000 per year in 
such compensation). 
 
3. Being affiliated with or 
employed by, or whose 
immediate family member is 
affiliated with or employed in a 
professional capacity by, a 
present or former internal or 
external auditor of the company 
(not ―independent‖ until three 
years after the end of the 
affiliation or the employment or 
auditing relationship). 
 
4. Being employed, or whose 
immediate family member is 
employed, as an executive 
officer of another company 
where any of the public listed 
company‘s present executives 
serve on that company‘s 
compensation committee (not 
―independent‖ until three years 
after the end of such service or 
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by the CSRC. 
 
should disclose in full the nature 
of the director‘s relationship and 
bear responsibility for explaining 
why he or she should be 
considered independent. 
notwithstanding the existence 
of relationships or 
circumstances which may 
appear relevant to its 
determination. 
the employment relationship). 
 
5. Being an executive officer or 
an employee, or whose 
immediate family member is an 
executive officer, of a company 
that makes payments to, or 
receives payments from, the 
public listed company for 
property or services in an 
amount which, in any single 
fiscal year, exceeds the greater 
of $1 million, or 2% of such 
other company‘s consolidated 
gross revenues (not 
―independent‖ until three years 





The board of directors 
affirmatively determines that 
the director has no material 
relationship with the public 
listed company (either directly 
or indirectly as a partner, 
shareholder or officer of an 
organization that has a 
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relationship with the company). 
Companies must identify which 
directors are independent and 
disclose the basis for that 
determination. 
 
Special criteria for audit 
committee members: who 
may not:  
(i) Accept any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory 
fee from the issuer; or 
(ii) Be an affiliated person of 











(B) Composition of Board and independent directors 
a. Comparison 
Table 5.3 shows the minimum number of independent directors on the boards of 
listed companies. The lowest is one third in China and Singapore, and the highest is 
majority in the USA. For UK public listed companies, at least half of the board, 
excluding the chairman of board, must be independent. The UK Combined Code 
advocates having a senior independent director who acts as an appropriate channel for 
shareholders to communicate with the board. The board of directors in Chinese listed 




In China, independent directorship has become mandatory since 2002. The 
one-third proportion of independent directors on the board is still under review of the 
CSRC. The expertise of an accounting professional is considered beneficial for the 
corporate governance of listed companies. 
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At least one third of the board 




At least one of the independent 




At least one third of the board 





General companies:  
At least half the board, excluding 
the chairman, must be 
independent.  
 
Smaller companies (Below the 
FTSE 350 throughout the year 
immediately before the reporting 
year): 
should have at least two 
independent directors. 
 
Senior independent director: 
 
The board should appoint one of 
the independent directors to be a 




At least a majority of the board 
must be independent directors. 
 
                                                        
607
 Supra Note 11, Art.1(3). 
608
 Supra Note 469, Guidelines 2.1. 
609
 Supra Note 468, A.3.2, A.3.3. 
610
 Supra Note 598, 303A.01. 
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The senior independent director 
should be available to 
shareholders if they have 
concerns that contact through the 
normal channels of chairman, 
chief executive or finance director 














(C) Composition of board committees and independent directors 
a. Composition 
    Table 5.4 shows that the majority of board committees must be independent in 
both China and Singapore. The Singapore Code of Corporate Governance makes it 
clear that the majority should include the chairman of the committee. In the United 
Kingdom, nomination committees must have at least a majority of independent 
directors, whereas all of the members of remuneration and audit committees must be 
independent. In US listed companies, the nomination committee, compensation 
committee, and audit committee must be composed entirely of independent directors. 
At least one, two, and all members of the audit committee in Chinese, Singaporean 




In China, the board of directors of a public listed company may set up a variety 
of board committees in relation to nomination, remuneration, auditing, and other 
reserved matters.
611
 As at 31 December 2004, around 47% percent of listed 
companies had established board committees.
612
 In practice, the effectiveness of 
these committees is subject to the influence of the controlling shareholder over 
management, the knowledge of independent directors, and the execution of the 
committee‘s decisions.613 
 
                                                        
611
 Supra Note 163, Art. 52, 
612
 Supra Note 292. The statistics from the report show that as at 31 December 2004, 
audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, strategy committee 
has been set up in 48.3%, 52.8%, 42.8%, 47.7% respectively of all companies listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
613
 Ibid. at 152. 
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Quorum: No requirement 
 
Proportion: 







At least one of the independent 
directors on the Audit Committee 
should be an accounting 
professional. 
1. Nomination committee  
Quorum: At least three directors 
 
Proportion: The majority of the 
committee, including the 
chairman, must be independent. 
 
2. Remuneration committee 
Quorum: Entirely composed of 
non-executive directors 
 
Proportion: The majority of the 
committee, including the 
chairman, must be independent. 
 
3. Audit committee  
Quorum: At least three directors, 
1. Nomination committee  
Quorum: No requirement 
 
Proportion: The majority of the 
committee, including the 
chairman, must be independent. 
 
2. Remuneration committee and 
Audit committee 
Quorum:  
General company:  
At least three independent 
directors 
 
Smaller company (Below the 
FTSE 350 throughout the year 
immediately before the reporting 
All committees: 




Expertise: All members of 
the Audit committee must be 
financially literate. 
                                                        
614
 Supra Note 10, Art.52. 
615
 Supra Note 469, Guidelines 4.1, 7.1, 11.1, 11.2; Sec.201B of Companies Act of Singapore requires all listed companies should have audit 
committee. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has recently supposed to raise the number of independent directors on the board, the 
nominating committee and remuneration committee from one third to a majority. Gabriel Chen, ―MAS tightens governance‖, Strait Times, 18 
May, 2010. 
616
 Supra Note 468, A.4.1, B.2.1, C.3.1. 
617
 Supra Note 113, Sec.301 (Audit Committee); Supra Note 598, 303A.04(a) (Nomination committee), 303A.05(a) (Compensation Committee), 





Proportion: The majority of the 
committee, including the 
chairman, must be independent. 
 
Expertise: At least two members 
must have accounting or related 
financial management expertise. 
year): 
At least two (2008 revised edition 
allows the chairman of the board 
to sit on the audit committee as a 
member but not a chair, provided 
that he or she was considered 
independent on appointment). 
 
Proportion: Entirely composed 














5.2.2 Board of supervisors 
A. Historical development 
(A) Germany 
The First Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century had profound effects on 
the social development and lives in Britain and other European countries. In the 
mid-19
th
 century, Germany was not yet a united country, but was divided into 
different countries with their own governments, markets, currencies, and armies, 
which impeded the economic growth of the whole region.
618
 Germany tried to 
advance its development both economically and militarily with neighboring 
industrialized countries. Accordingly, freedom of economy coupled with political 
unification was of historical significance for Germany. 
In 1871, the Prussian Chief Minister managed unified a number of independent 
German states into one nation by ―iron and blood,‖ and a German Empire was 
created.
619
 The Second Industrial Revolution in the 1850s promoted science and 
technology, and ―technological and economic progress gained momentum‖620 with 
the development of steam-powered ships, railways, and electronic power. Germany 
was thus transformed from an agricultural state into an advanced industrial state. 
From 1870 to 1913, the GDP of Germany increased by an average of 2.9% annually, 
ranking the country second in the world next to the United States.
621
 
The supervisory board was established by the General German Commercial 
                                                        
618
 Supra Note 51, at 76-7. 
619
 See also Alan Farmer & Andrina Stiles, The Unification of Germany (1815-1919) 
(Access to History) (3
rd
 Ed.) (Hodder Education, 2007); Dirk Verheyen, The German 
Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration (2
nd
 ed.) (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 1999), at 177-96. 
620 Ibid. See also Wally Seccombe, Weathering the Storm: Working-Class Families 
from the Industrial Revolution to the Fertility Decline (London; New York: Verso, 
1993), at 81-156. 
621
 Wu Youfa, The Modern and Contemporary History of Germany (Wuhan 
University Press, 2007) (in Chinese), at 15. 
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Code of 1861 to ―replace the state as monitor of the corporation.‖ The constitution of 
the supervisory board was totally separate from that of the management board so that 





The board of supervisors was introduced by the 1993 PRC Company Law 
(Annulled), which required all joint stock limited companies to have a dual board 
structure. In particular, the commercial banks are required to have at least two outside 
supervisors on their supervisory board.
623
 Such outside supervisors must be 
independent from the banks for which they work and the majority shareholders of the 




    Pursuant to the PRC Company Law, any joint stock limited company 
incorporated in China, either listed or non-listed, must establish a board of supervisors. 
The board of supervisors must comprise at least three persons, including 
representatives of shareholders and an appropriate percentage of employee 
representatives, who must account for not less than one third of all supervisors.
625
 
The board of supervisors must have one chairman, and an optional deputy chairman. 
The chairman and deputy chairman must be elected by more than half of all 
supervisors. The chairman of the board of supervisors must convene and preside over 
the meetings of the board of supervisors. No director or senior manager may 
concurrently act as a supervisor.  
                                                        
622
 Katharina Pistor et al., ―The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country 
Comparison‖ (2002) 23 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 791, at 816. 
623
 Guidelines of Corporate governance of Commercial Bank, issued by the People‘s 
Bank of China in June 2002, Article 59, 
624
 Ibid. Article 60. 
625
 Supra Note 4, Sec. 118. 
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B. Comparative research 
The supervisory board system was transplanted to China from Germany,
626
 
where a two-tier board system was made compulsory in 1870
627
 and has been a part 
of German stock corporations for more than a century. A comparative overview of 
supervisors, supervisory board, and co-determination in Germany and China is given 
in Tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7.  
 
(A) Comparison of supervisors in Germany and China (Table 5.5) 
a. Qualification 
In Germany, supervisors are not allowed to serve on the management board at 
the same time. In some circumstances, a person is not eligible to be a supervisor if he 
or she is the legal representative of one of the company‘s subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
the German Corporate Governance Code requires a company to have independent 
members within the supervisory board. However, in China, there are no legal 
requirements for the qualification of supervisors. In practice, department heads and 
chairmen of the trade union in state-held listed companies are often appointed as 
supervisors.
628




The PRC Company Law provides for the duty of loyalty and duty of diligence 
                                                        
626
 German Stock Corporations Act (Aktiengesetz) (hereinafter ―German Act‖, 
September 6, 1965 (Legal Gazette I 1089), as last amended by the Act of 28 Oct 1994 
(Federal Legal Gazette I 3210). The corporate governance in Germany in this thesis is 
based on the German Act and German Code. 
627
 Jean J. Du Plessis & Otti Sandrock, ―The Rise and Fall of Supervisory 
Codetermination in Germany‖ (2005) 16(2) International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 67, at 71. 
628
 Supra Note 26, at 12. 
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only in general terms, and leaves it to judges to develop the rules in judicial cases. In 
Germany, if a member of the supervisory board is absent from more than half of all 
the meetings of the supervisory board held within a financial year, this must be 
specifically noted down in the report of the supervisory board. With respect to the 
duty of loyalty, both China and Germany set out similar procedural requirements to 
disclose conflicts of interest. 
 
c. Removal 
In Germany, an incompetent or non-eligible supervisor can be removed at a 
shareholders‘ meeting by three quarters of the votes with or without cause, or by court 
order upon application. In China, removal is commonly passed by an ordinary 
resolution at a general meeting, unless otherwise provided for in the articles of 
company. 
 
Table 5.5 Comparison of supervisors in Germany and China 
 
Comparison German China 
Qualification 
1. A supervisor is not allowed to 





2. A person is not qualified to be a 
supervisor if he or she is the legal 
representative of one of the 
company‘s subsidiaries; or where 
one of the supervisors of Company 
A is the director of Company B, the 
legal representative of Company A is 





The qualification is not 
specified by law 
(except the 
independence 
requirement for the 
outside supervisors of 
commercial banks) 
 
Duty of diligence 
1. Every member of the supervisory 
board must take care that he or she 
Yes (same as that of 
directors) 
                                                        
629
 Supra Note 626, Sec. 105(1). 
630
 Ibid. Sec.100(2). 
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2. If a member of the supervisory 
board took part in less than half of 
the meetings of the supervisory 
board in a financial year, then this 









1. All members of the supervisory 
board are bound by the 
enterprise‘s best interests. No 
member of the supervisory board 
may pursue personal interests in 
his or her decisions or use 
business opportunities intended 
for the enterprise for himself or 
herself. 
 
2. Each member of the supervisory 
board must inform the board of 
any conflicts of interest. 
 
3. The supervisory board shall 
disclose in its report to the 
general meeting any conflicts of 
interest that have occurred. 
Material conflicts of interest 
shall result in the termination of 








The supervisory board must include 
what it considers to be an adequate 
number of independent members.  
 
A supervisory board member is 
considered independent if he or she 
has no business or personal relations 
with the company or its management 
board that cause a conflict of 
interests. Not more than two former 
members of the management board 
shall be members of the supervisory 
board and supervisory board 
Commercial banks are 
required to have at least 
two outside supervisors 
                                                        
631
 Supra Note 544, §5.4.5; Supra Note 626, Sec.116, 339 and 400. The requirement 
of duty of care and diligence for supervisors is the same as that of directors. 
632
 Supra Note 544, §5.4.8. 
633
 Ibid. §5.5. 
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members shall not exercise 
directorships or similar positions or 
advisory tasks for significant 




1. Shareholders‘ meeting: passed 





2. Court: upon application.636 
 
Removal is commonly 
passed by an ordinary 
resolution at a general 
meeting, unless 
otherwise provided for 




B. Comparison of supervisory board in Germany and China (Table 5.6) 
(A) Germany 
In Germany, the supervisory board exercises monitoring functions through 
actively participating in corporate governance matters by determining the members of 
the management board and by reviewing the business strategies of the company. 
Specifically, the supervisory board appoints and dismisses members of the 
management board, but can delegate its appointment authority to a special committee. 
The supervisory board also discusses and reviews the compensation of the 
management board members. The management board regularly coordinates with the 
supervisory board to discuss current business strategies. In China, in contrast, all of 
this is carried out by the shareholders (save for the employee representatives of the 
board of director who are elected by employees if the company opts to have employee 
representatives on its board), rather than the supervisory board. 
 
(B) Problems in China 
 The difference in power of supervisors in China and Germany is attributable to 
                                                        
634
 Ibid. §5.4.2. 
635
 Supra Note 626, Sec. 103(1). Here the difference between supervisor and director 
is that any director on the management board shall be only revoked by cause but the 
revocation of supervisor has no such a requirement. 
636
 Ibid. Sec. 103(3). 
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the structure of the respective two-tier boards. China‘s two-tier boards are horizontally 
located under the shareholder‘s general meeting, whereas German boards are 
vertically placed, with the management board being located under the supervisory 
board. The supervisory board in Germany thus has real authority to effectively 
monitor the management board. In contrast, the horizontal structure in China causes 
difficulties for supervisors as watchdogs, as they may not be able to obtain timely 
information because it is not compulsory for the board of directors to report to the 





Table 5.6 Comparison of Supervisory Boards in Germany and China 
 





The supervisory board appoints and 
dismisses the members of the 
management board. The supervisory 
board can delegate its appointment 





meeting and employees 
severally 
Compensation 
The supervisory board discusses and 
regularly reviews the compensation 








The management board should 
regularly coordinate with the 








The management board informs the 
supervisory board regularly, without 
delay, of all important issues with 
regard to business planning, risk 
management, and compliance. The 
Same 
                                                        
637
 See Hopt, Klaus J. & Leyens, Patrick C., "Board Models in Europe - Recent 
Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy" ECGI Law Working Paper No. 18/2004, available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=487944 
638
 Ibid. Sec.84(1); Supra Note 544, §5.1.2.. 
639
 Supra Note 544, §4.2.2. 
640
 Ibid. §3.2. 
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management board points out 
deviations of the actual business 
development from previously 





The supervisory board is entitled to 






Material transactions that may 
substantially change the assets or 
financial situation of the enterprise 
shall be subject to the approval of 
supervisory board,
643
 unless the 
management board has approving 
authority over matters that are 
passed by three quarters of votes at 
the shareholders‘ meeting.644  
 
Material transactions 
are subject to approval 
at the shareholders‘ 
general meeting or 
board of directors in 
accordance with the 
articles of association 
of the company. 
 
Exceptions: 
1. With respect to 
fundamental matters of 
the company, including 
capital 
increment/reduction, 
the issuance of 
corporate bonds, 
assignment, division, 
change of business 
form, restructuring, 
winding-up, or the 
amendment of 
constitutional 
documents, a special 
resolution shall be 
passed (with two thirds 
of the votes owned by 
all of the participating 
shareholders). 
 
                                                        
641
 Ibid. §3.4. The ―onerous reporting requirements‖ and ―voluminous paperwork‖ 
are criticized because they may result in excessive formality and cost enhancement 
without improving the efficiency of company. See Lauren J. Aste, ―Reforming French 
Corporate Governance: A Return to the Two-tier Board‖ (1999) 32 Geo. Wash. J. 
Int‘lL.& Econ.1, at 25 and 35. 
642
 Supra Note 626, Sec. 111(2). 
643
 Supra Note 544, §3.3. 
644
 Supra Note 626, Sec. 111(4). 
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2. The following 
matters shall be 
approved by both an 
ordinary resolution at a 
general meeting and by 
no less than 50% of the 
votes held by general 
public shareholders: (1) 
public offering of 
shares and convertible 
bonds or rights issues; 
(2) asset restructuring, 
where the total price of 
the assets purchased 
exceeds the audited net 
book value of those 
assets by no less than 
20%; (3) repayment of 
the shareholders‘ debt 
owed to the company 
by company‘s shares; 
(4) overseas listing of 













2. Members of the management 
board shall not take on sideline 
business activities unless approved 








The supervisory board can delegate 
to one or several committees the 
following activities: devising the 
strategy of the enterprise, 
compensation of the members of 
management board, investments and 
N/A 
                                                        
645
 The Provision on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the 
General Public Shareholders, issued by CSRC, with effect from 7 December, 2004 
646
 Supra Note 626, Sec.88; Supra Note 544, §4.3.5. 
647
 The establishment of committee is not compulsory, but ―comply and explain‖ 
approach is adopted. 
193 
 






(C) Comparison of codetermination in Germany and China 
a. Germany  
Unification in Germany required a suitable economic force to push the then 
divisive domestic markets together. Banks with universal financing power thus came 
to play a significant role. The securities market in Germany was inactive mainly due 
to Germany‘s traditional reluctance to invest and run risks in the capital market.649 
This made the banks the dominant financing source for corporations, rather than the 
stock market. 
The development of two-tier boards in Germany can be traced back to the 
foundation of a universal banking system in which the banks were the primary source 
of company funding. It was the banks that called for the establishment of a dual board 
system in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
650
  
    The supervisory board was merely a committee of shareholders until public 
interests were taken into account and participation was extended to employees.
651
 
Worker participation found its origins in the German Works Councils Act of 1920, and 
the system was reintroduced after the fall of the dictatorial Third Reich after World 
War II.
652
 Employees and trade unions helped to maintain the dependence on ―social 
                                                        
648
 Supra Note 544, §5.3.4, §5.3.5. 
649
 Franck Chantayan, ―An Examination of American and German Corporate Law 
Norms‖ (2002) 16 St. John‘s J. Legal Comment 431, at 449-50. 
650
 Janet Dine, ―Implications for the United Kingdom of the EC Fifth Directive‖ 
(1989) 38 I.C.L.Q. 547, at 547. 
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 See Klaus J. Hopt, ―The German Two-tier Board: Experience, Theories, Reforms‖, 
in Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research 





democracy‖ in Germany. The supervisory board system and concept of 
codetermination developed separately, but were later coupled to form an integrated 
system of the two-tier board.
653
  
    The codetermination structure, which requires an employee in the composition of 
supervisory board, reflects the ―social democracy‖ of the German corporate 
governance system.
 654
  Codetermination can be traced back to the Works Council 
Act of 1920 after the German Revolution of 1918.
655
 After further developed since 
the end of the Third Reich,
656
 the employee representation is now regarded as the 
most important characteristic of the two-tier board.
657
 
In Germany, how employee representation is applied depends on the industry 
type, business form, and number of employees in the corporation.
658
 The Mining Iron 
and Steel Industry Codetermination Act of 1951 requires the boards of companies in 
the mining, iron, and steel industries to be composed of representatives of 
employees.
659
 Companies outside of these three industries are regulated by the 
Codetermination Act of 1976.
660
 The German Corporate Governance Code sets out 
the statutory regulations for German public listed companies. The members of the 
supervisory board are to be elected by shareholders at the general meeting. In 
companies with more than 500 or 2,000 employees, employees must be represented 
on the supervisory board at a ratio of one third or one half, respectively. In companies 
with more than 2,000 employees, the chairman of the supervisory board, who shall be 
                                                        
653
 Supra Note 51, at 123. 
654
 Supra Note 583, at 567-8. 
655
 T. Raiser, "The Theory of Enterprise Law in the Federal Republic of Germany" 





 Supra Note 85, at 326; See also supra Note 627, at 78. 
658
 Supra Note 627, at 71. 
659
 Supra Note 655, at 115. 
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 Ibid. at 116. 
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the representative of the shareholders, has the casting vote in the case of split 
resolutions. Representatives elected by shareholders and employees are equally 
obliged to act in the enterprise‘s best interests.661 
Codetermination may help to flag up signals of social conflicts between the 
management and labor earlier and to keep a balance of interests in the supervisory 
board.
662
 However, empirical evidence shows that the functions of codetermination 
have diminished in two ways: ―the catalogue of corporate decisions requiring the 
consent of the supervisory board has been cut down‖ and ―shareholder representatives 
on the board do not like to criticize executives whom they regard as their peers in 
front of trade unionists.‖663 
 
b. Problems in China  
The requirements of the PRC Company Law for employee representation on the 
two boards are different. A two-tier board structure with employee representation on 
the supervisory board is mandatory for all public listed companies, but it is optional 
for the board of directors to have employee members.
664
 Representatives of 
employees on the board of supervisors must account for no less than one third of all 
                                                        
661
 Supra Note 544. 
662
 Supra Note 637, at 7. 
663
 Ulrich Schroder & Alexander Schrader, ―The changing role of banks and 
corporate governance in Germany: evolution towards the market?‖ in (Stanley W. 
Black & Mathias Moersch edited), Competition and Convergence in Financial 
Markets: the German and Anglo-American Models (Oxford; Portland: Hart Pub., 
2006), at 23. 
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 Supra Note 4, Sec.109. Since 2006, some of the solely State-funded companies 
are required to have at least one employee representative on the board of directors. 
The representative shall be elected from the employees and approved by the SASAC. 
As at June 2008, there are 17 solely State-funded companies which are the ―pilot 
enterprise‖ to have employee representative on their boards. See the Provisions of 
Reinforcing and Improving the Supervisory Board of State-owned Enterprises, issued 







(a) Non-compliance with the law 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange conducted a survey of 135 public listed 
companies in 2007 and found that 77% of companies had no employee representatives 
on their board of directors. Worse still, in 59.2% of the sample companies, the 
percentage of representatives of employees on the supervisory board accounted for 
less than one third of all supervisors.
666
 This participation ratio is disappointingly 
low. 
 
(b) Effect of labor representatives on the power balance 
In state-held listed companies, employee representatives may not be able to 
achieve a power balance on the board. Corporate laws do not confer employee 
representatives with any specific rights in decision-making or monitoring the 
activities of either the board of directors or board of supervisors. Further, it is unclear 
whether, as a supervisor elected from among employees, an employee supervisor 
should act in the best interests of employees or of the company as a whole or both. 
This issue is also related to employee participation in the stakeholder model of 
corporate governance in state-held listed companies. The controlling shareholder may 
oversee the management through the supervisory board. However, the employee 
representatives may be influenced by the trade union, which is controlled by the 
government. Hence, the interests of employees are aligned with the controlling 
shareholder, which is the government (or, at least, related to the government). 
Consequently, the balance of power remains with the representatives of shareholders, 
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 Ibid. Sec.118. 
666
 Supra Note 47, at 49. 
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rather than the representatives of employees.
667
 In addition, shareholder 
representatives are likely to suppress the influence of employees, such as holding their 





5.3 Practical issues arising from state controlled ownership in the two-tier 
boards of state-held listed companies 
The state-held listed companies in China are not well governed under the 
two-tier board system in which the state is the controlling shareholder for two reasons. 
The first is the conflict of authority between independent directors and supervisors, 
which renders the presence of the supervisory board redundant. The second is that 
independent directors cannot perform their third role in China of protecting minority 
shareholders because the nomination, remuneration, and evaluation are influenced and 
controlled by controlling shareholders. 
 
5.3.1 Need for independent directors in the presence of board of supervisors 
It has been a mandatory requirement in listed companies in China to have an 
independent director on the board of directors since 2002. However, it must be 
questioned why an independent director is needed in the presence of a supervisory 
board. There are two plausible reasons. The first is the internal problems of the 
supervisory board and co-determination in China, which have been discussed in 
contrast to Germany. The other reason is that the responsibilities of the supervisory 
board are taken on by independent directors or the audit committee.  
In this part, the focus is on the second reason. A general comparison is first made 
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 Supra Note 583, at 568. 
668
 This problem exists in the context of Germany as well. See supra Note 2, at 53. 
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between independent directors and board of supervisors, and their respective authority 
is distinguished to reveal the unique advantages of independent directors compared 
with board of supervisors, where appropriate, in the context of China. The 
independent director‘s replacement of the supervisory board as the sole watchdog 
may be seen as a solution, but may also pose risks in state-held listed companies. First, 
independent directors may not be independent from the controlling shareholders and 
may thus fail to protect minorities, and second, they may not be able to fulfill their 
duties. 
 
A. Comparative research between independent directors and supervisors 
In Chinese public listed companies, independent directors and supervisors are 
distinguished in respect of qualification, nomination, and election, but have the same 
duties of loyalty and diligence as non-independent directors. They also have some 
legal rights in common. A comparison is presented in the Table 5.7. 
 
(A) Qualification 
In China, the independence requirements (discussed in section 5.2.1 of this 
chapter) are provided by the ID Guideline. They include having basic knowledge of 
the operation of public listed companies and more than five years‘ work experience in 
law, economics, or another field. The services provided by independent directors must 
not have any relationship with or be carried out in circumstances that may affect their 
independence. There is no legal requirement for the qualification of supervisors.  
 
(B) Nomination and election 
The board of directors, board of supervisors, and shareholders individually or 
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jointly holding more than 1% of shares have the right to nominate independent 
directors under the PRC Company Law. The election of independent directors is 
passed by ordinary resolution at a general meeting, unless otherwise set out by the 
articles of the companies. Supervisors are nominated and elected severally at the 
shareholders‘ general meeting and employees‘ meeting. 
 
(C) Common duties 
The PRC Company Law provides that both independent directors and supervisors 
have duties of loyalty and diligence.
669
 All of the directors and supervisors of listed 
companies are subject to derivative action and personal action. The duties of loyalty 
and diligence between independent directors and supervisors are not expressly 
distinguished by law. 
 
(D) Common rights 
    Both independent directors and supervisors act as watchdogs to oversee the 
business and financial operation of corporations. They are conferred the same rights 




                                                        
669
 For supervisors, there is a balance to be struck between the duty to exercise their 
powers for the benefit of the company as a whole and their duty to protect the 
shareholders and employees who elect/appoint them. 
670
 The external auditor is one type of gatekeeper, who is a watchdog over the 
corporate governance and finance. There are two kinds of definitions of gatekeeper in 
a legal sense. One definition refers to ―the outside professionals‖ who providing 
―approving, certifying, or verifying‖ service to investors‖ initiated by John C. Coffee 
Jr. The other definition focuses on the ―private parties who are able to disrupt 
misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers‖. In this way, the 
gatekeeper has a certain authority to grant market access. See Erik F. Gerding, ―The 
Next Epidemic: Bubbles and The Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation‖ (2006) 
38 Conn. L. Rev. 393, Note 219; See also Arthur B. Laby, ―Symposium of New 
Models for Securities Law Enforcement, Outsourcing, Compelled Cooperation, and 
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    Table 5.7 Comparison of Independent Directors and Supervisors 
Comparison Independent directors Supervisors 
Qualification 
1. Basic knowledge of 
business and law, and five 





No specific qualification 
(except independence for the 




1. Board of directors 
2. Board of supervisors 
3. Shareholders 
independently or jointly 




Shareholders‘ general meeting 




meeting and examination by 




Shareholders‘ general meeting 
and employees‘ meeting 
severally 
Duties 
1. Duty of loyalty and duty of care as a director. 
2. Subject to derivative action and personal action 
Rights 
1. Calling an extraordinary general meeting and making 
proposals to the board of directors)
673
; 





B. Conflicts of authority between independent directors and board of supervisors 
A high level of trust and low level of conflict between independent directors and 
supervisors is not easily achieved.
675
 The powers of independent directors and Board 
of supervisors are listed in the Table 5.8.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Gatekeepers: Differentiating Gatekeepers‖ (2006) 1 Brook J.Corp.Fin & Com.L. 119, 
at 122-3. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., ―Understanding Enron: It‘s About the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid‖ (July 2002) Columbia Law School, Working Paper No.207, at 5. 
Reinier Kraakman, ―Gatekeeper: The Anatomy of A Third Party Enforcement 
Strategy‖ (1986) 2 J.L.Econ. & Org. 53, at 53. See also Assaf Hamdani, ―Gatekeeper 
Liability‖ (2003) 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 53; Peter B. Oh ―Gatekeeping‖ (2004) 29 J. Corp. 
L. 735; Ke Steven Wan, ―Gatekeeper Liability Versus Regulation of Wrongdoers 
(2008) 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 483. 
671
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672
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1. Major related-party transactions 
(referring to transactions that the public 
listed company intends to conclude with the 
related party and whose total value exceeds 
RMB three million or 5% of the company‘s 
net assets audited recently) should be 
approved by the independent directors 
before being submitted to the board of 
directors for discussion. Before an 
independent director makes a judgment, an 
intermediary agency can be employed to 
produce an independent financial advisory 
report that will serve as the basis for the 
final judgment.  
 
2. Providing an independent opinion on the 
following matters to the board of directors 
or at the shareholders‘ meeting:  
(1)  Nomination, appointment or removal 
of directors;  
(2) Appointment or dismissal of senior 
executives; 
(3) Remuneration for directors and senior 
executives;  
(4) Current or proposed loan borrowed from 
a public listed company or other fund 
transfer made by the company‘s 
shareholders, actual controllers or affiliated 
enterprises that exceeds RMB three million 
or 5% of the company‘s net assets audited 
recently, and whether the company has 
taken effective measures to collect the due 
amount;  
(5) Events that the independent director 
considers to be detrimental to the interests 
of minority shareholders. 
 
3. Proposing to the board of directors 
relating to the appointment or removal of 
external auditors. 
 
1. Checking the financial affairs and 
auditing of the company. 
 
2. Overseeing the director and senior 
executive‘s actions and demanding 
any director or senior executives to 
make corrections of conduct which 
has infringed the interests of the 
company. 
 
3. Putting forward proposals at 
shareholders‘ meetings. 
 
4. Attending board meetings to raise 
questions or suggestions. 
 
5. Proposing to remove a director or 
senior executive who has violated the 
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Requirement: Consent of at least half of all 
independent directors must be obtained if an 
independent director wishes to exercise the 
above rights. When more than two 
independent directors deem the materials of 
the board meeting inadequate or unclear, 
they may jointly submit a written request to 
postpone the board meeting. 
 
Consequence: If the foregoing rights cannot 
be exercised, then the public listed company 
should disclose to the public the related 
information as to why the rights of the 
independent directors cannot be exercised. 
 
(A) Unique power of independent directors 
Independent directors also have unique power (the first item in the left column in 
Table 5.8) to approve major related-party transactions.  
The Company Law defines a ―related relationship‖ as a ―relationship between the 
controlling shareholder, director, supervisor, or senior manager of a company and the 
enterprise directly or indirectly controlled thereby, and any other relationship that may 
lead to the transfer of any interests of the company,‖678 with the exception of 
companies controlled by the state, where there is no related relationship simply 
because their shares are controlled by the state.
679
 Both the Listing Regulation of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange
680
 and Listing Regulation of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange
681
 define related-party transactions as transactions between a public listed 
company or its subsidiary and a party that has a related relationship with the public 
listed company. Related-party transactions are not, in and of themselves, illegal. 
Empirical study shows that group-controlled listed companies engage in more 
                                                        
678




 The Listing Regulation of Shanghai Stock Exchange is revised in May 2006. 
681
 The Listing Regulation of Shenzhen Stock Exchange is revised in December 2004. 
203 
 
related-party transactions than their non-group controlled counterparts.
682
 Boards of 
directors can establish special committees to review or approve related-party 
transactions, but in practice few public listed companies have done so. Table 5.9 
shows that only 3.9% of state-held listed companies have set up such a working 
committee. Independent directors in public listed companies have the right to veto 
related-party transactions. Table 5.10 shows that in a small proportion of cases (7.7%), 
independent directors have vetoed related-party transactions involved with illegal 
company guarantees or occupation of funds by controlling shareholders.  
 
Table 5.9 Survey of Related-Party Transactions in Public Listed Companies by 





Companies with a 
committee dealing with 
related-party transactions  
Companies without a 
committee dealing with 
related-party transactions 




Private listed companies 6.7% 93.3% 
 
Table 5.10 Survey of Instances of Veto by Independent Directors regarding 
Guarantees or the Occupation of Funds by Public Listed Companies by the 




Veto Yes No Other responses 
Complete sample 6.5% 58.5% 35.0% 
State-held listed 
companies 
7.7% 56.2% 36.1% 
Private listed 
companies 
3.3% 64.4% 32.2% 
 
(B) Overlapping powers of independent directors and board of supervisors 
Some of the powers of board of supervisors (listed in Items 2-5 in the right 
                                                        
682
 Ming Jian & T. J. Wong, ―Earning Management and Tunneling through Related 
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Paper. 
683
 Supra Note 18, at 62. 
684
 Ibid. at 63. 
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column in Table 5.8) overlap that of independent directors (Item 2 (1) and (2) in the 
left column in Table 5.8) including overseeing the conduct of directors and senior 
executives, putting forward proposals at shareholders‘ meetings, attending board 
meetings and raising questions or suggestions, and proposing to remove a director or 
senior executive who has violated the law or resolution made a shareholders‘ meeting.  
An independent director has the same rights as a supervisor to make proposals at 
a general meeting (see Item 3 in the right column in Table 5.8) and to attend the board 
meetings (Item 4 in the right column in Table 5.8) with voting rights as a director. In 
particular, to help them to monitor the conduct of directors or top executives, 
independent directors have the right to provide an independent opinion to the board of 
the directors or to a shareholders‘ meeting in respect of the nomination, appointment 
or removal of directors and senior executives (Item 2 in the left column in Table 5.8). 
 
C. Overlapping powers of board of supervisors and the audit committee 
Auditors ensure the authenticity and completeness of financial statements.
685
 
                                                        
685
 As Li Rongrong, Chairman of the SASAC, has concluded, ―[H]ad we had a sound 
internal auditing and risk management system, the incident of China Aviation Oil 
(Singapore) could have been avoided.‖ The speech of Li Rongrong on the CAO case 
and internal risk control is available online at: 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentID=3309. Ning Guang Xia is quoted 
as the ―Chinese Enron‖ by Chinese media. It made up a fictitious client from 
Germany and issued reports of falsified export and profits, all of which were to 
manipulate the share price to an extremely high level. The auditors never had any 
suspicion of the performance of company, whose share price has increased 440% in 
the previous three years; and the auditors did not conduct any further investigation but 
only checked those documents provided by the company. The strategy for the auditors 
to reduce professional risk so that they do not need to plunge themselves into 
clarifying the genuineness of the documents is: exemption clauses in the engagement 
letter to waive or limit the liabilities of auditors. See K.W. Ching, Joo-Seng Tan & Chi 
Ching R.G., Corporate Governance in East Asia: The Road Ahead: Analysis and Case 
Studies in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan (Singapore; New York: 
Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), at 101. See also Wang Guocheng, Case Studies of 
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Comments (Economy and Management 
Publishing House, 2005) (in Chinese), at 123.  
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The responsibilities of auditors include ―examining the company‘s accounting and 
internal control systems‖ and ―determining that there are no material errors in the 
financial statements.‖686 The Caparo case defines two additional roles of auditors: 
preventing ―the company itself from the consequences of undetected errors or, 
possibly, wrongdoing;‖ and ensuring that shareholders ―scrutinize the conduct of the 
company‘s affairs and . . . exercise their collective powers to reward or control or 
remove those to whom that conduct has been confided.‖687 In reality, accounting 
standards permit adjustments and the use of assumptions to some extent in financial 
statements, and this discretion is at the hands of the management.
688
 The 
―independence‖ of auditing to provide a fair review and reliable opinion of financial 
statements is held in high regard
689
, and Section 201-209 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
emphasizes ―audit independence.‖690 
The audit committee is usually regarded as the most important board committee, 
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 Chartered Financial Analyst Institute, Schweser Study Notes (Vol.3): Financial 
Statement Analysis‖ (Kaplan Publishing, 2008), at 13. 
687
 Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman & Ors [1990] B.C.C. 164 HL, at 192. 
688
 Supra Note 686, at 26. 
689
 Ibid. at 13. 
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 The cost of compliance before the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
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According to the Washington Times report, none of ten largest new listings globally in 
2005 was registered in the USA. The obviously less listings may be caused by the 
excessively high compliance cost and more strict legal liability of auditors and 
lawyers by fear of litigation. Some adjustments have been made. For example, in 
2007, a new rule was promulgated by the SEC to exempt some foreign companies 
from complying with the Sarbanes-Oxley auditing requirement: The US trades of the 
company over a year shall be less than five per cent of their total trades for the year or 
the company has less than 300 worldwide or US shareholders. As Robert Clark has 
predicted, a ―carefully specified process‖ shall be set up for further empirical research 
to make improvements of the current auditing regulatory work. SEC Rule, 12h-6. 
Derrick A Paulo ―New York, we have a problem‖, Today online, 22 November 2006. 
See also Michael F. Holt, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Costs, Benefits and Business 
Impact (Oxford: CIMA Publishing, 2008) at 49-50 and at 75-6. Robert Charles Clark, 
―Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality 
Tale for Policymakers Too‖ (December 5, 2005) Harvard Law and Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 525, at 44.  
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because it is involved in the financial reporting of the company, and is located at the 
―intersection‖ of auditors, the board of directors, executive managers, and business 
units.
691
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act focuses on the crucial role of the audit committee 
and regulates the functions of it by three provisions,
692
 which should prove a good 
reference for future corporate regulations.
693
 
In China, an audit committee is required in all listed companies. The audit 
committee of listed companies usually has authority over internal auditing and the 
appointment or dismissal of external auditors. The working flow of auditing work is 
displayed in Figure 5.2. A team in the internal auditing division under the general 
manager is responsible for the routine work of internal auditing, financial reporting, 
and disclosure.
694
 The Accounting Law provides that ―the person in charge of a 
company shall be responsible for its accounting work as well as the truthfulness and 
completeness of the accounting materials.‖695 Auditing work is overseen by the audit 
                                                        
691
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Section 407 of Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
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 Sec. 4, PRC Accounting Law. It is adopted by the Ninth Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on January 21, 1985; it is revised 
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Figure 5.2 Hierarchy of the Internal Organization Structure of Public Listed 































Under the PRC Company Law, the supervisory board is also entitled to monitor 
the corporate financial affairs and the auditing work of a company (see Item 1 in the 
                                                                                                                                                              
October 31, 1999,  
 


















right column in Table 5.8).
696
 Hence, the powers of the supervisory board over 
auditing work overlaps that of the auditing committee. The audit committee, under the 
board, directly monitors internal auditing and other financial work through the 
internal auditing division and other related executive teams. However, there is no 
clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the auditing committee and 
supervisory board. In practice, most supervisors in state-held listed companies are 
nominated by the controlling shareholder as the shareholder‘s representative. Hence, 
the supervisory board often fails to exercise its authority over auditing work, and the 
auditing committee is in effect the only authority over the auditors.
697
 It is thus 
unnecessary and redundant (to some extent) to keep this powers with the supervisory 
board. 
 
5.3.2 Ability of independent directors to protect minority shareholders 
A. Role of independent directors 
(A) Dual role 
All directors have a legal responsibility to manage and monitor corporate 
business.
698
 An independent director is first and foremost a member of the board of 
directors and participates in the management along with the other directors. Thus, he 
or she should have the technical competence to contribute to the corporation in a 
fashion consummate with the size and nature of the business.
699
 At the same time, he 
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or she is a non-executive director with integrity, and shoulders the responsibility of 
ensuring the compliance and accountability of transactions. 
A series of reports that constitute the UK Combined Code so far emphasize the 
dual functions of non-executive directors, who ―should bring an independent 
judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance, resources‖ (Cadbury), 700 
―should have both a strategic and a monitoring function‖ (Hampel),701 and comprise 
―two principal components: monitoring executive activity and contributing to the 
development of strategy . . . while there might be a tension, there was no essential 
contradiction between the monitoring and strategic aspects of the role‖ (Higgs ).702  
Admittedly, the contradictions between independence in relation to business 
opinion and the inter-dependence of independent director with others on the board is a 
thorny issue. Their role of principally monitoring rather than managing make them 
unlikely to ―come across valuable business information,‖703 which may undermine 
the effectiveness of their function of watchdog.
704
 
As an independent director, it is not necessary to know the business of the 
company inside out, but such a director should use his or her expertise and maintain 
objectivity and above all, independence, to help advance corporate goals and achieve 
key business objectives. In China, an independent director holds the same level of 
                                                        
700
 See Cadbury Report (Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance) 1992, §4.11. 
701
 See §3.8 of Hampel Report 1998, issued by the Hampel Committee on Corporate 
Governance in 1998. 
702
 See Higgs Report (Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-executive 
Directors) 2003, §6.1 and 6.2. 
703
 See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ―Company Directors: 
Regulating Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties‖, joint 
consultation paper (1999), §3.46. The report is available online at: 
http://www.open.gov.uk/lawcomm 
704
 See Richard C Nolan, ―The Legal Control of Directors‘ Conflicts of Interest in the 
United Kingdom: Non-executive Directors Following the Higgs Report‖ (2005) 6 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 413. 
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legal duties as other directors on the board,
705
 and no judicial decision in China has 
yet clarified the tests to be applied to independent directors and non-independent 
directors.  
The Zhengzhou Baiwen Company Limited (―ZBW‖), a then state-held listed 
company on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, was sanctioned by the CSRC for false 
disclosure in its listing documents and annual reports in 2001.
706
 The case is 
summarized in Table 5.12. In this benchmark case, the CSRC adopted the same 
standard for all directors.
707
 Mr. Lu Jiahao, one of the independent directors of ZBW, 
was held liable for the genuineness and completeness of the listed company‘s listing 
documents and annual reports. He was sanctioned by the CSRC to pay a fine of RMB 
0.1 million, the same amount as the fines meted out to the other directors on the 
board.  
 
Table 5.12 Case summary of Zhengzhou Baiwen Company Limited 
Listing 
information 
Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1996 
Industry Commercial wholesaling  
History Before listing, it was a state-owned enterprise for the wholesaling of 
stationery.  
It was the first public listed company in the city of Zhengzhou. 
Reputation
708
 1. Top in the industry of commercial wholesaling. 
2. In Top 100 Chinese public listed companies. 




 ―False Example and Great Amount Defalcation: Caution from the 
Fall of Zheng Bai Wen‖, Xin Hua News Agency, October 30, 2000. 
                                                        
705
 For the duty of care and diligence, the case of Daniels v. Anderson distinguishes 
the extent of duty of care between executive and non-executive directors. 
706
 Sources: ―False Example and Great loss: the Fall of Zheng Bai Wen‖, Xin Hua 
News, 30 October, 2000; Finance and Economics (Cai Jin) Issue 8, 2001. 
707
 The sanctions were made by the CSRC, Zheng Jian Fa Zi [2001] No.19. 
708
 Before the scandal took place, ZBW was a ―miracle of stock market‖ bearing the 
weight of full confidence of public investors. ZBW is a listed company with ―state 








A. False listing information: 
a. False profit-making: RMB 19.08 million (1994 and 1995). 
b. Insufficiency of raised share capital: only RMB 3.34 million (the 
minimum shall be RMB 195.62 million). 
c. Omission in the application materials for IPO to the CSRC and in 
the Prospectus of the information of 22 branches. 
 
B. False disclosure after listing  
a. False profit-making: RMB 143.9 million. 
b. Non-disclosure of material investment: RMB 364.46 million. 
c. False financial statement: non-entry loss: RMB 255.38 million. 
 
C. Expropriation of corporate Funds: RMB 200 million. 
 
D. Illegal loan from bank (Zhengzhou Branch of Construction 
Bank): ZBW was both the debtor and guarantor, and the amount of 
the loan was around RMB 10 billion. 
Penalty by 
the CSRC 
Section 74 of Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing 
and Trading of Stocks 1993
710： 
1. The company: warning and fine of RMB 2 million. 
2. Chairman of the Board: fine of RMB 0.3 million. 
3. Vice Chairman of Board and General Manager: RMB 0.2 million. 
4. Other directors (including independent directors): RMB 0.1 
million. 
Final result 1. The debt of RMB 1.5 billion owed to the Construction Bank was 
transferred to Cinda Asset Management Company, one of the four 
big AMCs. 
 
2. Two options for Cinda: reorganization or application to the court 
for the bankruptcy of Zheng Bai Wen. 
 
3. The prerequisite condition for reorganization was recapitalization 
of RMB 600 million from the first big shareholder, the Zhengzhou 
municipal government, which refused. 
 
4. The bankruptcy application of Zheng Bai Wen filed by Cinda was 
thrown out by the court due to insufficiency of the documentation 
for the claim. 
 
5. The debt plus nearly half of the shares of the company were 
finally transferred to San Lian Group (RMB 300 million), which was 
then listed accordingly. 
 
                                                        
709
 The penalty decision was made by the CSRC in 2001. 
710
 It is issued by the State Council of China on April 22, 1993. 
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    In the last five years, some independent directors of state-held listed companies 
have exercised their right to appoint external auditors or propose the investigation of 
related-party transactions. For example, Mr. Cheng Houbo and Mr. Liu Wenbo, 
independent directors of Le Shan Electric Power Ltd. (―Le Shan Dian Li‖, listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange), challenged the 2003 financial statement of the 
company by employing the Shenzhen Peng Cheng auditing firm to conduct a special 
audit of related-party transactions and guarantees between the company and its 
controlling shareholder in 2004. In another case, four independent directors of Henan 
Lian Hua Monosodium Glutamate Ltd. (―Lian Hua Wei Jing‖, listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange), declared to the press that they had initiated a proposal to the 
company to investigate fund diversion by controlling shareholders, but their proposal 
was finally rejected by the company. 
 It has been reported in the press that most independent directors who have 
challenged controlling shareholders are eventually dismissed by the listed company 
after the event. Many independent directors also opt to resign for personal or health 
reasons for fear of the legal risk of challenging the company in cases in which 





(B) Third role of independent directors in China  
In China, independent directors are conferred a unique third role: that of 
defending minority shareholders against controlling shareholders, particularly in 
state-held listed companies. The ID Guideline states that although the primary target 
                                                        
711
See Securities Times, 11 July 2005, available at: http:// 
finance.people.com.cn/GB/1045/3533843.html; see also 21st Century News Report, 




of independent directors is to protect the overall interests of the company, they ―shall 
be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders‖ and 
―shall work independently and shall not subject themselves to the influence of the 
controlling shareholders of state-held listed companies.‖712  
The special mission of independent directors to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders in state-held listed companies in China is a key deviation from the 
rationale for independent directors in the widely held corporations in the United States. 
This third role of independent directors is confined to state-held listed companies that 
have controlling shareholders, but this kind of function is not unique in the context of 
China. As Arden J. stated in the case Re Macro Ltd ―given the presence of minority 
interests, the absence of an independent director world in my judgment be prejudicial 
to the position of the plaintiffs as shareholders in the companies . . . the desirability of 
having a truly independent board is applicable to all cases where there are minority 
shareholders.‖713 In view of the dominant power of controlling shareholders in the 
state-held listed companies in China, the role of independent director to defend the 
interests of minority shareholders is of great significance. 
 
B. Why independent directors may not be able to protect minority shareholders in 
China 
    In state-held listed companies in China, independent directors may not be able to 
protect minority shareholders because they are not independent from the controlling 
shareholder. This is due to the internal procedural limitation that the appointment and 
remuneration of directors is subject to approval at a shareholders‘ general meeting. 
                                                        
712
 Supra Note 11, Art. 1(2). See also Article 2 (1) of the Provision on Strengthening 
the Protection of the Rights and Interests of the General Public Shareholders, issued 
by CSRC, with effect from 7 December, 2004. 
713
 (1994) 2 BCLC 354. 
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Controlling shareholders have a predominant influence over state-held listed 
companies in China, and thus the survival of independent directors (whether they are 
re-appointed and how much they are paid) is in the hands of those shareholders.
714
 
The centralization of decision power under the administrative hierarchy, influenced by 
China‘s planned economy system in earlier times, has affected the internal experience 
of authority in state-held listed companies.
715
 The monitoring role over controlling 
shareholders assumed by independent directors may not be efficacious, because their 
interests are firmly linked to the controlling shareholders. 
A survey by the Shanghai Stock Exchange reveals that 90% of independent 
directors in Chinese public listed companies are nominated by the first majority 
shareholder.
716
 According to a survey of 26 independent directors of listed companies 
covering more than ten industries in nine cities in China, 35% had never issued any 
independent opinions that went against the views of the controlling shareholders, and 
33.3% had never vetoed or abstained from a board decision.
717
 The empirical 
evidence shows that independent directors are not genuinely independent in 
                                                        
714
 Most of the chairman, deputy chairman and chief financial officer of board of the 
state-held listed companies are directly decided or approved by the governments 
before election. Those directors and top executives usually have high-ranking officials 
in the governments as well as in the Chinese Communist Party at the same time. See 
Liu Hongxia & Han Yuan, ―Governance Risk of Board of Directors in the Chinese 
Listed Companies‖ (2007) 6 Contemporary Finance & Economics (in Chinese). See 
Zhang Duozhong, The Research on the Controlling System of State-held Companies 
(China Economic Publishing House, 2006) (in Chinese), at 144. The Communist 
Party Committee, employee representative meeting, and trade union, the old three 
power organs in previous SOEs still exist in the state-held listed companies and their 
holding companies. The three organs are exerting impacts to some extent on the 
operation of public listed company, through two-tier shareholdings and two-tier 
boards. As a consequence, the monitoring functions of independent directors and 
supervisory board are weakened. 
715
 Guthrie, Doug, Dragon in a Three-piece Suit: The Emergence of Capitalism in 
China (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
716
 Supra Note 18, at 5. 
717
 See the ―Report of Independent Director in China‖ (in Chinese), China Securities 
News, May 2004. 
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monitoring the controlling shareholders who have nominated them, let alone 
protecting minority shareholders.  
    To sum up this chapter, the two-tier board system is not well governed under the 
state-controlled model, first because the presence of the supervisory board is 
redundant as its responsibilities have been taken on by independent directors or the 
audit committee. Second, independent directors cannot perform their third role in 
China of protecting minority shareholders because their nomination, remuneration, 





















Chapter VI Reflections on the State-Controlled Model 
 
―The best structure cannot be derived from theory; it must be developed by 
experience.‖  
 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ―The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law‖ (1991) 
 
6.1 Are state-held listed companies in China well governed under the 
state-controlled model? 
6.1.1 Touchstone of a good corporate governance model 
Corporate governance consists of transparency, accountability, fairness, and 
responsibility, which are ―put into practice by a combination of regulations, rules, 
non-legislative codes, best practices, and self regulations,‖718 and should ―provide 
proper incentives for the board and management to pursue objectives that are in the 
interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring.‖719  The OECD recognizes that ―there is no single model of good 
corporate governance, but there are some common elements underlying good 
                                                        
718
 Law, Colin & Wong, Patricia, ―Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis 
between the UK and China‖ (2005) 16(9) I.C.C.L.R. 350. Fox & Heller (2006) 
combine the two perspectives and conclude that good corporate governance shall be 
defined by looking to the economic functions of the firm rather than to any particular 
set of national corporate laws. Two elements would be considered: 1. maximization of 
residuals by managers; 2. pro rata distributions of residuals to shareholders. Defective 
corporate governance means that a firm does not meet one or both elements of the 
definition. Residuals are defined as the difference between what a firm pays at 
contractually predetermined prices to obtain its inputs and what it receives for its 
output. See generally Fox, Merritt B. & Heller, Michael A. ―What is Good Corporate 
Governance‖, in Corporate governance lessons from transition economy reforms 
(Edited by Fox, Merritt B. & Heller, Michael A.) (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). The authors hold that good corporate governance shall be 
found in the ―economic functions of the firm‖ instead of from any domestic corporate 
regulations. 
719
 Supra Note 390. It asserts that corporate governance involves ―a set of 
relationships between a company‘s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders‖. Corporate governance also provides ―the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined.‖   
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corporate governance.‖ These include an effective corporate governance framework, 
suitable rights and equitable treatment for shareholders, the role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency, and the responsibility of the boards.
720
   
The corporate governance model for public listed companies has flexible 
standards depending on the existing institutional framework in each jurisdiction, 
which does not operate in isolation from the local political and economic 
circumstances.
721
 From the financial perspective, the touchstone of whether a 
corporate governance model is good or not should be distinguished from the different 
needs of technical evaluators, such as management performance or investment 
value.
722
 The CLSA report ―Saints and Sinners – Who‘s Got Religion?‖ (2001)723 
analyzes the results of a survey of 495 companies in 25 emerging markets around the 
world. The survey questions on corporate governance were divided into seven 
                                                        
720
 Supra Note 390, at 13. 
721
 Eduardo T. Gonzalez，Best practices in Asian corporate governance (Tokyo: 
Asian Productivity Organization, 2007), at 160. For merit-based system, see also Janis 
Sarra, ―Disclosure as A Public Policy Instrument in Global Capital Markets (2007) 42 
Tex. Int‘l L.J. 875. 
722
 With respect to the management performance, Berghe (1999) points out that 
―good performance can (temporarily?) mask the detrimental effects of poor 
management but poor performance often proved to be due to poor governance‖. See 
Lutgart van den Berghe, International Standardisation of Good Corporate 
Governance: Best Practices for the Board of Directors (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 
c1999), at 17. An effective governance arrangement should have the positive effects 
on the performance, notwithstanding the ultimate performance. See the McKinsey 
Global Investor Survey on Corporate Governance (2002) defines a company with 
good corporate governance as follows: 1. Owning majority of outside directors, who 
are truly independent and have no ties with management; 2. Directors have significant 
shareholding; 3. Material proportion of directors‘ pay is stock-related; 4. Formal 
director evaluation is in place; 5. Company is very responsive to investor requests for 
the information on governance issues. From the perspective of professional investors, 
good corporate governance may obtain a more attractive image for outside fund 
raising. See supra Note 380; see also International Financial Corporation, ―Step by 
Step, Corporate Governance Model in China: The Experience of the International 
Financial Corporation‖ (April 2005), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/home.nsf/Content/Corporate_Governance  
723
 Supra Note 1. See also the ―CLSA Corporate Governance Ratings in Southeast 
Asia‖ in ASEAN Roundtable, Reforming Corporate Governance in Southeast Asia: 
Economics, Politics, and Regulations (Singapore, ISEAS, 2005), at 25.  
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categories: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, 
fairness (minority shareholder protection), and social awareness. A corporate 
governance system for public listed companies should consider all seven categories in 




6.1.2 Practical issues of corporate governance in state-held listed companies in China 
The following section gives a brief summary of the key points in Chapter IV and 
V in relation to five practical issues that arise from state controlled ownership under 
the two-tier shareholding and two-tier board structure of state-held listed companies 
in China. 
 
A. Three practical issues raised in Chapter IV 
As discussed in Chapter IV, in the two-tier shareholding structure where the state 
is the controlling shareholder, minority shareholders are not well protected for three 
reasons. 
 
(A) Minority shareholders‘ interests are infringed upon due to tunneling behavior by 
controlling shareholders‘: 
There are two types of tunneling: illegal guarantees and the occupation of 
company funds. It is unsatisfactory that the CSRC officially arranges corrective 
approaches to illegal fund diversion by controlling shareholders, rather than legally 
punishing them. In such cases, the controlling shareholder in question is not legally 
liable as long as he or she is able to repay by the due time.  
 
                                                        
724
 Supra Note 722, International Financial Corporation, at 31. 
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(B) Minority shareholders may not able to effectively exercise their rights to protect 
themselves under the cumulative voting system     
In state-held listed companies, nomination is still under the control of controlling 
shareholders. In addition, minority shareholders may not have enough votes for their 
candidates. It is impractical for minority shareholders to elect their nominees under 
the cumulative voting system, given the controlling shareholder‘s concentrated 
ownership in such companies. Minority shareholders are usually public individual 
investors who have scattered views on the selection of candidates and the business 
operations of listed companies.  
 
(C) Minority shareholders may not able to effectively exercise their rights to protect 
themselves by derivative action 
Derivative claims made by the minority shareholders of listed companies are rare 
occurrences in China. Particularly in the case of state-held listed companies, the 
difficulty for the Chinese courts is not in hearing cases or delivering orders, but in 
dealing with conflicts of interest between the state (the government as controlling 
shareholder) and individual (minority shareholders). It is consequently difficult for the 
courts in China to decide cases that might involve ruling against the government. 
 
B. Two practical issues posed in Chapter V 
(A) Independent directors are needed in the presence of board of supervisors 
There are two reasons why independent directors are needed in the presence of a 
supervisory board. First, the internal problems of the supervisory board and 
co-determination in China affect the effectiveness of the supervisory board‘s functions. 
China‘s two-tier boards are horizontally positioned under the shareholder‘s general 
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meeting. The supervisory board in China thus has no real authority to effectively 
monitor the management board. In terms of co-determination, employee 
representatives may not be able to achieve a power balance on the board. Corporate 
laws do not confer employee representatives with any specific rights in the 
decision-making process or to monitor the activities of the board of directors or board 
of supervisors. The second reason is that the responsibilities of the supervisory board 
are taken on by independent directors or the audit committee.  
 
(B) Independent directors are not sufficiently independent from the controlling 
shareholders to protect minority shareholders 
Independent directors may not have sufficient independence to fulfill their duties. 
In China, an independent director holds the same standard of legal duties as other 
directors on the board, and no judicial decision in China has yet clarified the tests to 
be applied to different types of directors. In the last five years, some independent 
directors of state-held listed companies have exercised their rights to appoint external 
auditors or ask a listed company to investigate related-party transactions. Most of the 
directors who challenged controlling shareholders were eventually dismissed by the 
listed company after the event.  
In Chinese public listed companies, the appointment and remuneration of 
directors are subject to approval at a general meeting. Because controlling 
shareholders have a predominant influence over state-held listed companies in China, 
the survival of independent directors (whether they are re-appointed and how much 
they are paid) is in the hands of controlling shareholders. The monitoring role over 
controlling shareholders assumed by independent directors may not be efficacious, 
because their interests are firmly linked to controlling shareholders. 
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6.1.3 Are state-held listed companies in China well governed under the 
state-controlled model? 
The corporate governance model that China has assumed could not automatically 
have come into being without relying on the existing institutional framework, and 
would not independently survive without the circumstances and development in 
China.
725
 Economic development in China is always carefully steered in the desired 
direction by the central government, backed by heavy political intervention and ―close 
government-business relations.‖726 Banking operations and employee activities are 
still strictly controlled by the Chinese government. For the research in this thesis, the 
touchstone of whether state-held listed companies in China are well governed under 
the state-controlled model is whether the practical issues (discussed in Chapters IV 
and V and summarized in section 6.1.2) can be resolved under the current model.  
    The practical issues explored in Chapter IV and V are closely related to the 
controlling shareholder – the Chinese government – under the state-controlled model 
of corporate governance. A look at the elements of the state-controlled model itself 
shows that the Chinese government has substantial control over the corporate affairs 
of state-held listed companies. The bank-based model and the stakeholder model, both 
of which were connected to state asset management in China during its economic 
transition from an economy predominated by central planning to an economy driven 
by market forces with gradual SOE reform. 
                                                        
725
 ―The question is closely related to how the objectives of corporate governance 
could and should be defined, given one‘s assessment of the country‘s social norms and 
aspirations, and the progress of reform and development in related key areas such as 
the banking sector, capital markets, social security and welfare position, and 
regulatory and law enforcement institutions.‖ See Supra Note 38, at 39-40. 
726
 William D. Greenlee, Jr., ―Business Not as Usual in China‖ (2006) 14 FEB Nev. 
Law. 10, at 12; See also Randall Peerenboom, ―Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, 
One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China‖, (2002) 23 Michigan 




    Hence, the problems caused by government‘s heavy involvement and 
intervention under the two-tier shareholding and two-tier board system in China under 
the existing governance model prevent the amelioration of the practical issues arising 
from the specific shareholding and board structure of state-held listed companies. The 
situation is worsened by (1) the supervisory board working ineffectively; and (2) 
insufficient independence on the part of independent directors.Thus, state-held listed 
companies in China are not well governed under the state-controlled model. 
 
6.2 Why the corporate governance of state-held listed companies in China fails to 
work effectively under the state-controlled model 
6.2.1 Issue of enforcement 
With the passive involvement of banking and employees, the aforementioned five 
practical issues are related to enforcement.
727
 Without an effective and efficient 
enforcement system, it is impossible to put any regulatory and governance framework 
into practice.  
    
A. Is the enforcement of corporate governance transparent? 
The answer to this question is in principle affirmative, given the disclosure 
requirements for listed companies in China. In addition to annual, semi-annual, and 
                                                        
727
 The inadequate legal enforcement is recognized by the China Corporate 
Governance Report (2003) as one of the eight basic problems of public listed 
companies in China: (1) improper shareholding structure; (2) misplaced government 
rules; (3) inadequate legal enforcement and legal protection of investors; (4) insider 
control in corporate affairs; (5) immaturities of the external governance structure; (6) 
non-guaranteed quality of information disclosure; (7) lack of fiduciary duties and 
supporting culture environment; (8) weak roles of the media and public. See Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, Executive Summary of Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate 





 when a major event
729
 occurs and such material 
information may substantially affect the company‘s stock price, public listed 
companies should submit an ad hoc report to the CSRC‘s local authority and the stock 
exchange, and make an announcement to the general public immediately.
730
   
Since 2001, Chinese listed companies have been required to disclose information 
regarding corporate governance.
731
 The information to be disclosed is specified by 
the Code of Corporate Governance of Public Listed Companies to be (i) the 
composition, performance, and evaluation of the board of directors, of specialized 
committees, and of the board of supervisors; (ii) the performance of independent 
directors, including their attendance at board of directors‘ meetings, their issuance of 
independent opinions on related-party transactions and on the appointment or removal 
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 Pursuant to the Securities Law, the information disclosed shall be ―authentic, 
accurate and complete and shall not have any false record, misleading statement or 
major omission‖. It is the secretary of board of directors that is in charge of the work 
of disclosure. The directors, supervisors and senior managers of a listed company 
shall have the obligation to guarantee the quality of information. The Securities Law 
requires the annual report to be submitted within four months after the end of each 
accounting year and mid-term report within two months after the end of the first half 
of each accounting year. The Administrative Measures For the Disclosure of 
Information of Public listed companies further supplements the requirement of 
submitting the quarterly report within one month after the end of the third and ninth 
month of each accounting year. 
729
 The Securities Law enumerates such major events as: any change of business 
scope, directors, no less than one-third of supervisors or senior executives, holdings of 
any shareholder (who holds or controls no less than 5% of the company's shares) of 
the company; any decision of the company on capital reduction, restructure of the 
company, liquidation or litigation where the company is involved, etc. 
730
  Supra Note 5, Sec.67. 
731
 Shanghai Stock Exchange, China Corporate Governance Report 2008: 
Transparency and Information Disclosure (Fu Dan University Press, 2008) (in 
Chinese), at 42. 
732
 Supra Note 10, Art.91. 
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However, a report of the IFC finds that most Chinese listed companies ―are not 
inclined to go beyond those basic requirements.‖733 Listed companies are not actively 
involved in communication with public investors.
734
 To improve the relationship 
between shareholders and public listed companies and to better protect shareholder 
rights, the CSRC issued Working Guidelines for the Relationship between Public 
listed Companies and Investors
735
 for all the public listed companies to follow. The 
regulations require information disclosure and communication, including the 
development strategy of the company, the company‘s significant investments and 
changes, the construction of enterprise culture.
736
  
     The information required to be disclosed gives a basic idea of the development 
of the company, but the effectiveness of this channel in helping shareholders to 
understand the company‘s internal operations is doubtful. This is primarily due to 
companies‘ lack of consciousness or activism in their disclosure to investors, 
especially public minority shareholders. In practice, the contact phone numbers of 
some public listed companies are not reachable, and inquiries by email are never 
                                                        
733
 Supra Note 722, International Financial Corporation. 
734
 Ibid. In my opinion, merit-based system is more practical for China‘s corporate 
governance than comply and explain system, because the merit-based system requires 
more detailed disclosure so that unwillingness and inactivity of companies may be 
avoided. The standard of disclosure in such a merit-based system shall be explained 
more clearly and in greater detail to the public listed companies for practice. For 
example, a checklist shall be made to ensure the key governance practices be abided 
by. More importantly, the CSRC should explain the disclosure requirements to help 
investors to understand the extent of application of law by the public listed companies. 
See generally Mak Yuen Teen ―Improving the Implementation of Corporate 
Governance Practices in Singapore‖, written for Monetary Authority of Singapore and 




 It is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, with effect from July 
2005. 
736
 Ibid. Art.6.  
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answered. In some cases, company officers reply to the inquiries perfunctorily, and 




B. Do the regulatory authorities really work to ensure enforcement? 
The CSRC, its local branches, and the two stock exchanges (Shanghai and 
Shenzhen) are the primary regulatory authorities supervising listed companies in 
China. 
The CSRC was established in 1992 under the State Council to administrate and 
supervise the national securities market with more than thirty regulatory bureaus 
(local authority of the CSRC) that cover different geographic regions of the 
country.
738
 The CSRC monitors public listed companies through its local branches, 
where every supervising official is in charge of five to ten companies. They update 
information on public listed companies (and especially their governance structure and 
material related-party transactions).
739
 In performing these duties, the CSRC has the 
authority to take regulatory actions, including conducting investigations without 
limitation of public listed companies and financial institutions in respect of securities 
trading and clearing services.
740
  
The stock exchange is an operator and frontline regulator that controls the 
securities-trading business of listed companies and provides services to issuers and 
intermediaries. Where any normal trading of securities might be disturbed by 
forthcoming announcements or urgent matters, the stock exchange can call a technical 
                                                        
737
 Lu Zhou, ―Close Contact with investor relationship‖, China Securities News, 24 
April 2007. 
738
 Supra Note 5, Sec.179. The term ―CSRC‖ in this chapter means, collectively, the 
CSRC itself and the regulatory bureaus. 
739
 Notice of the Local Offices’ Work on Overseeing Listed Company, issued by 
CSRC in October 2001, Art.2. 
740
 Supra Note 5, Sec.180. 
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suspension of trading after reporting to the local authority of the CSRC. The stock 
exchange can also restrict specific types of trading in the event of possible speculative 
trading or insider trading.
741
 
Approximately 593 contraventions by listed companies were discovered and 
punished by the CSRC during the period 1996 to 2007.
742
 Among these reported 
cases, 461 (77.74%) concerned information disclosure.
743
 Over 50% of the disclosure 




However, such data is not convincing, as it is questionable whether the Chinese 
authorities would have detected all such misconduct.
745
 The CSRC and stock 
exchanges are ―susceptible to political influence and local protectionism,‖ because the 
punishment and further revelation of unlawful events may ―cause a stock market 
crash‖746 and the ensuing market instability would be likely to result in a substantial 
loss of state assets owned and controlled by the Chinese governments in state-held 




6.2.2 Cause of non-enforcement 
As identified by North, enforcement is ―typically imperfect‖ because the 
outcome is decided by functions of the agents who carry out the enforcement.
748
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 Ibid. Sec.115. 
742




 Ibid. at 120. 
745
 Noëlle Trifiro, ―China's Financial Reporting Standards: Will Corporate 
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Corporate governance in state-held listed companies is not effectively enforced 
because the sole discretion is exercised by the Chinese governments to arbitrarily 
interfere in governance practices and the regulation of state-held listed companies.   
In the final analysis, the state-controlled model fails to resolve the practical 
issues because the behavior of the state and business entities is not strictly restrained 
as a result of non-enforcement of law. On the one hand, the occurrence of corruption 
results in the non-enforcement law, and on the other hand, non-enforcement reinforces 
corruption. Consequently, corporate governance in state-held listed companies is 
trapped in a vicious circle in the long term. 
 
A. Definition of corruption 
    The generality of corruption is affirmed by Braendle, Gasser, and Noll, who state 
that ―there is no country, which has not been hit by corruption at some point in its 
history.‖749 Corruption is usually defined as the ―use of public office to pursue private 
gain in ways that violate laws and formal rules.
750
 It also refers to the act of ―a 
fiduciary person who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his or her station or character to 
procure some benefit for himself or herself or for another person, contrary to duty and 
the rights of others.‖751 Corruption generally derives from the abuse of power752 by 
which the abuser obtains private benefits.    
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C. Harms, ―Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New 
Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption‖ (2000) 33 Cornell Int'l L.J. 159, at 
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B. Corruption in China 
In China, corruption among government officials generally takes the form of 
embezzlement (―Tanwu‖), misappropriation (―Nuoyong Gongkuan‖), or bribery 
(―Shouhui‖), which are respectively provided for by Sec. 383, 384, and 385 of the 
Criminal Law. Embezzlement is distinguished from misappropriation in that in the 
former case, the official in question takes advantage of his or her position to acquire 
state property,
753
 whereas in the latter case the official misappropriates public 




In the course of SOE reform toward privatization, particularly in the case of 
state-held listed companies, government officials have faced manifold opportunities to 
misappropriate state assets or accept bribes, after which the misconduct of the 
company and its officers is hidden.
755
 Corruption in China is often a combination of 




C. Is corruption being combated in China? 
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    As indicated by a survey conducted by the China Reform and Development 
Research Institute, corruption is ranked first among all factors with an impact on the 
social stability of China.
757
  
The Anti-corruption Bureau (ACB) is the agency that investigates crime that 
involves taking advantage of duty (―duty-breach crime‖) by government officials 
(including, without limitation, embezzlement, misappropriation, and bribery). The 
ACB works under the procuratorate of every province in China. As per the 2009 
report of the Supreme People‘s Procuratorate of the PRC delivered at the second 
session of the Eleventh National People‘s Congress, the ACB had handled 33,546 
cases of duty-breach crime and investigated 41,179 persons (including 2,687 officials 
above the county level) in 2008.
758
 Of these cases, 17,594, or over half, were 
―spectacular cases‖ involving bribes of more than RMB 50,000 or embezzlement or 
misappropriation worth more than RMB 100,000.
759
 The Central Commission of the 
Disciplines of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has implemented many 
inspection programs to monitor party members, and particularly government officials 
at the national and provincial levels.
760
  
  Although provincial governments across China have issued over 2000 
anti-corruption regulations and policies
761
 in addition to the Criminal Law and 
sectoral regulations concerning duty-breach crimes, corruption is still rife and difficult 
to quantify.
762
 The PRC Premier Wen Jiabao admitted in his government work report 
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that ―corruption remains a serious problem in some localities, departments and 
areas.‖763 A number of campaigns have been launched to fight corruption, which have 
involved the prosecution of ―high-profile cases involving high-level officials‖ but 




D. Why corruption occurs in China 
The reasons underlying the presence of corruption in Chinese society are 
addressed from the historical, economic, and cultural perspectives. 
 
(A) Historical reasons 
    Hwang (1987) explains the structural factors in Chinese society that contribute to 
corruption ―historically and, to an extent, even in modern contexts, many Chinese 
have lived in encapsulated communities that are hierarchically organized, with major 
economic and other resources controlled by a few power[ful] figures who could 
arbitrarily allocate resources. In these settings, it has been imperative to be sensitive 
to one‘s social position and to the kinds of resources that could elicit and be forced to 
give up through obligations incurred over long periods of time.‖765 
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    In contrast to the individual-oriented liberty of Western society,
766
 China has 
long-standing traditions based on the system of identity in a social hierarchy in feudal 
society. The first is ―Qin Qin‖ (―fidelity to familism and paternalism‖), which 
enshrines the hierarchical pattern of a family based on patriarchy in which fathers or 
eldest brothers should be respectable and have authority over decision-making. The 
second is ―Zun Zun‖ (―fealty to the emperor‖), whereby all citizens swore fealty to the 
Emperor, who was the son of God (―Tian Zi‖). 
Parent-child, husband-wife, elder-younger siblings, Emperor and subordinate, 
and friend-friend relationships constitute the classic paradigm of the Chinese feudal 
system. These five basis relationships are called ―Wu Lun‖ in Chinese. Wu Lun 
reflects that ―hierarchy ordering of familial relations is the principal foundation upon 
which complex and interlocking human relations in the Chinese society are 
constructed (the five relationships except for friend-friend are hierarchy relations).
767
 
Before a person comes into the network of a society, he or she must first be ―a proper 
parent, child, spouse sibling or friend to another,‖768 whereby ―Shangxia Youdeng, 
Guijian Youbie, and Zhangyou Youxu‖ (differences exist between ups and downs, 
noble and humble, and young and old). 
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Wu Lun became the standard of conduct, and was increasingly reinforced by 
successive Emperors for thousands of years.
769
 The Emperors maintained a hierarchic 
system by pushing people to accept Wu Lun and respect for traditions, and particularly 




    The hierarchal organization of feudal Chinese society advocated a hierarchal 
structure between government officials and the common people, or ―Guan Gao Min 
Di, Guan Zhong Min Qing‖ (government officials are superior to the common people), 
which led to the derivation of ―Guan Ben Wei,‖ or the idea of ―prerogatives and 
privileges going with the position of cadre.‖771 The Guan Ben Wei takes position as a 
core measure of a person‘s social status and value.772 Hence, the Chinese people‘s 
worship and pursuit of power did not disappear with the collapse of the feudal 
autocratic society, but has spread and continues to strengthen the public‘s fear of the 
Chinese government and the motivation to seek positions in the government.
773
 
Notably, from the perspective of common people in China, possessing power means 
possessing money (or making wealth) and privileges (―Sheng Guan Fa Cai‖), and 
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(B) Economic reasons 
    There are also economic reasons that give rise to corruption. If their salary is 
much lower than that of their peers in business or other professionals, then civil 
servants are likely to engage in embezzlement or collect bribes from their privileged 
position, particularly when the expected cost of being caught is low.
775
 
    The government in China has followed an egalitarian policy of distribution. 
Compensation is usually composed of two parts: a basic salary (based on a uniform 
national level and specific regional standards) and a bonus. The egalitarian approach 
is a product of China‘s planned economic system, in which resources were limited and 
the value of labor capital was not recognized.
776
 The average level of salary for 
government officials in China has been low for decades.
777
 The low salary system did 
not become a major factor in increasing corruption when wages in business were 
lower than in government.
778
 However, since the late 1970s when China began to 
open up to the outside world and carry out economic reform under the policy of 
―letting a few people be rich first‖ advocated by Deng Xiaoping, the salary level of 
Chinese government officials has been well below the average in society.
779
 Thus, 
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 Ibid. at 225-6. 
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officials may seek to take advantage of their positions to conduct corruptive 
behaviors. 
To ensure that a remuneration scheme attracts qualified talent into governments 
and to further combat severe corruption,
780
 incentive arrangements have been allowed 
to be taken into account in an executive‘s earning package since 1992. An example is 




Stock options have been voluntarily adopted in some joint stock limited 
companies since the 1990s,
782
 but they are not widely used in listed companies. The 
regulation governing stock options in public listed companies was issued by the 
CSRC as Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the 
Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Public Listed 
Companies (For Trial Implementation) (―Incentive Notice‖). The Incentive Notice 
limits the scope of persons who are qualified for options, including directors, 
supervisors, senior executives, and core technicians or business personnel of a listed 
company, and other employees, but excluding independent directors. The aggregate 
target stock involved in all of the effective equity incentive plans of a listed company 
must not exceed 10% of the total company stake. The interval between the date of 
granting of the stock options and the exercisable date must be no less than one year 
and no more than 10 years. The equity incentive plan must be drafted by the 
remuneration committee of the board and passed at a board meeting. All independent 
directors must present their own independent opinions on the equity incentive plan. 
Excerpts from the plan, the board resolution, and independent directors‘ opinions shall 
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also be disclosed to the public, approved by the CSRC, and passed at a shareholders‘ 
meeting by more than two thirds of the voting rights held by shareholders attending 
the meeting. For state-held listed companies, approval must be given by the SASAC 
in advance before voting at the shareholders‘ meeting.783 
 According to a survey in 2006, less than 10% of companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange have adopted stock options as part of their executive 
compensation systems, and most of those adopting options are privately held.
784
 Only 
11% of central SOEs have incorporated such incentives into their remuneration 
schemes.
785
 However, stock options are applied as significant instruments for 
―addressing the agency problem‖ but may be ―part of the agency problem itself.‖786 
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So far, there is no empirical evidence to prove how stock options and other incentive 
arrangements for government officials will reduce corruption in China. 
 
(C) Cultural reasons 
 ―Culture‖ is ―an accumulation of experience derived from the adaptive, often 
partial solutions, to frequently encountered problems of the past‖ and ―becomes 
deeply imprinted in the minds of people.‖787 In a broader sense, the term ―culture‖ is 
referred to by Thomas L. Friedman as ―a product of the context‖ combined with 
―geography, education level, leadership, and historical experience.‖ 788  Culture 
includes the ―shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles and values [that] worked in the 
past,‖789 and aims not to ―determine peoples‘ views per se,‖ but to ―orient people to 
process new information in a particular law.‖790 The culture of a society reflects a 
collective ideology commonly recognized by most people.
791
 
However, culture is not invariable, but may evolve with internal changes in the 
―values, beliefs, and views‖792 of new government leaders who steer the development 
policy of a country, and adaptation to external challenges.
793
 Culture may be 
perceived to induce greater path dependence than other factors,
794
 and consequently 
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culture is ―considered to be a very powerful impediment to change.‖795 The values 
originating from culture direct the choice of conduct of particular corporations and 
certain interpersonal institutions,
796
 and are a ―major determinant of corruption.‖797 
 
a. Legal culture 
―Every legal system is built upon some kind of philosophical foundations.‖798 
China is a state with a long history and a vast territory, with a large accumulation of 
ideologies, culture, and traditions. The Chinese cultural heritage has grown and 
evolved through a long history and it is not possible to change it overnight.
799
 For 
example, the May Fourth movement in 1919 was a radical attack, because it ―went 
beyond an empire or a particular dynasty.‖ The revolution targeted but failed to 
destroy the ―ideological underpinnings of the imperial regime, to a system of thought 
and social organization that had been accepted for centuries and had survived every 
change in dynasty.‖800  
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menu. Second, from a forward-looking viewpoint, cultural values are deeply 
embedded in people's minds and in social institutions. As a result, a corporate 
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importantly, legal areas) is more likely to work smoothly in a particular society. 
Additionally, such compatibility may increase the persistence of certain features and 
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 Lucien Bianco (translated from the French edition by Muriel Bell), Origins of the 




The traditional Chinese legal culture focuses on the ―debate of Confucians v. 
Legalists‖ in relation to strategies for managing the state through the more than 
2,000-year-old history of Chinese feudal society.  
Confucians advocated governing or ruling a nation by ―De‖ (morality) and ―Li‖ 
(ritual).
801
 The ethics of morality and conduct from rituals were thought to be closer 
to social ideals. More specifically, rulers should use the inherent obligations of moral 
ethics to govern society by choosing and appointing the social elite. The premise of 
the Confucian vision was the existence of ―perfect people‖ who have ideal 
self-consciousness and self-discipline in a society of righteousness and harmony.
802
 
The law merely had its ―subsidiary function‖ to support morality and rituals.803  
In contrast, the legalists denied that ―moral influence alone could determine the 
social order and emphasized the paramount application of explicit laws and sanctions 
to ensure social stability, in that most people can be persuaded to behave properly 
only when threatened with harsh punishment.‖804 The legalists held that rulers should 
promote long-standing social stability by the force of law, which had the most exact 
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procedures and most effective approaches to control society as a whole in the shortest 
time.  
Both Confucius and the Legalists supported the ―rule of man,‖ whereby the 
Emperor has supreme power above the law despite the existing distinction of the 
priority of morality or law in ruling the nation. Once one of these two philosophies 
was adopted by the emperor, it became ―state orthodoxy.‖805 In history, Legalism was 
exclusively advocated by the Emperors of the Qin Dynasty.
806
 After the Qin Dynasty, 
Chinese Emperors adopted Confucianism (supplemented by Legalism and other 
ideologies) into their kingcraft to govern the common people.
807 
     
Chinese law is one of the oldest legal traditions in the world. In ancient China, 
with its large territory based on agriculture, the Emperors were always trying to 
expand the territory to decrease the loss of land caused by natural calamity.
808
 Water 
control, as a prime task, required the nationwide deployment of human and financial 
resources.
809 
All of this required a unitary state power. In the Chinese imperial 
dynasties that spanned more than 2,000 years, the Emperors were expected to be 
―virtuous in an exemplary manner.‖810 The position of Emperor was not only above 
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all people, but also above the law. The Emperors exercised autocratic control and 







The culture of ―Guanxi‖ (relationship) is deeply ingrained in Chinese society. 
The Chinese term Guanxi refers to social networking and connections that can be 
drawn upon to ―secure favors in personal relations‖ and ―contains implicit mutual 
obligations, assurances, and understanding.‖813  
 
(a) Familism 
According to ethical values at the household level, traditional Chinese were 
inclined to solve problems through internal familial regulations or long-existing folk 
customs.
814
 Thus, ancient private business entities, which were similar to the 
corporation form originating in the West, habitually had familial hallmarks, and were 
sort of clan businesses organized and managed by family members.
815
 China‘s 
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inherent ―relationship‖ value is based on lineage and familism, where duty and 




(b) Development of Guanxi from familism to more complicated relations 
―The Specificity of Guanxi lies in the synthesis of the emotional and instrumental 
dimension of social relations.‖817 Personal relationships based on kinship can be 
developed at school, in the work place and through friendship. The Guanxi cumulated 
in social life is widely applied as a shortcut to solve problems in business.
818
     
―La Gaunxi‖ means maintaining the social network, or staying on good terms 
with someone.
819
 Guanxi may create more flexible chances and capacities within 
complex political and economic relations.
820
 When a Guanxi-oriented request is 
refused, the requesting party will lose ―Mianzi‖ (face),821 and the ―Ren Qing‖ (human 




(c) Guanxi and corruption 
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 Supra Note 685, K.W. Ching, Joo-Seng Tan & Chi Ching R.G, at 32. 
817
 Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten, ―Social Capital, Chinese Style: Individualism, 
Relational Collectivism and the Cultural Embeddedness of the 
Institutions-Performance Link‖ (2009) China Economic Journal, Vol. 2(3) 325, at 
338-40. 
818
 Supra Note 752, at 5-6. See also supra Note 749, at 4; Joel R. Samuels, ―Tain't 
What You Do‖: Effect of China's Proposed Anti-Monopoly Law on State Owned 
Enterprises‖ (2007) 26 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 169, at 194-5. 
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 Supra Note 752, at 12. 
820
 Supra Pitman B. Potter, ―Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and 
Selective Adaptation‖ (2004) 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465, at 473. 
821
 The ―Mian Zi‖ means ―prestige and honor‖ of a person. See George O. White III, 
―Navigating the Cultural Malaise: Foreign Direct Investment Dispute Resolution in 
the People's Republic of China‖ (2003) 5 Transactions: Tenn. J. Bus. L. 55, at 58. 
822
 Ibid. at 59. 
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Guanxi is ―one of the major dynamics of Chinese society‖ and ―a key business 
determinant of a firm‘s performance,‖823 and thus trust between parties is integral to 
business development.
824
 Guanxi is cultivated and maintained by the exchange of 
gifts and entertainment to establish networks of mutual indebtedness.
825
 Such 




Gift-giving is an ordinary means of developing Guanxi, whereas bribery is 
viewed as illegal by law. The distinction consists in the underlying motive and 
objective of the persons giving and accepting the gift.
827
 Nevertheless, interpersonal 
networking based on Guanxi has provided ―a fertile soil‖ 828  for corruption in 
China.
829
 Nowadays, numerous business firms in China develop Guanxi with 
government authorities, who have a powerful influence on market activities.
830
 The 
manipulation of Guanxi often results in ―disparate treatment,‖ and a culture of 
non-compliance with the law is built up.
831
 In a culture of corruption, individuals and 
                                                        
823
 Supra Note 752, at the section of ―Preface‖. Mr. Gao Xiqing, President of China 
Investment Corporation, addresses at a conference in 2008 held by the OECD reported 
in the Straits Times, June 28, 2008 by stating that ―Our government has never been 
transparent for 5000 years. Now we are told we need to be transparent and we are 
trying…We are regular people. We do not have horns growing out of our head.‖  
824
 Supra Note 818, Joel R. Samuels, at 194-5. 
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 Supra Note 755, at 253. 
826
 Supra Note 175, at 241. 
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 Supra Note 752, at 29 and 216. 
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Art.19. 
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 Supra Note 752, at 228. 
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 Willian P. Alford et al. (edited), Raising the Bar: The Emerging Legal Profession 
in East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Studies, Havard Law School, 2005). 
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entities ―feel justified in getting their piece of action by illicit means.‖832 Corrupt 
Guanxi and Guanxi-based corruption foment ―opportunism and dishonorability‖ in 
China‘s economic and social development.833  
 
6.3 Could State-held listed companies be well governed in other jurisdictions? 
Under the state-controlled model, the Chinese government exercises its control 
over the corporate governance of state-held listed companies with ―substantial 
discretion.‖834 By comparison, state-held listed companies could be just as well 
managed at arm‘s length, as in Singapore.  
When Singapore gained its independence from Malaysia in 1965, it became a 
small city state with limited resources and a scant labor force. Singapore has been 
―shaped [by] its deep sense of vulnerability and the recognition of its dependency on 
global economy.‖835 
The core values of Singaporean culture are ―honesty and integrity.‖836 The 
Singapore government has always pursued two imperative strategies: economic 
growth and national stability.
837
 Singapore is always thinking of ways to survive and 
thrive, but these are founded on a dependence on its disciplined people as the main 
resource,
838
 learning new knowledge and perceptions from others,
839
 and taking 
advantage of its geographical location for external trading.  
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 Stuart Marc Weiser, ―Dealing with Corruption: Effectiveness of Existing Regimes 
on Doing Business‖ (1997) 91 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 99, at 131; see also supra Note 
818, Joel R. Samuels, at 194-5. 
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    Singapore has achieved a ―creative synthesis of Western law and Eastern 
tradition.‖840 Singapore is a common law jurisdiction where the conceptions of 
Confucius are pursued and incorporated as a principal aspect of thought. Singapore 
adopts a down-to-earth policy in developing its economy, and has ameliorated its 
legal environment through effective enforcement and transparent governance. 
Singapore today is one of the world‘s freest economies, ranking second in the 
2008 index of economic freedom.
841
 One of the least corrupt nations in the world 
according to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2006,
842
 corporate governance in 
Singapore‘s listed companies has always been top in Asia.843 
    The widespread government linked companies (GLC) of Singapore are 
well-known for their commercial focus. The Temasek companies are also GLCs, and 
no less than 20 percent of their stake is held by Temasek Holdings Limited 
(―Temasek‖).844 Temasek, a distinguished investment company since its incorporation 
in 1974, holds and manages investments that were previously held by the Ministry of 
Finance of Singapore. In addition to its normal fiduciary duties, the board of directors 
is accountable to the President of Singapore to ensure that all transactions are made at 
a fair market value.
845
  
                                                        
840
 Li-ann Thio ―Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in 
Singapore‖ (2002) 20 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 1, at 8. The author argues that ―[w]hile 
the Rule of Law is not formally enshrined in the Singapore constitution‘s text, it has 
through practice entered Singapore‘s constitutional and political lexicon‖, at 1. 
841
 The Index covering 10 specific economic freedoms of 162 countries is issued by 
the Heritage Foundation. It is available at the website of Heritage Foundation: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/countries.cfm 
842
 The Corruption Perceptions Index is made by the Transparency International. 
843
 According to the CLSA 2007, Hong Kong ranks the first, and Singapore ranks the 
second. Before 2007, Singapore occupied the first place throughout the years. 
844
 For example, Temasek holds 21.72% of interest in Keppel Corporation. See 
Annual Report 2008 of Keppel Corporation, at 230. See also ―Temasek Companies vs 
GLCs: There‘s a Difference‖, Business Times, 25 June, 1999. 
845
 See ―Temasek Review 2009‖, available at: http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg 
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    Temasek is a non-listed state-held company wholly owned by the Ministry of 
Finance. This section gives an analysis of the legal framework, objectives, and 
administration of Temasek in connection with the state assets that it holds compared 
with the holding companies of state-held listed companies in China, although these 
hold much greater amounts of state assets (over RMB 10 trillion) and the SOEs (over 
100,000)
846




6.3.1 Legal framework 
    Temasek is governed by the Singapore Companies Act and all other applicable 
laws and regulations in Singapore.
848
 In China, the legal framework is more 
complicated due to the various types of holding companies of state-held listed 
companies: (1) solely state-funded companies, which are a specific kind of limited 
liability company under the PRC Company Law, are 100% owned by the state, and 
are authorized by the State Council or the local people‘s government for supervising 
state-owned assets; and (2) state-held companies, of which (i) the state or a solely 
state-funded company is the controlling shareholder or (ii) a solely state-funded 
company is the ultimate parent company, are incorporated either as limited companies 
or as joint stock limited companies. 
 
6.3.2 Objectives 
                                                        
846
 The figure comes from the address of Mr. Li Rongrong, Chairman of the SASAC, 
reported by the Securities Daily, 30 June 2009.  
847
 The portfolio of Temasek Holdings Limited (―Temasek‖) reaches 172 billion 
Singapore dollars as at 31 July 2009, available on the website of Temasek: 
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Temasek is a commercial-mission-driven corporation that aims to ―create and 
maximize long-term shareholder value as an active investor and shareholder of 
successful enterprise.‖849 In China, holding companies of state-held listed companies 
are concerned with social stability, attracting investment, and maintaining a low 
unemployment rate, in addition to commercial objectives. In view of the specific 
national conditions and demand for sustainable development in China, the ultimate 
target is to balance the strength of various factors, including rural and urban 
development, economic growth and social justice, internal stability and external 
relationships, and individual interests and collective achievement.
850
 
It is often the ―multiple and contradictory objectives‖ of state ownership that 
results in ―either a very passive conduct of ownership functions‖ or conversely leads 
to ―the state‘s excessive intervention in matters or decisions which should be left to 
the company and its governance organs.‖851 The failure to clarify the position of 
Chinese holding companies of state-held listed companies causes further difficulties 





Nowadays, the Singapore government‘s role in the GLCs is declining, and the 
GLCs themselves have to hold their own more.
853
 As Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, Prime 
                                                        
849
 The introduction is available on the website of Temasek: 
http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg 
850
 Asian Development Bank concludes that ―the PRC Government has adjusted its 
development strategy to focus on achieving ‗five balances‘ between rural and urban 
development, interior and coastal development, economic and social development, 
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ADB report of March 2008, available at the website of ADB: 
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 Supra Note 210, at 23. 
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 Supra Note 714, Zhang Duozhong, at 113. 
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 ―State Support for GLCs on the Decline‖, The Straits Times, 8 November 2001. 
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Minister of Singapore, states, ―as the economy grows and the private sector expands, 
the shape of government in business will change. The key is not whether the 
companies are government owned, but whether they are well-run, entrepreneurial, and 
profitable.‖854 
The Singapore government and the President are not allowed to be involved in 
business and commercial operations, so Temasek as an state-owned company 
maintain an independent commercial position. Meanwhile, Temasek does not direct 
the ―commercial or operational decisions of its portfolio companies.‖855 Thus, the 
Singapore government has maintained an arm‘s-length relationship with the private 
sector through its government-held corporations, and has no direct control over the 
corporations, although it is ultimately accountable for them.
856
 A reduction in the 
state‘s substantial involvement could ―reorient the incentives of enterprises towards 
the market.‖857  
In the holding companies of state-held listed companies in China, the governance 
structure is more complex. It includes CPC committees and trade union committees in 
addition to the board of directors and board of supervisors.
858
 Moreover, these 
institutions are frequently subject to the involvement of government authorities in 
business operations and human resources by administrative order.
859
 They are 
directed to achieve short-term goals such as pricing control and meeting export, 
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employment, or financial targets.
860
 These holding companies pass the bureaucratic 
―spirit‖ to their state-held listed subsidiaries.  
In China, the SASAC under the State Council and related authorized authorities, 
on behalf of the state, exercise ownership of state-owned assets by performing the 
investor duties. Based on the principle of the ―separation of bureaucracy and 
business,‖ it is critical to clarify the role of the investor in the administration of state 
assets as either a regulator or a shareholder. This undertaking requires further 
theoretical research and empirical work, but the first step is to clearly divide the 
internal departments within government authorities between investment and 






    As stated in the Temasek Review 2009, ―a robust and pragmatic governance 
framework provides a balance between accountability and responsiveness, between 
empowerment and organizational alignment, and between risks and returns.‖ 862      
The essence of the governance issue is not state-controlled ownership itself, but how 
the corporate governance of state-held listed companies in China to be regulated by an 
enforceable legal framework, targeted by defined objectives, and managed with full 
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 Jean-Claude Maswana, ―China's Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
Exploring the Contradictions‖ (2008) 19 International Research Journal of Finance 
Economics 89, at 95. The author recognizes that “although such controls over the 
price and financial sector may appear a less desirable policy stance, related policies 
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financial stability and external shock immunity‖. 
861
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 However, such improvements must take place 




6.4 How corporate governance in state-held listed companies might work 
As has been stated, state-held listed companies in China are not well governed 
under the state-controlled model, because the practical issues of the weak protection 
of minority shareholders (Chapter IV) and the failure of the two-tier board structure to 
perform efficiently (Chapter V) cannot be addressed by the model due to 
non-enforcement of the law and corruption. It is proposed here that corporate 
governance in state-controlled listed companies could be made more effective under a 
―law-controlled model.‖ This model would improve the corporate governance of 
state-held listed companies by implementing the rule of law in terms of state-held 
listed companies in China. Failing that, corporate governance could be improved by (i) 
reforming the law to settle the practical issues; and (ii) enforcing the law to fight 
against corruption.  
 
6.4.1 Rule of law 
A. Theoretical conceptions of the rule of law 
Law is one of the most important instruments of social control.
865
 The concept 
of the ―rule of law‖ was put forward by the Greek ideologist Plato and subsequently 
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864
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Aristotle, who referred to the ―obedience to positive law and formal checks and 
balances on rulers and magistrates.‖866 The conceptions of the rule of law in modern 
times have been widened through clear and stable legislation, effective enforcement, a 
transparent and independent judiciary, and reasonable acceptance by the general 
public. In a jurisdiction with a rule of law, ―law is able to impose meaningful 
restraints in the state and individual members‖ under the supremacy of the law and 
equality of all before the law.
867
 The law is meant to ensure administrative 
transparency and judicial independence so that the ―predictability‖ and ―certainty‖ of 




    The rule of law respects fundamental human rights and serves the goal of 
stability
869
 to promote ―fairness and equity‖ and protect ―the poor and the weak.‖870 
However, the realization of the individual‘s rights is based on secured property 
ownership and freedom of contract in the legal sense. La Porta et al. (1998)
871
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 See Coffee, John Jr., ―Do Norms matter? A Cross-Country Examination of the 
Private Benefits of the Control‖, Columbia Law School Working Paper, January 2001. 
Coffee recognizes the social norms, as another social control instrument (independent 
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law. Conversely, when legal rights and remedies adequately protect investors, there is 
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already legally mandated or to develop creative means by which to bond those 
promises through self-help corporate governance measures‖. 
866
 See Aristotle, Politics (University of Chicago Press, 1985); See also Sharma, 
Sharda Sanjay, ―Justice without Power is Inefficient, Power without Justice is 
Tyranny‖ (January 19, 2009), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329885. 
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 Supra Note 726, Randall Peerenboom, at 471-2; See also Randall Peerenboom, 
―Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?‖ (2005) 36 Geo. J. Int‘l L. 809, at 
814-6.  
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emphasize the legal system as an external factor in evaluating corporate governance 
practices. They review the legal rules
872





 and the quality of their enforcement.
875
 The results 
show that ―common law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law 
countries the weakest, legal protection of investors, with German- and 
Scandinavian-civil law countries located in the middle.‖ 876  Nevertheless, one 
consideration should be stressed. The standards and level of the rule of law cannot be 
universal, and can only be roughly compared between jurisdictions.
877
 Adam 
Ferguson‘s classic affirmation of the establishment of nations is that it is ―the result of 
human action but not the result of human design.‖878 This point of view has been 
                                                        
872
 See ibid, at 1120. The authors only refer to the laws, pertaining to investor 
protection of company and bankruptcy/reorganization laws, with no rules on merger 
and takeover, disclosure, securities exchange, banking and financial institution.  
873
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874
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875
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Int‘l L. 823, at 842. 
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commended by Hayek as the ―basis of our understanding not only of economic life 
but of most truly social phenomena.‖879  
 
B. Is the rule of law put into effect in contemporary China? 
(A) Rule by law? 
The essential difference between ―rule of law‖ and ―rule of man‖ is that the 
force of law prevails over that of dictators in the event of any discrepancy or conflict 
between them in the context of the rule of law. The ―rule of man‖ was a long-standing 
social system in feudal China, and Emperors were supreme above the law.
880
  
Pitman Potter captures the approach of the rule by law as ―instrumentalism‖ as 
follows. 
―Laws and regulations are intended to be instruments of policy 
enforcement.  Legislative and regulatory enactments are not intended as 
expressions of immutable general norms that apply consistently in a 
variety of human endeavors, and neither are they constrained by such 
norms.  Rather, laws and regulations are enacted explicitly to achieve the 
immediate policy objectives of the regime.‖881  
 
    Contemporary China has been a country of ―rule by law‖ since the late 1970s.882 
Since China adopted the Reform and Opening up policy in the late 1970s, the law is 
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 Hayek, Friedrich A. Von, Individualism and Economic Order (London: Routledge 
& K. Paul, 1949), at 7-8. 
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 Supra Note 866. Qing (1644-1911A.D.) was the last imperial dynasty in Chinese 
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B.C.) to Qing Dynasty as the imperial or feudal period of China. 
881
 Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 2001), at 10. It is also quoted by supra Note 804, at 
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pronouncements of Mao ―were believed to be the only source of law‖ when ―laws 
were abolished and all law schools were closed‖ during the Revolution. See Stephen 
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utilized by Chinese governments as an instrument of administration.883 The legal 
system, as Potter points out, is not ―a limit on state power; rather, it is a mechanism by 
which state power is exercised,‖ because ―the legal forms and institutions that 
comprise the Chinese legal system are established and operate to protect the 
Party/state‘s political power.‖884 By relying on the law as an instrument for public 
governance, the ―rule by law‖ has been utilized by political authorities to ―serve the 
interests of the nation‖ rather than ―protect the rights of individuals.‖885  
 
(B) A ―thin rule of law‖? 
Professor Peerenboom divides the theories of the rule of law into two types: thin 
and thick.
886
 A thin rule of law underlines the ―formal or instrumental aspects of rule 
of law—those features that any legal system allegedly must possess to function 
effectively as a system of laws.‖887 In contrast, the thick rule of law starts with the 
basic elements of the thin conception but then incorporates elements of political and 
economic arrangements, forms of governments, or conceptions of human rights.
888
 It 
is not uncommon to connect economic development with democracy nowadays, but 
there is no causational relationship between them two. As Peerenboom points out, 
                                                                                                                                                              
L. McPherson, ―Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: The Path to Judicial 
Independence in China” (2008) 26 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 787, at 792; see also He 
Weifang, ―China‘s Legal Profession: The Nascence and Growing Pains of a 
Professionalized Legal Class‖ (2005) 19 Colum. J. of Asian L. 13; Xin Chunying, 
―What Kind of Judicial Power Does China Need?‖ (2003) 1 Int‘l J. of Const. L. 58. 
883
 See discussion on the difference between ―rule of law‖ and ―rule by law‖, 




 Supra Note 726, Randall Peerenboom, at 26. 
886 







―although wealth matters, this does not mean there is a particular point at which 
countries necessarily become democratic.‖889 
The constitutive elements of the ―thin‖ rule of law are summarized by 
Peerenboom as procedural rules, transparency, general and fair applicability, clarity, 
predictability, consistency, stability, enforcement, and reasonable acceptance by the 
majority of people affected.
890
 The legal system in China is characterized by 
Peerenboom as ―a system that complies with the basic elements of a thin rule of 
law.‖891 
As Wang and Zhang (1997) state, ―China is trying to advocate the rules of 
predictability, calculability and accountability of market operation, principles of 
freedom and autonomy, considerations of equal value and efficiency, and ideas of 
democracy and human rights, etc, and further incorporate all of this into current legal 
system.‖892 With increasing consciousness of the law in China, ordinary people have 
become accustomed to depend on the law to resolve disputes.
893
 In the past few 
decades, a legal system has been established in China with ―remarkable progress,‖894 
but a thin rule of law has not yet truly been put into effect. 
China‘s legal system still falls short in some elements compared with the 
minimum standard to achieve the thin rule of law, so China is in transition from rule 
by law to a thin rule of law.
895
 Laws in China have not been well enforced, 
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 Supra Note 160, at 26-28. The author cites the example of Asian countries, such 
as the Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia, etc. 
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 Wang Chenghuan & Zhang Xianchu, Introduction to Chinese Law (Hong Kong: 
Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 1997), at 27. 
893
 See Benjamin L. Liebman, ―Assessing China's Legal Reforms‖ (2009) 23 Colum. 
J. Asian L. 17, at 20. 
894
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particularly in their application to government officials or business entrepreneurs due 
to political influence.
896
 The political challenge in the attainment of a thin rule of law 
in China is discussed in the next section, but put briefly the law cannot be effectively 
enforced without taking into account native resources and circumstances, and it takes 
time for a nation to improve and perfect by steps its legal institutions in the context of 
its specific social circumstances.
897
 
     
C. Is it possible to give effect to the rule of law in terms of state-held listed companies 
in China? 
(A) Policy 
The principle of ―governing the country according to law and building a socialist 
country under rule of law‖ (―Yifa Zhiguo, Jianshe Shehui Zhuyi Fazhi Guojia‖) was 
declared to be a long-term state policy for the first time by the then President Jiang 
Zemin in his keynote address delivered at the 15
th
 National Congress of Communist 
Party of China in 1997.
898
 The rule of law is asserted in the White Paper on Rule of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Development‖ 2004 Sing. J. Legal Stud. 347. See also Statement of William P. Alford 
to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Hearing on Human Rights in 
the Context of the Rule of Law (7 February 2002), available online: 
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/hearings/020702/alford.php. Professor Alford recognizes 
that―[O]ver the past quarter century, the PRC has been engaged in the most concerted 
program of legal construction in world history. At the end of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976), the PRC's modest legal infrastructure lay in near ruin--with but a 
skeletal body of legislation, a thinly staffed judicial system, and a populace having 
scant awareness of law. Today, the PRC has an extensive body of national and 
sub-national legislation and other legal enactment, concentrated on, but not limited to, 
economic matters, and has joined major international agreements covering trade, the 






 Chen Jianfu, Chinese Law: Towards an Understanding of Chinese Law, its Nature 
and Development (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), at 361. 
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Law in China published by the State Council in 2008,
899
 and is further provided for in 
the Amendment 1999 to the PRC Constitution.
900
 
    More recently, in a report delivered at the 17
th
 National Congress of CPC in 
2007 President Hu Jintao cited the rule of law as a ―fundamental principle‖ that 
constitutes the ―essential requirement of socialist democracy.‖ China has practically 
completed its social transformation from a traditional closed realm to a relatively 
open market over the past few decades, and the rule of law has been officially 
recognized by the Chinese government as a significant approach to promote political 
stability, economic sustainability, and social evolution.  
With respect to the rule of law in China, the economic reforms have helped to 
create positive surroundings for legal reform and demand an effective legal system.901 
State-held listed companies have a unique strategic or monopolistic position in 
China‘s economy. The corporate governance reform of state-held listed companies in 
China is at the intersection of Chinese economic growth and legal modernization. 
Corporate governance itself has surpassed its pure legal meaning. It is thus necessary 
to escalate the internal governance practices of state-held listed companies to a 
broader external institutional context of social circumstances. 
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 This is the first white paper on the rule of law released on 28 February 2008 by the 
State Council Information Office of China. The official Chinese text is at: 
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/fzjs/node_7041734.htm. The English version entitled 
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The policy of promoting the rule of law may more accurately represent the 
aspirations of Chinese leaders in the transition toward a market-oriented economy, 
coupled with the underlying political challenges.
902
 The law itself may ―fail to limit 
the state power.‖903 The gap ―between the law on paper and the law in reality‖ is not 
closed.
904
 The achievement of the rule of law in China is challenged by its tardiness 
in reaching political maturity compared with its speediness to secure economic 
growth.  
In China, there are no clear lucid lines between ―nation‖ (―Guojia‖), 
―government‖ (―Zhengfu‖), and ―the Communist Party of China‖ (―Zhongguo Gong 




The propaganda of the CPC has always declared that ―every CPC member is a 
unselfish public servant of the people,‖907 but the Party itself poses a substantial 
challenge to the promotion of the rule of law in China.
908
 The CPC has been the 
leading political party since the foundation of People‘s Republic of China in 1949. 
The other eight political parties are named ―democratic parties‖ (―Minzhu Dangpai‖), 
and participate in and discuss state affairs (―Canzheng Yizheng‖). The political system 
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(2005) 20 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 43, at 64. 
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258 
 
is expressly defined in the Preamble to the PRC Constitution as ―the system of 
multi-party co-operation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of 
China (―Duodang Hezuo, Zhengzhi Xieshang Zhidu‖), which is virtually a one-party 
dictatorship system because the democratic parties are merely entitled to discuss and 
consult on state affairs and have no power of determination.
909
   
The ―peculiar entrenchment‖ of the CPC in the political system renders the law‘s 
application to ―all segments of the society‖ impossible910: the law has become a 
―tool‖ for CPC members to manipulate.911 For instance, the judiciary is not detached 
from the CPC and government authority to act independently in accordance with the 
law based on legal principles and public policies, and judges are often pressured to 
make decisions that favor the interests of the government.
912
  
The essential challenge to the rule of law in China lies in the CPC‘s one-party 
dictatorship. Is it possible for the CPC to change its mindset and effect a true rule of 
law? It will be difficult for the CPC to change because it is reluctant to lose its current 
arbitrary power and political control.
913
  
The adherence to the leadership of the CPC as China‘s ruling party is one of the 
fundamental principles of the PRC Constitution
914
 because ―both the victory in 
China‘s New Democratic Revolution and the successes in its socialist undertaking 
have been achieved by the Chinese people of all nationalities, under the leadership of 
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 Bradley L. Milkwick, ―Feeling for Rocks while Crossing the River: The Gradual 
Evolution of Chinese Law‖ (2005) 14 J. Transnat‘l L. & Pol‘y 289, at 306. 
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 Supra Note 227. It is regulated in the Preamble of Constitution of PRC. The other 
fundamental principles include: ―adherence to the people‘s democratic dictatorship, to 
the socialist road, and to the reform and opening to the outside world‖. 
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the Communist Party of China.‖ 915  More importantly, the PRC Constitution 
expressly provides that ―the system of the multi-party cooperation and political 
consultation led by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop for a long 
time.‖916 The ambiguous terminology here makes the timeline for the existence of the 
one-party system difficult to change quickly.  
The CPC‘s reluctance is reflected in the speech of President Hu Jintao, who is 
also general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, on the relationship between the 
concepts of the ―Socialist Rule of Law‖ and the CPC. He states that ―the CPC‘s 
leadership is the fundamental guarantee of the rule of law, which is the basic strategy 
for the people running the country under the leadership of CPC. So we shall 
consciously uphold the CPC‘s leadership, consolidating the party‘s ruling status and 
maintenance of unity of the socialist rule of law.‖917 
It is thus impossible, or at least difficult, to give immediate effect to the rule of 
law in China because the CPC has no political initiative to adjust its supreme role in 
China‘s political structure, and has no apparent willingness to give up its overall 
control. 
 
6.4.2 Reforming the law 
A. Overview 
Although the rule of law is difficult to effect in China, a ―law-controlled model‖ 
could improve corporate governance in state-held listed companies by reforming the 
law. 




 Ibid.  
917
 The speech is delivered by President Hu Jintao on the twentieth anniversary of the 





Such legal reform should have two-dimensions: succession from existing 
sources and transplants from overseas jurisdictions. The modern Chinese legal system 
has a great diversity of sources, including traditional Chinese laws more than 2,000 
years old
918
 and foreign laws transplanted from civil law and common law 
jurisdictions. The contemporary legal system in China has elements originating in 
overseas jurisdictions, reflecting a symbiosis of Eastern and Western civilizations, 
which is a pragmatic approach for developing and newly independent countries.
919
 
North considers path dependence as the ―constraints on the choice set in the 
present that are derived from historical experiences of the past,‖920 and affirms that 
the dominant beliefs of powerful political and economic entrepreneurs result in the 
accretion of elaborate institutional structures that could ―impose severe constraints on 
the choice set of entrepreneurs when they seek to innovate or modify institutions in 
order to improve their economic or political position.‖921  
    The path is full of all kinds of institutions that are formal or informal ―rules of 
the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interactions.‖922 The institutions that have been created or are evolving 
aim to reduce uncertainty and seek stability in social development and human 
behaviors.
923
 North points out that institutions related to political stability, property 
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 In history, the Chinese emperors, full of hubris, regularly treated those Western 
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security, and the rule of law are most important and will raise both ―physical capital‖ 
and ―human capital.‖924 
    Path dependence may have counteractive effects on radical law reform, but the 
adaptive selection power of a nation must not be ignored. North calls this kind of 
power ―adaptive efficiency,‖ and posits that it is able to restrict the influence of 
institutional differences between jurisdictions.
925
 Moreover, private parties may also 
choose to resort to contracting to avoid the influence of path dependence where it is 
not regulated by mandatory legal rules.
926
 
    It is recognized that globalization is ―both a cause of convergence and a measure 
of the degree to which convergence has occurred.‖927 Globalization is already an 
irreversible trend, and derives from practical experience. For developing countries, 
convergence by means of legal transplanting may help them rapidly reconstruct legal 
arrangements ―by the increased availability and more efficient allocation of resources, 
freer circulation of knowledge, and more open and competitive milieus.‖928 China is 
increasingly linked with and affected by the impact of globalization through it 
extensive contact with other countries, which has deepened the understanding of 
international practices.
929
 The motivations for legal transplanting can be classified 
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 See Kanda, Hideki and Milhaupt, Curtis J., ―Re-examining Legal Transplants: The 
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Law and Economics Working Paper No. 219. Available at SSRN: 
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into three types: (1) passive acceptance, usually following colonization, military 
occupation, or political need; (2) voluntary transplanting for the purpose of ―practical 
utility‖ in the domestic legal system;930 and (3) accidental transplanting, where, in the 
view of Montesquieu the adaptation of specific laws from one jurisdiction to another 
is ―accidental.‖931 
 
B. How law reform originally and officially took place in China  
It was stated by Deng Xiaoping that ―a good system can lead more people to be 
good, and a bad system will make the good people turn bad.‖932 The process of law 
reform in China over the past century has undergone four phases: (a) during the late 
Qing Dynasty
933
 from 1902 to 1911; (b) during the Republic of China after the ―Xin 
Hai Revolution‖ 934  based on the Kuomintang‘s ―Six Codes‖ 935 ; (c) from the 
establishment of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 until the end of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
of legal transplant‖ that the imported legal rule is used in the same way with intended 
consequences as it is used in the home country. They further recognize that both 
―micro-fit‖ (the complementation of imported rules with the preexisting legal 
infrastructure) and ―macro-fit‖ (the complementation of imported rules with the 
preexisting political and economic institutions). And they use the experience of Japan 
to explain that the double-fit standard is likely to take time to measure up even if the 
transplant was at the first start ill-fitted: the fiduciary duty was transplanted by Japan 
from the United States in 1950 and had never been specifically applied by the 
Japanese courts until the late 1980s when other specific provisions of corporate law 
are not able to cover the newly emerging activity and judiciary finds its ways to 
confer the claimant with judicial relief for the breach of fiduciary duty. 
930
 Ibid. at 7. 
931
 See generally Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, The Spirit of the Laws 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). But Montesquieu never denies the 
possibility of transplantation, but recognizes the difficulty of achieving its original 
purpose. 
932
 See Deng Xiaoping, Collection of speeches and Writings by Deng Xiaoping 
(―Deng Xiaoping Wen Xuan‖), Volume 2 (People Press, 1994) (in Chinese). 
933
 Qing (1644-1911A.D.) was the last dynasty in Chinese feudal history. 
934 The ―Xin Hai Revolution‖, lead by Suen Yi-San, overturned the reign of the Qing 
Dynasty and ended the feudal system in China, which had lasted for more than two 
thousand years (B.C. 221-1911 A.D.). 
935
 The ―Six Codes‖ were composed of the Constitution, civil, criminal, civil 
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―Cultural Revolution‖936 in 1976; and (d) from China‘s adoption of the state policy 
known as ―Reform and Opening Up to the Outside World‖937 from 1978 to the 
present.  
From the mid-1800s, Chinese people under the imperial Qing Dynasty 
experienced war, invasion, and colonization. The Opium Wars (1839-1842)
938
 broke 
the gates of China to the outside world. As a result of invasion and colonization by 
Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States, Portugal, Japan, and other 
imperialistic countries, China fell into a semi-feudal and semi-colonial state. As a 
―colony of many countries,‖ the Qing imperial government was forced to sign a 
number of unequal treaties, according to which China had to cede land, open more 
trading ports, and make heavy payments to the foreign powers.
939
  
In the political sense, the sovereignty of the Qing Dynasty was lost. The invading 
countries deprived the Qing government of state sovereignty and shared 
administrative power among themselves. Being conscious of the difficulties in 
governing such a huge country, the colonial countries made use of the Qing 
governments as a tool to control China. This policy was ―Controlling Chinese by 
Chinese‖ (―Yi Hua Zhi Hua‖). It was in this way that China became a semi-colonial 
and semi-feudal country. 
                                                        
936 The ―Cultural Revolution‖ from the 1966 to 1976 had made retrogress and left 
unimaginable legislative and judicial lacunas.  
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The state policy of Reform and Opening Up was adopted at the 3rd Plenum of the 
11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978. 
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From an economic perspective, the traditional agricultural society based on 
hierarchy and identity was challenged by industrial technology, which was based on 
equality and contracts. The self-sufficient economic system in China was primarily 
based on agriculture and a household handicraft industry of limited productivity. The 
highest population growth rate in China‘s demographic history also occurred during 
this period. The large population of over 400 million caused tensions over resource 
distribution and competition, which led to social instability and turbulence.
940
 The 
colonialists controlled and monopolized the Chinese market by using their privileges 
to make unequal treaties. They dumped goods and output capital into China by setting 
up factories and banks, rebuilding railways, and exploiting mines, all of which had 
bolstered the economic system of China before the Qing Dynasty collapsed. 
Against the backdrop of long-standing and time-honoured stability, colonized 
Qing dynasty recognized that its development lagged behind that of the rest of the 
world. It had tried to catch up through a succession of reforms proposed in the 
1860s
941
 by introducing military technology from Western countries. However, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, and especially after its defeat by Japan in the First 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895),
942
 the Dynasty was aware that the choice between 
existential survival and destruction could only be solved through reform and 
reconstruction of the social system and its institutions.  
Law reform at that time served two purposes: ―to pave the way for the transition 
from traditional law to modern Western law; and to respond to Western criticisms on 
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the cruelty of certain penalty provisions in traditional Chinese law.‖943 What is more, 
judicial independence was deprived and replaced by ―consular jurisdiction.‖944 The 
colonialist countries promised to return judicial sovereignty to China only if China 
would undergo legal reform by transplanting foreign laws. It was under such 
circumstances that the Qing dynasty launched a legal reform in 1902, the purpose of 
which was to retrieve the lost juridical sovereignty. Presided over by Shen Jiaben 
(1840-1913), the imperial legal commissioner, this legal reform was carried out for a 
decade until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in the ―Xin Hai Revolution‖ in 1911, which 
brought to an end the Chinese feudal system of more than two millennia.  
In terms of legislation, rather than a uniform code containing all legal provisions, 
the new legal system separated public from private statutes and substantive from 
procedural laws. More than ten statutes were drafted and promulgated in the areas of 
politics, economy, trade, culture, education, justice, and diplomacy. These statutes 
were to replace the former “Da Qing Lü Li” Code (Code of Qing Dynasty), which 
applied across the nation before the reform.
945
 The judicial system was then 
transformed through the separation of adjudication from government authority. Legal 
                                                        
943
 Supra Note 896, Wang Jiangyu. 
944
 It is called in the other way ―exterritorial jurisdiction‖. The colonist enjoyed the 
privileges and immunities that if a national of any colonist became a defendant in a 
lawsuit, civil or criminal, he was not to be tried by a Chinese court but by the consul 
of his own country. 
945
 The draft of Civil Code was made in 1907 by Japanese jurists, on the basis of 
patterns copied from the civil laws of two European countries: France and Germany. 
The format of the Civil Code followed the German model, with the same titles and 
sequence of five parts: general rules; law of obligation; law of property; family law; 
and succession. The principles of the Civil Code derive from the main lines of the 
French Civil Code (1804), which was the benchmark civil code of civil law system 
including the classic concepts are ―equality‖, ―protection of private property‖, 
―freedom of contract‖, and ―fault liability‖. The Commercial Code was also drafted 
by jurists from Japan in 1908, and was based on the commercial laws in Germany, 
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proceedings were complemented by new rules, such as proxy and bailment. A number 
of new legal concepts and principles were also introduced, such as ―rights and 
obligations,‖ ―equality,‖ ―human rights,‖ and ―separation of powers‖ by means of 
translating Western laws and legal literature, the drafting of laws by Japanese scholars, 
setting up legal education in schools,
946
 and sending students abroad to study foreign 
law.
.947 
The law reform launched by the Qing government did not enable it to regain 
legal sovereignty, retrieve its territory, and rebuild the prosperity of the dynasty. 
However from a historical perspective, it was undoubtedly the starting point of 
official law reform in China, and gained the country greater exposure to the outside 
world (probably accompanied by humiliation and disgrace), and constitutes the 
preliminary framework for the contemporary Chinese legal system. 
This legal reform changed China‘s original self-sufficient legal system and 
launched China into a more advanced global system. This was a two-way process 
between China and the outside world, accompanied by humiliation and disgrace in 




C. Progression of law reform in China in the past thirty years 
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    The new Chinese government under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping began to 
carry out reform and opening-up policy in 1978949 under the state policy known as 
―Reform and Opening Up to the Outside World.‖950 Law reform since the late 1970s 
has contributed to the establishment in China of a modern legal system suitable for a 
market-oriented economy.951 
    After experiencing the ―Xin Hai Revolution‖ (1911), ―War of Liberation‖ 
(1945-1949), and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), most of the traditional shackles 
fell away. After jettisoning the blind worship of the Soviet Union, the socialist 
government of China began to seek legal modernization. The traditional legal culture 
was re-examined and researched, in a process of ―developing the useful and 
discarding the useless,‖ from diverse legal sources. The contemporary Chinese legal 
system came into being in a process filled with conflict and compromises between 
transplanted and local institutions.  
In contrast to the legal reform during the late Qing dynasty, which was a passive 
undertaking with the intention of utilizing legal transplants to save the country from 
being totally colonized by invaders, law reform in China since the late 1970s has been 
a spontaneous process.  
Law reform played a leading part in the process of modernization in China in the 
20th century, and will continue to promote this process. Law is not only a set of rules, 
but also a combination of thoughts, attitudes, customs, and modes of conduct. 
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Adaptability and applicability must be considered. Law reform has been a universal 
practice throughout history, reflecting the demands deriving from a nation‘s unique 
circumstances and its visions of the outside world.  
 
D. Problems of law reform in China 
(A) Are laws lacking in China?  
The answer to the question of whether laws are lacking in China is probably 
negative. Since the late 1970s, China has carried out legal reform to establish a 
relatively complete system of law and advance legal modernization.
952
  
    ―Legislation‖ is defined by Hart as ―an exercise of legal powers operative or 
effective in creating legal rights and duties.‖953 However, statutory law can never be 
complete. Legislation is not the only resource to be relied on in a ―rule of law‖ society, 
because other factors such as morality and credit are also at work.
954
 There are a few 
elements of company law that are common across jurisdictions. Hansmann and 
Kraakman (2001) identify the five essential characteristics to be legal personality, 
limited liability, transferable shares, investor ownership, and delegated management 
under the board structure.
955
 The legal rules of corporation law are usually divided 
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into two kinds: mandatory and enabling provisions.
956
 Corporation laws should be ―a 
continuous evolution of law to a changing environment‖957  and should have a 
capacity for constant adaptability in a changing society.  
According to statistics, the promulgation of new legislation in China from 1979 
to 2004 increased by 11.8% per year,
958
 with ―new laws and regulations are being 
issued at breakneck speed, old laws and regulations are amended continually, and 
whole new regulatory regimes and institutions are being created.‖959 The White 
Paper on China’s Rule of Law published in 2008 announced that the number of 
currently effective laws promulgated by the National People‘s Congress (National 
Legislature of China) as at the end of 2007 was 229.
960
 Over fifty regulations have 





The path of law reform has not been smooth or easy given the specific political, 
economic, and social conditions in China. Legal reform must be ongoing to catch up 
with the progress of political and economic reform.
962
 In addition to objective 
demands, the legal system in China will ―continue to be driven by more social sources, 
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The first problem of legal reform lies in the compatibility of the new legal 
elements with local circumstances. In the past 30 years, the motivation for reform in 
China has been voluntary and pragmatic, which is consistent with the golden rule of 
the reform policy set out by Deng Xiaoping that ―for socialism to obtain the 
comparative advantage against capitalism, it shall audaciously assimilate all the other 
advanced achievements.‖964 Law reform in China is target oriented and based on 
choice, and thus legislators actively select and take the best of the elements of foreign 
jurisdictions for domestic application.
965 
There is a lack of empirical studies and 
convincing statistics to prove the effectiveness and efficiency of the new legal norms 
applied in China.  
Second, transplanting has been the main approach to legal reform, and has 
repeatedly been one of the primary instruments in the process of China‘s legal 
modernization in various historical episodes. The transplanting approach is a gradual 
process of local orientation and acceptance. What has been transferred must ―carefully 
leave untouched the essential, the unalterable, what is proper to China herself.‖966 
Many specific systems of foreign laws have been incorporated into Chinese law. For 
example, the Law on Marine Environment Protection of the PRC adopts the same 
registration system and criteria as the corresponding laws in the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and the United States.
967
 When the Rules on Software Protection of PRC 
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Legal transplanting has also been applied to the law covering the corporate 
governance of listed companies in China, with independent directors being taken from 
the United States, the supervisory board from Germany, and the director‘s duty of 
loyalty and duty of diligence and shareholder‘s derivative action from common law 
jurisdictions.
969
 These measures have been transplanted to solve underperformance or 
pitfalls in existing corporate governance. 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) distinguish four main approaches to legal reform: (1) 
―copying‖, or using without change; (2) ―emulation‖, or accepting a particular part 
rather than copying all the details; (3) ―hybridization and synthesis‖, or combining 
elements from two or more countries; and (4) ―inspiration‖, or ―studying familiar 
problems‖ for ―fresh thinking‖ about what is possible way to settle the problems.970 
Throughout the history of China‘s social development, the first three types have been 
widely applied. The legal reform at the end of Qing Dynasty in the early 1900s 
typically ―copied‖ the Japanese and German legal systems; derivative action by 
shareholders and the duties of loyalty and diligence of directors, supervisors, and 
senior executives were emulated in corporate law; the supervisory board from 
Germany and independent directors from the United States were hybridized and 
synthesized into the two-tier board structure of public listed companies of China. 




 Wang Jiangyu takes the view that the corporate laws of China ―embrace a 
significant amount of institutions imported from foreign sources‖, consequently ―it is 
difficult to identify the single most significant ‗origin‘ country‖. See Wang Jiangyu, 
―The Strange Role of Independent Directors in a Two-Tier Board Structure in China‘s 
Listed Companies‖ in Changing Corporate Governance Practices in China and 
Japan: Adaptations of Anglo-American Practices (Edited by Masao Nakamura) 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 185-205, at 187. 
970
 See David Dolowitz & David Marsh, ―Who Learns What from Whom: A Review 
of the Policy Transfer Literature‖ (1996) 44 Political Studies 343, at 351. 
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―Inspiration‖ has required trial and error on the part of the Chinese government, 
legislators, scholars, and entrepreneurs throughout Chinese history to address 
practical issues.
971
 In the next section, these practical issues (discussed in Chapter IV 
and V and summarized in 6.1.2 of this Chapter) are addressed using the ―inspiration‖ 
approach to generate ―fresh thinking‖ about possible ways to resolve the issues so that 
proposals can be consciously and voluntarily recognized, executed, and evaluated in 
practice. 
 
E. Proposed law reforms in relation to the practical issues arising from state controlled 
ownership under the two-tier shareholding and two-tier board structure of state-held 
listed companies in China 
Constant law reform could generate a ―consistent and coherent‖ regulatory 
framework and define clear duties and obligations for public authorities and corporate 
organs to improve the corporate governance of state-held listed companies.
972
 Law 
reform must be placed within the framework of specific historical, cultural, and social 
                                                        
971
 ―Shang Yang Legal Reform‖ (―Shang Yang Bian Fa”, implemented in 359 B.C. 
for the first time and 350 B.C. for the second time) called by Bai Yang as ―the only 
successful and splendid legal reform in Chinese history‖ in his book Outline of 
Chinese History could be an approach of ―inspiration‖. Shang Yang, statesman of Qin 
Kingdom in the ―Warring States Period‖ (Zhan Guo Shi Dai) of ancient China, was a 
legalist. Under the support of the then king of Qin (Qin Xiao Gong), Shang Yang 
carried out numerous reforms under his legalist philosophies in the social hierarchy, 
military power, moral ethics, etc. In particular, it is regulated by law that all the 
disputes shall be filed to the specific institution instead of being solved through 
private duel and that all the legal standards shall be fixed and be equally applied to all 
the people of Qin Kingdom. ―Shang Yang Legal Reform‖ helped to change Qin from 
a backward and poor kingdom to a prosperous one with centralization of power 
devolved from the nobility, and to laid a solid foundation for Qin Shi Huang to 
establish Qin Dynasty and become the first emperor of a United China in 221 B.C. 
See Bai Yang, Outline of Chinese History (5
th
 ed.) (Shanxi People Press, 2008) (in 
Chinese), at 152-4; see also William H. Mcneil & Jean W. Sedlar (edited.), Classical 
China (Readings in World History (Oxford University Press, 1970) at 78-81. 
972
 Supra Note 210, at 18. 
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circumstances of China, and requires re-thinking and recognizing the historical and 
realistic situations of SOEs and state-held listed companies. 
    Although the public transaction of non-tradable shares has been gradually 
facilitated by the reform of the two-tier shareholding structure since 2005, state-held 
listed companies will continue to play a dominant role in the Chinese capital market. 
To eliminate, or at least reduce, the involvement and interference of government 
authorities in business operations and corporate governance, this thesis proposes the 
following reform to solve three of the five practical issues arising from 
state-controlled ownership. The other two issues of the infringement of minority 
shareholders‘ interests due to tunneling and the inability of minority shareholders to 
effectively exercise their rights to protect themselves through derivative action are 
discussed in the next section on law enforcement. 
 
(A) The presence of supervisory board is redundant as its responsibilities have been 
taken up by independent directors or the audit committee (first issue in Chapter V) 
Bhagat and Black‘s survey of US public companies finds no compelling 
evidence on the relationship between board composition and firm performance, and 
particularly the supermajority structure of independent directors within the boardroom. 
In China, there is similarly a lack of convincing empirical research to prove that a 
two-tier board system improves the corporate governance of Chinese public listed 
companies.  
The improvement of internal monitoring in China is unlikely to be a one-off 
accomplishment, but a process of trial and error as legal reform and economic 
development deepen. As Robert Clark states, ―much of the reform movement is based 
on seemingly plausible hypotheses, or a prior theorizing, but not also on serious and 
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methodical study of the facts . . . it may be that a future long-term rigorous empirical 
study will find a positive connection . . . in the interim, however, we proceed on the 
basis of theory and faith.‖973  
The institution of the supervisory board in China is a misconception of the 
governance structure from Germany, and does not take into account the specific 
features of the Chinese institutional environment that affect the viability of the 
supervisory board due to its overlapping powers with independent directors and the 
audit committee.  
The supervisory board could be removed, as its powers under the Company Law 
are in effect exercised already by independent directors and the audit committee. To 
be specific, a comparison of the supposed division of powers as summarized in Table 
6.1 compared with that of its counterpart in other countries in Table 5.8 shows that the 
overseeing of directors and senior executives (Items 2-5 in the right column in Table 
5.8) is already shouldered by independent directors (Item 2 in the left column in Table 
6.1), and the monitoring of financial affairs and auditing of the company (Item 1 in 
the right column in Table 5.8) are under the powers of audit committee (Item 1 in the 
right column in Table 6.1). Similarly, although independent directors have unique 
approval rights over major related-party transactions, their right to propose to the 
board to appoint or dismiss external auditors (Item 3 in the left column in Table 5.8) is 
exercised by the audit committee (Item 2 in the right column in Table 6.1). 
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1. Major related-party transactions 
(referring to transactions that the public 
listed company intends to conclude with 
related parties and whose total value 
exceeds RMB 3 million or 5% of the 
company‘s net assets as audited recently) 
should be approved by independent 
directors before being submitted to the 
board of directors for discussion. Before the 
independent directors make a judgment, an 
intermediary agency can be employed to 
produce an independent financial advisory 
report that will serve as the basis for final 
judgment.  
 
2. Providing independent opinion on the 
following matters to the board of directors 
or at the shareholders‘ meeting.  
(1)  Nomination, appointment, or removal 
of directors. 
(2) Appointment or dismissal of senior 
executives. 
(3) Remuneration for directors and senior 
executives. 
(4) Current or proposing loan borrowed 
from the public listed company or other 
fund transfer made by the company‘s 
shareholders, actual controllers, or affiliated 
enterprises that exceeds RMB 3 million or 
5% of the company‘s net assets as audited 
recently, and whether the company has 
taken effective measures to collect the due 
amount. 
(5) Events that the independent director 
considers to be detrimental to the interests 
of minority shareholders. 
 
 
1. Monitoring the financial affairs 
and auditing of the company. 
 
2. Appointing or dismissing external 
auditors. 
 
An individual independent director does not have a magic effect himself or 
herself, but together and in cooperation they can create a structural adjustment to 
make the monitoring of corporate business more effective.
974
 The independent 
                                                        
974 John F. Olson & Michael T. Adams ―Composing a Balanced and Effective Board 
to Meet New Governance Mandates‖ (2004) 59 Bus. Law. 421, at 422. 
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directors themselves could meet at least once a year apart from the other directors on 
the board to discuss and exchange views and comments on corporate affairs and the 
performance of duties.
 975
 Independence not only stands for the relationship with the 
company, but also indicates ―independent thought,‖ which would enable independent 
directors to function better as a watchdog.
976
 Meanwhile, independent directors 
should not completely isolate themselves from non-independent directors. They 
should still be involved in the management activities of the company to better 
understanding the business and more effectively monitor transactions.  
 
(B) Independent directors may not be able to protect minority shareholders (second 
issue in Chapter V) 
a. Reinforcing the independence of independent directors through their nomination, 
remuneration, and evaluation by third parties 
Currently, the appointment of independent directors must be submitted by a 
public listed company to the CSRC for approval,
977
 and in the case of commercial 
banks and insurance companies must also be approved by the China People‘s Bank 
and Insurance Regulatory Committee, respectively.
978
 
Some scholars also propose setting up an institution, government agency, or 
self-regulatory organization to be in charge of the nomination and appointment of 
                                                        
975
 Supra Note 691, at 11. 
976
 Erica Beecher-Monas, ―Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom: 
Just How Far Have You Come, Baby?‖ (2007) 86 Or. L. Rev. 373, at 376. 
977
 Supra Note 11, Art. 4(3). 
978
 Art.11, Guidelines of Independent Director and Outside Supervisor in the 
Joint-Stock Commercial Bank, issued by People‘s Bank of China, with effect from 23 
May, 2002; Art.8 of the Interim Measures for the Administration of Insurance 
Companies’ Independent Directors, issued by the China Insurance Regulatory 
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In practice, since November 2009 the SASAC has acted experimentally as such a 
corporate governance authority for the selection and appointment of non-executive 
directors in some central SOEs in which it is the investor.
981
 However, the SASAC is 
not strictly an outside third party, as it is controlling shareholder of many central 
SOEs and exercises investor‘s rights authorized by the State Council on behalf of the 
state. Non-executive directors appointed by the SASAC are generally retired senior 
executives of SOEs, professional managers of multinational corporations, and 
professionals and scholars in the fields of finance, law, and taxation.
982
 The directors 
appointed by the SASAC report to the SASAC every half year unless urgent matters 
arise that require prompt reporting.
983
 
A feasible solution for state-held listed companies in China is to confer the 
nomination, remuneration, and evaluation of independent directors to an outside third 
party (hereinafter termed the CG Authority).  
 
                                                        
979
 See Guangdong Bureau of CSRC, ―The Proposal of Improving the Supervisory 
Board and Independent Directors of Public Listed Company‖, 21 August 2008, 
available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n870586/n8215838/10776215.html; See 
also Peng Dingdai, ―The US Independent Director system and Reflections on China‖, 
(2007) 5 Law Review (in Chinese); Huang Feiming, ―Independent Director shall 
contribute more to protecting the minorities‖, available at: 
http://www.chinavalue.net/Article/Archive/2008/3/1/101694_2.html 
980
 Chee Keong Low, ―A Road Map for Corporate Governance in East Asia‖ (2004) 
25 Nw. J. Int‘l L. & Bus. 165, at 179-80. 
981
 Regulation of Non-executive Directors in the Experimental State-owned 
Enterprises, issued by the SASAC, with effect from 13 October 2009. 
982
 Feng Zhenzhong, ―The Reflections of the Non-executive Director System‖ (2008), 
written by the official of SASAC,  available on the website of the SASAC: 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1271/n4213364/n4213672/n4222565/4376488.html 
983




The CG Authority would be entitled to nominate qualified and technically 
competent independent directors from its talent pool. The selection of independent 
directors should be made on the basis of qualification and experience. The selected 
candidates must also meet the basic requirements of independence.
984
 The 
qualifications of candidates may be further evaluated by the nomination committee of 
the company board for specific requirements such as shareholding and conflicts of 
interests. The independent directors would finally be elected and appointed at a 
shareholders‘ general meeting by the passing of an ordinary or special resolution, 
depending on the articles of the company. The nomination of independent directors 
would thus be under the authority of an outside party, so that state-held listed 
companies, and more exactly their controlling shareholders, would elect independent 
directors from a designated list of candidates only, rather than electing candidates 
picked for the controlling shareholders‘ benefit.  
 
(b) Remuneration 
In the experimental SOEs, the remuneration package (including salary, bonuses, 
and mid-/long-term incentives) of non-executive directors is currently determined by 
the SASAC.
985
 It is assumed under the proposed system that the remuneration 
package of an independent director is composed of two parts: one part is the basic 
allowance decided by the CG Authority in consideration of qualifications and 
                                                        
984
 Supra Note 980, at 179-80. The author points out that ―a fine balance‖ should be 
stricken: ―On the one hand, they should be sufficiently broad to provide for a large 
enough pool and avoid micro-management that may turn away talented individuals 
from assuming the office of INED (non-executive directors). On the other hand, they 
should be sufficiently rigorous not only to ensure that those eligible are independent, 
but also professionally qualified to manage shareholder investments prudently and to 
attain a rate of return that is commensurate with the risks undertaken.‖ 
985
 Supra Note 981, Art.16 and 17. 
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experience, and the other is based on individual workload and corporate performance, 
and would be determined by the remuneration committee of the corporate board.
986
 
The sources of remuneration of independent directors should not be subject to 
approval at a general meeting. Rather, they should be extracted from special funds 
drawn from the annual profits of the company. This would give independent directors 
a more independent space in which to exercise their professional role of surveillance.  
 
(c) Evaluation 
Good governance depends on best practice in the areas of ―board size, committee 
structure of the board, frequency of board meetings.‖987  Are more and longer 
meetings always better?
988
 More probably, effective work flow and an ethical mindset 
among directors are more valuable. As Burris, Kempa and Shearing state, ―systems of 
governance can help promote rationality and fairness, but these are, in the end, 
characteristics of people, not systems‖.989 
The appraisal of the performance of independent directors shall be conducted by 
the CG Authority by means of a dynamic evaluation mechanism constituting 
identified indicators, including, without limitation: (1) whether there have been any 
scandals in or sanctions imposed on the company (for example, the listed company 
has not been publicly censured or received any other administrative discipline by the 
CSRC in the past three years; (2) whether the independent director has exercised an 
appropriate level of professional skepticism in discharging his or her statutory duties; 
                                                        
986
 Ibid. at 181. See also Sarah Kiarie, ―Non-Executive Directors In UK Listed 
Companies: Are They Effective‖ (2007) 18(1) I.C.C.L.R. 17, at 21. 
987
 Supra Note 86, at 38. 
988
 Douglas M. Branson, ―Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate 
Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-Worldcom Era‖ (2006) 58 S.C. L. Rev. 65, at 66. 
989
 Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, ―Changes in Governance: A 
Cross-disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship‖ (2008) 41 Akron L.Rev.1, at 66. 
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and (3) annual ratings of corporate governance by grading agencies in the industry. 
The CG Authority may choose a number of indicators to adequately and appropriately 
appraise the quality of work performed by independent directors.  
 
b. Might this solution run counter to the idea that shareholders should be entitled to 
exercise their votes to appoint whoever they want? 
Under majority rule, majority shareholders can normally nominate the 
membership of the board unless otherwise set out in the articles of the company.
990
 
The articles reflect the will of corporate members, and thus ―the will of the majority 
prevails‖ and ―the decision of the majority will be binding on the minority.‖991 In the 
case of public listed companies, the minority can choose to sell their shares to exit, 
but may resort to the courts to change the majority‘s decision on the grounds of 
prejudice or other statutory circumstances.
992
 
However, majority rule cannot be pushed too far in state-held listed companies in 
China.
993
 The danger is that the controlling shareholder will ―abuse his power and 
enrich himself at the expense of the other shareholders.‖994 Thompson points out that 
―an unqualified system of majority control creates the potential that a selfish majority 
will appropriate the interests of the minority.‖ 995  As discussed in Chapter IV, 
                                                        
990
 Robert B. Thompson, ―Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in 
Corporate Law‖ (1995) 84 Geo. L. J. 1, at 2. The author traces the limits on the 
majority rule back to the American political system: ―the limits on this majority power 
are likewise well known, beginning with the limited power of government under our 
Constitution and the protection of individual rights through a judiciary independent of 
the legislative and executive branches‖. 
991
 See Shanthy Rachagan, ―Agency Costs in Controlled Companies‖ (2006) Sing. J. 






See Jens Dammann, ―Corporate Ostracism: Freezing Out Controlling 
Shareholders‖ (2008) 33 J. Corp. L. 681, at 685. See also supra Note 991. 
995
 Supra Note 990, at 1. 
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tunneling by controlling shareholders‘ making guarantees for holding companies‘ 
loans and the diversion of corporate funds to holding companies causes loss and 
damage to the company and the interests of minority shareholders. What is 
noteworthy is that derivative claims made by the minority shareholders of listed 
companies are rare in China, with no judgment being found in the ―LawinfoChina‖ 
database since the Company Law was revised in 2006. It is difficult for the courts in 
China to decide on derivative claims that might involve ruling against the 
government.  
The proposed third party‘s authority to nominate and evaluate independent 
directors is an exception to the majority rule, but the need for independent directors to 
safeguard minority shareholders is so important, particularly in state-held listed 
companies, that the majority‘s wishes cannot be fulfilled at their will. The third role of 
independent directors to protect minority shareholders aims to independently monitor 
the controlling shareholder‘s conduct and to prevent corporate scandals which would 
damage investor‘s confidence in ―an environment where disclosure is minimal and 
legal remedies are uncertain.‖996 
The basis of the third role of independent directors will inevitably cause conflicts 
of interest with controlling shareholders. However, in state-held listed companies, the 
monitoring role over controlling shareholders assumed by independent directors may 
not be efficacious because their nomination and remuneration are firmly correlated 
with and influenced by the controlling shareholders. For this reason, if the entitlement 
of nomination, remuneration, and evaluation of independent directors could be taken 
over by a third party, then corporate scandals due to the majority‘s abuse of power 
could be prevented and tackled at source. Indeed, in a sense, the controlling 
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 Supra Note 991. 
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shareholder‘s rights under majority rule would be transferred but not deprived, to the 
outside third party with the benefit that independent directors would actually, rather 
than merely nominally, play a positive and independent role on the board. 
Broadly speaking, corporate governance is not only a legal issue, but an issue of 
balance of power. The law plays an important role in striking a balance of power 
between the majority and minority. An illustration of this is the legal constraints on 
the ability of majority shareholders.
997
 For instance, during the Reform of Sales of 
Non-Tradable Shares of Public listed Companies in the A-share market of China, as 
analyzed in Chapter IV, the proposal of each company must obtain majority approval 
from holders of tradable and non-tradable shares separately.  
Thus, the third party‘s authority would run counter to the majority rule that 
shareholders should be entitled to exercise their votes; but independent directors 
would in effect fulfill their third role of safeguarding the interests of minority 
shareholders under this outsourcing arrangement. 
 
(C) Minority shareholders may not be able to effectively exercise their rights to 
protect themselves under the cumulative voting system (second issue in Chapter IV) 
Cumulative voting may well work in three ways. First, as proposed, if the 
nomination of independent directors were the authority of an outside party, then the 
controlling shareholder‘s votes would not be concentrated on candidates who have no 
relationship with them, and thus minority shareholders would have more chance to 
pool their votes to elect independent directors from the designated list of candidates.  
The second way relates to nomination. In state-held listed companies, it is 
impractical for minority shareholders to elect nominees under the cumulative voting 
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 Ibid. at the part of ―Conclusion‖. 
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system given the controlling shareholder‘s concentrated ownership in such companies. 
When minority shareholders wish to elect their own candidates, they need more 
shares for the election. So, if the shareholding threshold for nominating independent 
directors could be reduced, then even if minority shareholders held a very small 
number of shares compared with the total number of company shares it would be 
possible for them to nominate their directors. 
Third, minority shareholders are usually public individual investors who have 
diverse views on the selection of candidates and on the business operations of listed 
companies. The existence of institutional investors who hold a large number of shares 
in a listed company may help to strike the balance between controlling shareholders 
and other minority shareholders,
998
 except that institutional investors purchase the 
shares with the purpose of short-term arbitrage rather than long-term investment, and 
might not intend to nominate and elect their own directors to the board.  
Institutional investors, particularly pension funds, life-insurance companies, and 
fund management companies, are at a nascent stage in China,
999
 although in recent 
years the number of institutional investors has substantially increased. In 2007, the 
proportion of institutional investors in China‘s A-share market increased 25 percent 
from 2004 levels according to the statistics of CSRC.
1000
 Up to July 2007, 
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 See David H. Brown & Alasdair I. Macbean, Challenges for China’s Development: 
An Enterprise Perspective (Routledge, 2005), at 40. See also A.J. Boyal, Minority 
Shareholder’s Remedies (Cambridge University Press, 2002), at 75. 
999
 Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr. ―Hail Britannia: Institutional Investor 
Behavior under Limited Regulation‖ (1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997, at 1999. Two 
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The economic system of China is in transition from a state-planned to a 
market-oriented economy, and the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance in China is strictly controlled by the government. The activity of 
institutional investors in the market is monitored to ensure market stability. A number 
of regulations have been promulgated by the central government to control the 
number and proportion of foreign institutional investors. Qualified investors (―QFII‖) 
are entitled to invest in the Chinese markets after approval by the CRSC.
1002
 A QFII 
applicant must have a sound financial and credit status to meet the requirements set 
out by the CSRC on asset scale, and must not have received any substantial penalties 
from the authorities in the place where the QFII was incorporated. Moreover, the 
jurisdiction in which the applicant was incorporated must have a sound legal and 
regulatory system, and its securities supervisory authorities must have signed a 
memorandum of cooperation and understanding with the CSRC.
1003
 
With increasing capital from foreign institutional shareholders in the local 
markets, the cumulative voting system may work better with the involvement of 
institutional investors that are focused on long-term investment, as this would help to 
make good use of minority holdings. 
 
6.4.3. Enforcing the law 




 The recent regulation is Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment 
within the Territory of China by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, jointly 
issued by the CSRC, PBOC and Foreign Exchange Bureau, with effect from 
September 1, 2006. 
1003
 Ibid. Art. 6. 
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―Corporate governance is a process, not a state.‖1004 A system itself cannot be 
evaluated as good or bad, but as effective or ineffective. Being listed does not mean 
that effective corporate governance has been achieved. The governance practices of 
state-held listed companies in China must move forward in parallel with 
developments in politics and the economy. 
A corporate governance system is an amalgamation of diverse social elements in 
the process of respecting, protecting, promoting, and delivering business activities, 
and is recognized as an effective approach to promote political stability, economic 
sustainability, and social progress by preventing weak group from falling into the mire 
of corruption. 
Shang Fulin, Chairman of the CSRC, states that ―corporate governance is a 
permanent topic in the capital market and is a long-term task of the China‘s capital 
market.‖ Corporate governance is not just a concept, but a true practice to be realized 
by means of robust, comprehensive, and systematic regulatory authorities that enforce 
the law. The enforcement of the law in China must be strengthened in two ways: 
fighting corruption and promoting judicial independence. These solutions can be 
applied to resolve the two outstanding issues raised in Chapter IV. 
 
A. Minority shareholders‘ interests are infringed upon due to tunneling by controlling 
shareholders (first issue in Chapter IV) 
    Each country has its own factors, such as historical conditions, traditional 
customs, and social environment, that persist or change over a certain period due to 
internal evolution or external impacts. These factors shape the country‘s ideology in 
dealing with practical issues. No matter how insightful the policy-makers, legislators 
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 Sir Adrian Cadbury, ―Corporate Governance and Development‖, forward of 
Global Corporate Governance Forum. 
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and jurists, they cannot have a complete, intensive, and anticipatory understanding of 
the complex causal relations of a specific society; instead what they can grasp is 
generalized knowledge from history and abroad. 
    Tunnelling in state-held listed companies arises from corruption among 
controlling shareholders, who maintain close relationships with the government and 
CPC or who themselves are government agencies in charge of managing state assets. 
Fighting corruption is a long-term task in China. Given China‘s large geographical 
size and huge variation across regions and industries,1005 there must be few countries 
that face the same magnitude of difficulties, with so large a population, so distinct a 
regional imbalance, so heavy a historical legacy, and so long-standing a cultural 
ideology, in solving so many problems within so short a period.  
 
(A) Anti-corruption regime 
    The anti-corruption regime in China is governed by the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Administrative Supervision
1006
 and regulated by the 
Administrative Inspection Agency of the Chinese government (―Inspection Agency‖) 
at all levels.  The Inspection Agency has the authority to investigate cases of 
corruption and refer cases of embezzlement, misappropriation, and bribery to the 
prosecutors pursuant to the Criminal Law. 
    However, there is another anti-corruption approach, ―Shuang Gui,‖ that plays a 
significant role in fighting against corruption in a political sense. Shuang Gui is 
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 Qian Yingyi, ―Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China‖, in 
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regulated by the Discipline Inspection Committee of CPC (DIC) under the CPC 
Regulation of Investigation Work of Discipline Inspection
1007
. Shuang Gui refers to the 
power of the Discipline Inspectors of the DIC to order a suspect to confess his or her 
crime at the designated place for an indefinite period before handing over the suspect 




Shuang Gui is an internal investigation by the CPC of suspected officials who 
are CPC members. This means that all government officials who are CPC members 
are subject to Shuang Gui, after which they are referred for normal legal proceedings. 
Other suspects who are not CPC members are directly subject to investigation by the 
Inspection Agency. Actually, Shuang Gui is not legal in nature because detention must 
be authorized by laws passed by the National People‘s Congress or its Standing 
Committee.
1009
 As it is not authorized by law but by the internal regulations of the 
CPC, Shuang Gui ―poses a challenge to the Chinese legal system‖ and places 
corruption cases in an ―extra-judicial zone.‖1010 It is suggested that Shuang Gui be 
removed as a means of investigating government officials who are CPC members. 
Instead, corruption cases involving both CPC members and non-CPC members should 
follow normal legal proceedings. 
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of the Ninth National People's Congress on March 15, 2000, promulgated by Order 
No.31 of the President of the People's Republic of China on March 15, 2000, and with 
effect from July 1, 2000. Pursuant to Sec. 7 and Sec. 8(5), ―compulsory measures and 
penalties such as deprivation of citizens' political rights and restrictions on personal 
freedom‖ shall be regulated by laws enacted by the National People's Congress or its 
Standing Committee. 
1010
 The Financial Times, ―The Case of the Chinese Mayor Who Wasn‘t There‖, 
available at: http://chinadigitaltimes.net, August 2009. 
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(B) Supervisory regime 
Corporations in China perform within a ―governance framework‖ that is 
structured ―by the corporation‘s own constitutions, by those who own and fund them, 
and by the expectations of those they serve.‖1011 An optimal supervisory regime must 
be reinforced to ensure the smooth operation of the systems of internal controls and to 
secure a ―low level of corruption and high level of honesty.‖1012 The strategy of an 
effective anti-corruption policy should be to clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
state-held listed companies and the CSRC to execute and maintain a high-quality 
supervisory regime to prevent existing or potential corruption.  
 
a. Roles and responsibilities of state-held listed companies 
    The roles and responsibilities of state-held listed companies are proposed as 
follows: 
(a) Obtain all possible relevant information and documents and make an initial 
evaluation and proposal of financial or credit limits. 
(b) Ensure that credit limits are established and are sufficient before transactions. 
(c) Submit requests to management for ad-hoc approval of potential credit 
excesses. 
                                                        
1011
 Supra Note 1004. See supra Note 989, at 44. The corporate actors shall have 
legitimate qualifications and responsibility for performance in the process of 
corporate governance, in which they exercise their capacity and capability. Burris, 
Kempa and Shearing think that the ―human‖ element manifests a relationship of 
―trust‖; otherwise people would either ―refuse to engage participatory mechanisms for 
governance‖, or engage in ―maximizing their own personal or their own groups‘ 
benefit‖. The good governance shall ―create an incentive to channel individual 
economic effort into activities that bring the private rate of return close to the social 
rate of return. See also Douglass C. North & Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the 
Western World: A New Economic History (Cambridge [Eng.] University Press, 1973) 
at 1. 
1012
 Supra Note 789, at 120. 
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(d) Ensure regular monitoring and surveillance of debtors‘ outstanding in 
respective portfolios. 
(e) Promptly detect problem credit and delinquent accounts. 
(f) Report the suspension of sales or contracts to delinquent accounts. 
(g) Assist and co-ordinate the receipt of all necessary collateral documents. 
(h) Development by the Risk Management department of the company a detailed 
work plan for the annual internal control and risk review. 
 
b. The roles and responsibilities of CSRC 
The roles and responsibilities of CSRC are proposed as follows: 
(a) Evaluate the business and economic conditions and performance of state-held 
listed companies. 
(b) Where appropriate and necessary, seek a source of information to facilitate the 
evaluation, including conducting an inspection or reviewing of financial 
reports. 
(c) Approve ad-hoc applications for delayed reporting. 
(d) Regularly monitor and review the status of delinquent companies. 
(e) Inform the Inspection Agency promptly about existing or potential corruption; 
(f) Work closely and support the Risk Management department of state-held listed 
companies in reporting and documentation. 
     
c. Assessment criteria 
    With diligent monitoring, potential problems and risks can be identified and 




(a) Business track record.  
(b) Financial position, with key indicators such as equity, profitability, turnover, 
leverage, and liquidity. 
(c) Credit grade and reports. 
(d) Compliance of the company administration with internal corporate regulation 
and policies.  
(e) Market news, including unusual changes and adverse scenarios. 
 
d. Dos and Don‘ts 
    The key points for fighting corruption and ensuring the good governance of 
state-held listed companies are summarized in Table 6.2. 
 
     Table 6.2 DOS AND DON’TS IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
 
                 DO             DON'T 
 Ensure that the company is within its 
authorized credit and transaction limit 
 Extend unauthorized credit 
limits and transactions 
 Conduct regular evaluations of 
business operations 
 Rely only on personal judgment 
 Immediately report potential 
corruption 
 Assume any misconduct to be 
normal 
 Maintain goodwill and a regular 
relationship with customers 
 Treat customers on the basis of 
personal relationships 
 Enforce discipline on customers to 
perform according to agreed payment 
terms 
 Allow customers to develop 
poor and tardy payment habits 
 Ensure all transactions comply fully 
with the requirements of the internal 
risk management policy and CSRC 
Regulations 
 Transact/contract with a 
customer before obtaining 
proper internal approval  
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 Document all transactions with a 
customer 
 Transact with a customer on an 
unofficial or informal basis 
 
B. Minority shareholders may not able to effectively exercise their rights to protect 
themselves by taking derivative action (third issue in Chapter IV) 
As discussed in Chapter IV, derivative claims by minority shareholders are rare 
occurrences in China. In the case of state-held listed companies, the difficulty for the 
Chinese courts is in dealing with the conflicts of interest between the state (the 
government as controlling shareholder) and individual (minority shareholders). It is 
essential for the Chinese courts to have judicial independence to decide such cases. 
Judicial independence in China comprises three aspects: 1. independence of the 
judiciary from other authorities; 2. independence of the lower courts from the higher 
courts; 3. independence of judges. 
 
(A) Independence of the judiciary from other authorities 
a. Problems 
The People‘s Courts are the judiciaries of the state,1013 and are divided into the 
Supreme People‘s Court and the local people‘s courts at four levels: the Supreme 
People‘s Court, the High Court, the Intermediate Court, and the District Court.1014 
Except for the Supreme People‘s Court at the national level, these are local courts 
located at the provincial, city, and county level, respectively. The four-level system of 
                                                        
1013
 Ibid., Sec. 23. 
1014




courts corresponds with the different levels of people‘s congresses 1015  and 
government (although the people‘s congresses and governments have one more level 
at the lowest level: the village level.) 
In China, the National People‘s Congress (NPC), along with its Standing 
Committee, is the legislature of the state.
1016
 It delegates certain legislative powers to 
the local people‘s congresses, central government, and local governments 
(collectively referred to as ―authorized legislative agencies‖).1017 The NPC and its 
Standing Committee have the authority to appeal the laws and regulations enacted by 
the authorized legislative agencies that contravene the PRC Constitution or the 
statutes enacted by the NPC. Moreover, the people‘s congresses at all levels are the 
―organs of state power‖ (―Quanli Jiguan‖). Pursuant to the PRC Constitution, all 
power in China belongs to the people, and the people‘s congresses are the organs 
through which the people exercise the power of the state.
1018
 The people‘s congresses 
are responsible for creating and supervising the government and judiciary.
1019
  
The judiciary in China is not independent from the people‘s congresses in two 
senses. First, the presidents of court (―Yuan Zhang‖, who is in charge of the 
administration of the court and is the highest judge of the court) are elected by the 
people‘s congress at the same level, and the vice-presidents and other judges are 
                                                        
1015
 Pursuant to Sec.30 of the Constitution of PRC, the hierarchy of people‘s 
congresses is divided into five levels: a. National People‘s Congress (NPC); b. 
Province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government, 
i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqin; c. City (divided into districts), or 
autonomous prefecture; d. County, autonomous county, or city (not divided into 
districts, usually referring to updated names of urbanized counties in China), or 
municipal district; e. Village. The lowest two levels of people‘s congresses are 
directly elected (by citizens); the highest levels are indirectly elected - by 
representatives (elected by citizens). 
1016
 Supra Note 227, Sec.58, and Sec.62. 
1017
 Supra Note 1009. 
1018
 Supra Note 227, Sec.2. 
1019
 Ibid. Sec.3. 
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recommended by the president and further appointed (or removed) by the standing 
committees of the people‘s congresses at the same level.1020 Second, the people‘s 
congresses have no authority to directly change any judicial decision that has been 
finally decided by the court. However, the people‘s congresses have the power to 
require a court at the same or lower level within the province to change its decision, 
because the people‘s congresses are authorized by the PRC Constitution to supervise 
the judiciary‘s activities as the organ of state power,1021 in spite of the fact that the 
exercise of this supervisory power is an exceptional event.
1022
  
    The financial conditions of the judiciary are closely related to government: the 
financial budget of the judiciary (for example, the salary of judges and operational 
expenses of the courts) are calculated by the local government at the same level to be 
submitted to the people‘s congress at the same level for approval.1023 
 
b. Proposal 
In principle, the implementation of judicial justice in China should not be 
connected with or influenced by the people‘s congresses (legislature and organ of 
state power) or the government (executive branch). In practice, the personnel (election, 
appointment, and removal of judges) and finance (financial budgets for judges and 
courts) of the judiciary should be conferred by law to the Supreme People‘s Court so 
                                                        
1020
 Sec.35, Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the People’s Republic of China, 
passed by the Second Session of the Fifth National People‘s Congress on July 1, 1979 
and revised on 31 October, 2006. 
1021
 Supra Note 227, Sec.3. 
1022
 In 2003, the case decided by Intermediate People‘s Court of Luoyang, Henan 
Province concerning the application of Seed Law was challenged by the People‘s 
Congress of Henan Province. See Zhang Mingjie (edited), Judiciary Reform in China 
– Retrospects and Prospects (Social Sciences Academic Press, 2005) (in Chinese), at 
143-4. 
1023
 See Tan Shigui & Li Rongzhen, Judiciary Reform from the Perspective of Rule of 
Law (Law Press, 2007) (in Chinese), at 119. 
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that the judiciary is virtually able to independently operate from the people‘s 
congresses and government at all levels. 
With respect to the supervisory power conferred by the PRC Constitution, the 
people‘s congress should not require the courts to change their decisions. Instead, any 
local people‘s congress may give their comments on a judicial case decided by a court 
at the same level to the High Court at the provincial level or by the NPC to the 
Supreme People‘s Court for consideration. 
 
(B) Independence of the lower courts from the higher courts 
a. Problems 
Pursuant to the PRC Constitution, the Supreme People's Court supervises the 
administration of justice by the local people‘s courts at various levels, and the courts 
at higher levels supervise the administration of justice by those at lower levels.
1024
 
No court is independent from the Supreme People‘s Court and the courts at 
higher levels, as these have supervisory authority conferred by the PRC Constitution. 
This authority specifically refers to the following two systems within the judiciary. 
 
(a) Instruction-request system (―Anjian Qingshi Zhidu‖) 
    Under the instruction-request system, the lower court can consult a higher 
authority and decide a case as indicated by the instructions of the higher authority. 
This system renders the appellate jurisdiction useless, because the first instance court 
may decide cases based on instructions from the higher authority rather than on its 
independent judgment. In practice, the Supreme People‘s Court delivers numerous 
                                                        
1024
 The Supreme People‘s Court is the highest appellate court in China. Supra Note 
227, Sec.127.  
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(b) Jurisdiction-transfer system (―Guanxiaquan Zhuanyi‖) 
The procedural laws provide that the courts at higher levels can transfer a case 
over which it has jurisdiction in the first instance to a court at the lower level for 
adjudication. The courts at higher levels also have the authority to adjudicate cases 





It is proposed to abolish the instruction-request system, because the lower courts 
can resort to the instructions of higher court from time to time and the higher courts 
have discretion to interfere in the decisions of the lower courts. It is essential to 
separate the lower courts from the higher courts in delivering substantive findings. 




    The transfer of jurisdiction may still take place in circumstances of complex 
factual scenarios, change of disputed amount, or avoidance of conflicts of interest in 
practice. The specific circumstances for transferring jurisdiction between the higher 
                                                        
1025
 For example, ―Reply to the Issue on Loans between Individuals and Enterprises‖, 
requested by High Court of Hei Long Jiang Province, 13 February 1999; ―Reply to 
the Issue on Litigation Arising out of Delisting‖, requested by High Court of Shanghai, 
17 July, 2007; ―Reply to the Issue on Jurisdiction on the dispute of arbitration clause‖, 
requested by High Court of Shandong Province, 8 August, 2000. 
1026
 Sec.39, Civil Procedure Law of PRC (revised 2007), with effect from 28 October 
2007; Sec.23, Criminal Procedure Law of PRC (revised 1996), with effect from 17 
March 1996; Sec.23, Administrative Procedure Law of PRC, with effect from 1 
October 1990. 
1027
 In China, the party(ies) owning a right of appeal is entitle to appeal to the higher 
level court (unless the Supreme People‘s Court is the court who makes the judgment 
of first instance). The appellate court has the final adjudication power in China. It is 




and lower courts shall be further stipulated by laws and regulations, such as how 
―complex‖ the facts and how much a percentage change in the disputed amount would 
warrant a transfer. 
 
(C) Independence of judges 
a. Problems 
The PRC Constitution expressly provides that ―the courts exercise judicial power 
independently and are not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public 
organization or individual.‖1028 However, ―independence‖ refers to the collective 
independence of courts, rather than the individual independence of judges.
1029
 Judges 





(a) Approval by the president of the court 
    In China, every judgment document issued by the court must be internally 
reviewed by the president of the court (or failing the president, the vice-president in 
charge or president‘s alternate). After the president‘s review and approval, the 
document is sealed by a stamp of court and delivered to the relevant parties; otherwise 




(b) Judicial committee (―Shenpan Weiyuanhui‖) 
                                                        
1028
 Supra Note 227, Sec.126. 
1029
 Supra Note 1023, at 117. See also Li Lin, Rule of Law and Judiciary Reform 
(Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008) (in Chinese), at 88. 
1030
 Supra Note 1023, at 95. 
1031
 Supra Note 1029, Li Lin, at 88. 
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    In the event that the judge has found that the case that he or she is hearing is 
―important (―Zhong Da‖), complex (―Fu Za‖), or hard (―Yi Nan‖) cases (which are not 
statutorily defined by virtue of law but decided by the judges depending on the facts 
and circumstances of the case), he or she can submit the case to the judicial committee 
of the court to decide. In China, each court has a judicial committee that is composed 
of the president, division chiefs, and experienced judges.
1032
 The decision of the 
judicial committee must be followed by the judge, although what the members of 





    The internal procedures for approval of the president of judgment documents and 
submission to the judicial committee for deciding important, complex, or hard cases 




    However, judges are also likely to escape or shift their responsibility in important 
and complex cases.
1035
 This also relates to the system of misjudged cases (―Cuo An 
                                                        
1032
 ―The judicial committee is the most authoritative body in a court, which is 
responsible for discussing important or difficult cases, making directions concerning 
other judicial matters and reviewing and summing up judicial experiences. In case of 
differing opinions, the majority's opinions shall be adopted.‖ See ―China‘s Judicial 
System: People‘s Court, Procuratorate and Public Security‖, available at: 
http://www.olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/chnjudic.htm 
1033
 Supra Note 1029, Li Lin, at 88. 
1034
 Ibid. at 84. See also Jiang Bixia, ―Strengthening the Function of Court‖, People‘s 
Court Daily, 18 September 2002. 
1035
 Supra Note 1023, at 95. 
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Zeren Zhuijiu Zhi‖) established in the courts by the regulations of each province.1036 
Where a judge is found to decide a case attributable to misapplying the substantive 
law or procedural law because of his or her willful misconduct or gross negligence, 
the case in question is determined as a ―misjudged case.‖ The hearing judge of the 
misjudged case is then liable and his or her salary, benefits, and promotion prospects 
will be substantially affected.
1037
 Thus, judges may be willing to give up their 
independence to decide a case by resorting to the judicial committee for a final 
decision. 
    It is proposed to abolish the internal procedures for approval by the president of 
judgment documents to improve the independence of judges by restoring the legal 
effect of a judge‘s signature. The functions of the judicial committee should be 
modified so that it can give its opinion on important, complex or hard cases, but the 
judge hearing the case delivers the judgment. 
 
(D) Summary 
An anonymous judge in an intermediate court of China once said that he has the 
courage to bear the legal liability, but not the political responsibility; because the 
consequences of the former are expressly provided by law, whereas those of the latter 
are not predictable.‖ 1038  It is essential for the Chinese courts to have judicial 
independence to accept and decide cases without any external political or economic 
                                                        
1036
 Since the 1990s, the people‘s congresses of a number of provinces have 
promulgated regulations in relation to the misjudged cases to fight against the 
corruptions in the judiciary. For example, the Provision of Liability in the Misjudged 
Cases, issued by People‘s Congress of Hainan Province, with effect from 26 
September, 1997; and the Provision of Liability in the Misjudged Cases, issued by 
People‘s Congress of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, with effect from 22 June, 
2006. 
1037
 Supra Note 1029, Li Lin, at 88. 
1038
 Supra Note 1022, at 42. 
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interference in three aspects: 1. the independence of the judiciary from other 
authorities; 2. the independence of the lower courts from the higher courts; and 3. the 
independence of judges. In China, where the rule of law has not been implemented, 
judicial independence depends, in addition to the aspirations of the courts and judges 
themselves, greatly on the social and political maturity of the political authorities to 
respect to the judiciary. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The improvement of corporate governance in state-held listed companies cannot 
solely depend on a few outstanding experts and elite, but should be accomplished 
through the contribution of all Chinese people across the generations, which will be a 
time-consuming and labour-intensive task. What is needed is for everyone to 
contribute their creative potential to conquer the obstacles on the path toward the rule 
of law. Although it is unlikely that there exists one perfect strategy for application in 
China, the most populous country in the world, a creative re-thinking and a better 
realization of the significance of corporate governance regimes is occurring, which 
should gradually move toward better protection for disadvantaged minorities and 
more efficient business operations in China. 
Taking all the practice issues and social underpinnings (including the political 
challenges, economic reform, and cultural inheritance) into consideration, the 
following conclusions are drawn. First, state-controlled listed companies would be 
better governed under a ―law-controlled model‖ rather than a ―state-controlled 
model.‖ This new model would improve the corporate governance of state-held listed 
companies by virtue of implementing the rule of law in China (or at least the ―thin‖ 
rule of law in transition from ―rule by law‖). Failing that, the practical issues arising 
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from ―state-controlled model‖ could be addressed by (i) reforming the laws; and (ii) 
enforcing the laws (including improving the anti-corruption supervisory regime and 
effecting judicial independence). To strike a consistent balance between political force 
and legal enforcement, the corporate governance of state-held listed companies would 























Chapter VII Final Reflections 
 
―It is not an accident that human beings preserve and advance in the face of 
adversity. Adaption is in our nature, a fact that leads me to be deeply 
optimistic about our future.‖ 
 
Alan Greenspan ―The Age of Turbulence‖ (2007) 
 
    This thesis addresses the issue of state-held listed companies in the context of 
China, which is governed by the ―state-controlled model.‖ The research was carried 
out using a variety of methodologies, including historical, comparative, literature, and 
case study analysis to examine areas ranging from economic reform to the rule of law, 
from path dependence to legal transplanting, from legislation to enforcement, and 
from government roles to market forces.  
Ensuring equal access to justice is a very basic tenet across the world. In a public 
sense, governance is ―the management of the course of events in a social system,‖ 
which is an ―adaptive social process.‖1039 Corporate governance deals with elements 
in the private sector to ―achieve effective and efficient management.‖ 1040 
Consequently, the corporate governance process is just one part of an overall complex 
of integrated legal processes that form the lifeblood of a modern industrialized 
society. 
In the past decade, a growing number of Chinese entrepreneurs have proved 
willing and eager to improve corporate governance.
1041
 A large number of 
international organizations are helping China to promote economic growth and reduce 
poverty. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and International Finance Corporation 
                                                        
1039
 Supra Note 989, at 64. 
1040
 Ibid. at 10. 
1041
 Supra Note 722, International Financial Corporation. It is concluded by IFC 
from its experience in the technical assistance for corporate governance in China. 
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(IFC) are playing positive roles in expanding employment opportunities and 
improving management performance. 
Since joining the ADB in 1986, China has received financial loan assistance of 
USD 19.25 billion, ranking the country as the ADB‘s second largest borrower for 
private sector financing.
1042
 The main financing projects are in the areas of urban 
construction, the environment, and energy-related development. A technical assistance 
special fund from the ADB was initiated in September 2007 aiming to improve 
corporate governance practices in the Bank of China.
1043
 The IFC‘s support to China 
has focused solely on corporate governance in the private sector. The IFC not only 
provides financial assistance to the private sectors, but also takes an equity stake in 
corporations so that it can contribute its international expertise to help localize 
well-established practices from overseas, such as financial accounting and internal 
control systems.1044
 
The current financial and technical assistance provided by the 
ADB and IFC is mostly directed toward small and medium-sized enterprises. Public 
listed companies, and particularly state-held listed companies, do not have access to 
such assistances due to considerations of commercial confidentiality and national 
security. 
Focusing on development in China from a global perspective engenders a clearer 
understanding of the governance structure in this rapidly developing country. As a 
wise man once said, ―in history lies the knowledge, in knowledge lies the answer.‖ 
This thesis explores the problems with governance in China with respect to tunneling 
by controlling shareholders, minority shareholder protection, and the conflicting 
functions of independent directors and supervisors. The corporate governance system 
                                                        
1042




 Supra Note 722, International Financial Corporation. 
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now plays and will continue to play a key role both macroscopically in economic 
growth and microscopically in business expansion, and we academics should step 
forward to do more than we have done so far. 
Above all, preaching pure rights or liabilities without considering all of the 
specific factors is unrealistic. The rule of law in China combines the issues of 
efficiency and equity because the Chinese government is pursuing socialism and 
depends on a policy of harmonization to strike a balance between the interests of 
stakeholders.
1045
  All developing countries face the challenges of globalization, 
without completely entering into an industrialized society with free trade coupled with 
sound regulations. They are confronted with the threats from globalization, and at the 
same time the impacts of localization.  
The state-controlled model has common elements with the bank-based model in 
an unstable securities market without timely market regulations, and is also 
characterized by employee participation from the stakeholder model.  
One of the main future challenges is whether and how political power in China 
will be decentralized from the central and to the local level of government, and the 
level of economic autonomy that will be achieved between government and 
enterprises. Further, the realization of the rule of law in China may be challenged by 
its tardiness in reaching political maturity. The ―peculiar entrenchment‖ of the CPC in 
the political system makes it impossible to apply the law to ―all segments of the 
society,‖ and the law is used as a ―tool‖ by some CPC members to manipulate for the 
purpose of corruption. 
The other challenge is choosing the empirical tools to apply and the means of 
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 Estimating the effects of the structure, inter-relationships, and 
functions of governance requires a systematic quantity and quality analysis of data 
from public listed companies. More importantly, the data must be accessible and 
accurate, which signifies that company operations and judicial decisions must be open 
and transparent for reference. 
    ―Globalization brings not only the material forces, but also life chances of 
individuals and communities.‖ 1047  Such gains are ensured by advancements in 
democracy and the rule of law that prevent weak group from falling into the mire of 
corruption and dictatorship. ―Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity 
everywhere.‖1048 Although a complicated and long-term process, law reform in 
China no longer involves the direct copying and translation of legal terms, but the 
adaptive selection of legal concepts that suit local circumstances.
1049
 Law reform 
must be placed within the framework of the specific historical, cultural, and social 
circumstances in China. Looking ahead, corporate governance systems are being 
adjusted by enterprises themselves under the administration of governments. The 
elements of corporate governance that are regulated by statutes or recommended in 
best practices in a jurisdiction are likely to be transferred to other jurisdictions, but 
not without adaption and localization. 
Rather than the state-controlled model, this thesis proposes that corporate 
governance in state-held listed companies would work better under a law-controlled 
model, which is based on the progressive pursuit of the rule of law. How the 
ownership structure and board structure are to be made effective and efficient to 
                                                        
1046
 Supra Note 989, at 8. 
1047
 David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999) at 1. 
1048
 Ben Ruth, ―Social Security in the Year 2000: Potentialities and Problems‖ (1995) 
16 Comp. Lab. L.J. 139 at 140. 
1049
 Supra Note 877, at 827. 
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promote corporate governance will be decided by trial and error during the political 
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1992 
 
Interim Provisions on the Management of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks, issued by the 
State Council, with effect from April, 1993 
 
Reply Regarding The Burden Of Liability Of The Revocation Or Going Out Of Business 
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Measures for the Inspection of the Listed Companies, issued by CSRC, with effect from 
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effect from October, 2001 
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Provisional Regulation Regarding Reduction of State-owned Shareholding for Raising 
Social Insurance Fund, issued by the State Council, with effect from June 2001 
 
Notice of Non-acceptance of Civil Compensation Claim in the Securities Case, issued by 
Supreme People‘s Court, with effect from September 2001 
 
Code of Corporate Governance of Public listed Company, issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission and State Economic and Trade Commission (in 2003 it was 
changed to the Ministry of Commerce) of the State Council, with effect from January 
2002 
 
Notice on the Issuing Guidance on Risk-based Loan Classification, issued by the People‘s 
Bank of China, with effect from January 2002 
 
Guidelines of Corporate governance of Commercial Bank, issued by the People‘s Bank of 
China, with effect from June 2002 
 
Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned Assets of the 
Enterprises, issued by the State Council, with effect from May 2003 
 
Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on the Relevant Work of Further 
Regulation of Initial Public Offering, issued by CSRC, with effect from October 2003 
 
Some Provisions on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in 
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